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1SOO1ARY
There is a strong theme in contemporarJ marxism which argues
that the monopoly stage of capitalism requires a different
analysis from that provided by Marx, who is seen as essentially
examining a competitive stage. Such a view leads to a
questioning of the law of value as a law of regulation of
capitalism, operating through the forml .ation of an average profit
rate. It is important to ask how far modern marxists have been
able to return to, develop and make use of Marx's analytical
categories and this is something that to date has not been
comprehensively done. Using a history of thought approach is
an obvious method for achieving this. My prime concern will be
to spell out the changing forms that competition takes with the
development of capitalism from the competitive to the monopoly
stage. Structural changes brought about by the accumulation
process (the growth of large-scale enterprise and of finance
capital) are paralleled by changing competitive strategies, which
can in turn be linked with developments in the law of surplus
value as the regulatory process for 'many capitals'.
Chapter 1 clears the ground with an assessment of methodology
in Marx, followed by a consideration of the contribution that the
marxist paradigm has to make to a study of competition and
monopoly. It then lays the foundations for later chapters by
examining two cornerstones of Marx's methodology, his periodisation
of history and his theory of value. Both are of crucial concern
to the changing nature of competition in relation to the monopoly
stage of capitalism and to the operation of the law of value.
The second chapter provides an interpretation of the role of
competition in Marx's economic writings. This means, in the first
place, bringing together what Marx had to say about competition,
for his analysis of competition is scattered throughout 'nas Kapital'
(in particular Volume III) as well as certain comments made in the
Grundrisse and elsewhere. Although Marx never dealt with
2competition between 'many capitals' in a comprehensive fashion,
it seems probable that he intended to do so, since there are
references to such an intention at many points in his economic
writings. Such a task means that I emphasize the laws for 'many
capitals' in competition as derivative from those for 'capital in
general' in the process of showing the connection between
competition and the law of value. The ambivalent and contra-
dictory nature of competition are important themes for Marx in
his analysis of competition operating at two levels to establish
an average rate of profit (competition within sectors and between
sectors).
Chapter 3 considers the transitional elements in Marx's
thoughts: elements which examine the interface between competition
and monopoly. Firstly there are his brief but graphic references
to the possibilities for the growth of large scale enterprise.
Then there is his consideration of the 'fractions' of capital
(banking, industrial and commercial) and the growth of the credit
system. Finally, no writers that I am aware of make reference to
Marx's analysis of extra surplus profits arising at the level of
competition between sectors. To what extent does Marx provide any
basis here for analysing the monopoly stage of capitalism?
The next chapter considers the changing nature of competition
as seen by the marxist theorists of imperialism. In what ways do
these writers see the regulatory processes of capitalism changing
with the development of the monopoly stage? As the nature of
competition changes and new forms develop are there corresponding
changes in the mode of operation of the law of surplus value?
The chapter argues for a certain disjuncture between Marx and Lenin,
but identifies Hilferding as providing the basis for a possible
synthesis between Marx and the imperialists.
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the modern debate within marxism on
the role of competition. The former sets the scene by providing
an overview of the themes in the current literature and then looking
in more detail at the contemporary debate on some long standing
themes: periodisation, competition and the role of the market and
prices. I argue that contemporary marxism shows a richness and
diversity of approach to the theme of competition and its
implications which is not very easy to follow. Chapter 6 pin-
points some relatively new approaches to the debate, looking at
corporate organization and the growth of monopoly capital, at
finance capital, at the role of profits and also of the state.
Both chapters are concerned to ask how far modern marxists have
been able to return to and develop Marx's analytical ideas on
competition and the regulation of capitalism through the law of
surplus value. It is particularly in Chapter 6 that I develop my
own ideas that the strength of the marxist paradigm in a study of
competition and monopoly lies in the institutional and develop-
mental elements that it can contribute to the tendency to form an
average profit rate. Marxist theory has, therefore, an important
contribution to make in its ability to link the changing nature of
the adjustment mechanism with the dynamic aspects of capitalism.
The changing forms taken by the law of surplus value in other words
link in with what Marx called the 'laws of motion' of capitalism,
the way in which accumulation has influenced the development of
capitalism. Changes in the nature of competition indicate changing
forms taken by the law of surplus value, which in turn is expressed
through the distribution of surplus value within the capitalist
class.
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4INTRODUCTION
A. Why this topic?
My essential concern is with competition and its relation to
monopoly as an aspect of the history of economic thought within
the marxist tradition. This is a topic about which much has
been written in the orthodox tradition, but I am not aware that
this has been done in any comprehensive way for marxism. My aim
is to clarify the contribution of a specifically marxist approach
to the examination of this area of study. The history of thought
has shown the marxian paradigm as being distinct from orthodox
developments in the discipline of economics and I would hope in the
course of this thesis to pinpoint aspects of the marxist tradition
which have a genuine contribution to make to the theory of
competition and monopoly, as well as its inadequacies in this
respect. Such a task should also be useful in providing some
basis for a theoretical outline or framework which could be used
for the further development within marxist political economy of a
theory of competition and monopoly of relevance for the capitalism
of the end of the twentieth century.
For from the beginning of this century it has been common for
critics of Marx to point out that in "Das Kapital" a competitive
system had been analysed. Thus Louis Boudin, a distinguished
American critic of Marx writing in 1906 was emphatic on this point.
"The Marxian analysis of the capitalist system and his deductions
as to the laws of its development proceed upon the assumption of
the absolute reign of the principle of competition."(1) More
recently, P.A. Baran and P.M. Sweezy tell us that "we must recognise
that competition, which was the predominant form of market relations
in nineteenth century Britain, has ceased to occupy that position,
not only in Britain but everYWhere in the capitalist world."(2)
They consider that the marxian analysis of capitalism still
ultimately rests on the assumption of a competitive economy.
5Amongst modern marxist authors calling for a reappraisal of
marxist political economy on the grounds that competitive analysis
is insufficient are Sweezy and Poulantzas. Paul Sweezy in an
essay on the "Theory of Monopoly Capitalismll , written in 1971, asks
for a significant contribution to be made to the theory of monopoly
capitalism in the belief that traditional marxists (With the
exception of Lenin and Hilferding) have failed in this respect.
"They [the traditional marxistsJ have their economic theory from
'Capital' which they consider equally applicable to the capitalism
of today as it was to the capitalism of the mid-nineteenth century •••
On another level, the traditionalists of course embrace Lenin's
theory of imperialism with its emphasis on monopoly and state action,
but there is no effort to integrate this with the economics Marx
expounded in the three volumes of Capital. And when it comes to
the features which most strikingly differentiate the capitalism of
Marx's day from that of our own, the traditionalists usually do not
get much beyond commonplace description."(3) Poulantzas, in a book
in which he analyses the class structure of contemporary capitalism
specifically calls for further analysis of developed capitalism,
arguing that the effects of imperialism on underdeveloped capitalism
have received more attention.(4) This work will be related to
developed rather than underdeveloped capitalist formations.
This study then, is a response to the call for a contribution
to the theory of the monopoly stage of capitalism, and is an attempt
to provide a groundwork from the history of marxist ideas. There
are of course many possible aspects of the theory of the monopoly
stage which could be chosen: the role of the state, class structure,
internationalisation of capital, capital accumulation or under-
development. I have chosen to deal with one aspect of theory:
the relationship between changes in the nature of competition and
monopoly and its implications for the labour theory of value. What
is the significance of this area of theory? In the first place many
marxist and neo-marxist authors have seen in the development of the
monopoly stage of capitalism the possibility that the law of value
is no longer relevant. They have further been lead to question the
theoretical validity of the labour theory of value. Now, as I shall
6show when I deal with these criticisms in detail, there is often a
considerable vagueness and imprecision in these claims. Indeed,
many marxist authors restrict themselves to an almost rhetorical
assertion that the monopoly stage of capitalism is likely to
contradict the law of value. The arguments of each author taken
alone could be considered as not worthy of reply. I feel, however,
that enough Marxist authors make this kind of assertion to
necessitate a more systematic investigation of the relationship
between the changing nature of competition and value theory. There
are in fact few marxist political economists who do not consider
this as a problem.(S) A crucial question in my examination of
marxist ideas of competition and monopoly is to ask what status the
labour theory of value has under the monopoly phase of capitalism.
Secondly, it is surely important to show how the laws which
Marx deduced for the competitive stage of capitalism apply to a
later stage. The mechanical transfer of such laws to new circum-
stances is unjustified. Preobrazhensky raised this point clearly
in 1926, when in a section of "The New Economics" entitled 'The Law
of Value and Monopoly Capitalism' he says that it is not sufficient
to assert that the prerequisite for the law of value to be able to
operate is the existence of a system of commodity production.
"Commodity production takes place in the very divergent conditions
of a society of independent producers working for the market; early
capitalism with survivals of craft regulation of production, and
interference of the feudal state in the production process;
classical capitalism in the period of free competition; monopoly
capitalism and the state capitalism of war time economies. ":But,"
asks Preobrazhensky, "Would anyone undertake to affirm that under
all these four types of commodity production the law of value was
able to operate in the same way and to display all of its most
characteristic features?".(6) Meek too would support this attitude:
in a section of his "Studies in the Labour Theory of Value" in which
he spells out a conceptual framework within which he suggests that
research into the operation of the law of value in different histori-
cal systems might proceed, emphasises that "Marx's theory of value
cannot be mechanically extended to the new historical circumstances.
7Marx's theory was developed in the context of a given stage in the
development of capitalism and a given set of problems and the
essence of what he said has to be disentangled from this contextrt . (7)
A third consideration, although one which is of less relevance
to an academic thesis, is the implications for political strategy of
any additions to, or modifications of, marxist political economy
which might arise from consideration of the changing nature of
competition and monopoly. Whilst my emphasis throughout this study
is on capitalist competition, this may also lead to insights into
the possibilities for political change on a society-wide basis. One
of the central features of the marxist methodology is its 'theory of
liberation', and I would hope that this thesis is not irrelevant to
the process of political and social change.
A concern with competition and monopoly is inevitably a concern
with what Rosdolsky calls the relationship between 'many capitals'.
As will be shown in the second chapter, an understanding of the
nature of 'capital in general' is an essential prerequisite for
grasping the relationship between 'many capitals'. Nevertheless
the primary focus of this thesis is on capitalist competition, rather
than on class struggle. The relationship between 'many capitals'
in turn involves an understanding of what Aglietta calls the
'regulatory processes' of capitalism, themselves expressed in their
connection with the law of value. Changes in the forms of competition,
changes from competition to monopoly, will change the capitalist
regulatory process and will further lead to changes in the forms of
value. As Aglietta puts it "The forms of competition are histori-
cally modified to the extent that the expanded reproduction of capital
in general imposes its demands on social relations as a whole".(S)
Much of this thesis will be concerned with these changing forms,
including their reflection in changes in the institutional structure
of capitalism.
Ben Fine and J.M. Chevalier are both writers who point to ways
in which a marxist approach to competition and monopoly may prove
useful. For Fine "the circuit of capital is an excellent framework
8in which to examine all aspects of monopoly, defined as a barrier
to capital in general ••• Entry to the circuit at all is always a
barrier to the proletariat; a monopoly of finance capital extends
this barrier to industrial capitalists".(9) In the conclusion to
his study of the financial structure of American industry, Chevalier
sees his own study as a firstStep towards a better understanding of
the relation between the financial structure and the behaviour of
firms, which could usefully be extended. ''Notre etude est une
premiere etape vers une meilleure connaissance des relations qui
existent entre la structure financiere et Ie comportement des
firmes; elle ponrrait etre completee utilement par une analyse
theorique des transformations structurelles du capitalism monopolite
qui devrai t avoir des implications importantes, notamment en ce qui
concerne les mecanismes de formation des prix et d'accumulation du
capital".(10) I propose to consider the marxist contribution to the
theory of competition and monopoly through an examination of the
history of economic thought.
:B. The history of economic thought apuroach
Taking a history of thought approach to a problem is of course
strongly rooted in marxist methodology. A critique of existing
theories is part of Marx's dialectical analysis, as will be shown in
the opening section of the next chapter which examines methodology.
Thus Marx took a detailed critique of his predecessors as a basis for
developing his own conceptions, particularly in "Theories of Surplus
Value", although also in his other works on political economy.
My avowed intention then is to use the method of the history of
economic thought. What does this involve and what are the merits of
the method as such? Not surprisingly, there are differences of
opinion over the answers to these questions. A crucial controversy
is that of the role of ideology in the history of thought. "Is the
history of economics a history of ideologies?" asks Schumpeter.(11)
If the answer is in the affirmative, then this whole approach could be
9dismissed, and it is for this reason that I want to focus in this
section on ideology and the histo~J of economic thought. Such a
focus will do much to clarify what the method involves, and its
merits. Next, is there a specifically marxist history of thought
and if so what does it consist of? Finally, how does the method
of the history of economic thought inform and illuminate my sUbject
matter? Why is it appropriate?
It was Freud who first exposed people's propensity for
rationalisation, whilst Marx was important in showing how our ideas
spring from ideology. The seeds sown by these two thinkers have
had lasting intellectual effects, and it is now a commonplace to ask
"why do I believe what I believe?" It seems to me that four ways
of treating the role of ideology can be identified.
In the first, ideology is contrasted with the scientific core
of the subject. Positive economics is seen as economic theory
cleansed of value judgements. Normative economics deals in contrast
with policy, where value judgements enter in.(12) It is worth
noting in criticism. here, however, that values are not individual,
but are determined by society. An obvious example is changing
attitudes to women. In addition many so-called facts are not free
of values. But to return to the main point: economics has a
scientific core. What is 'scientific' about it? One modern view
would argue that economics uses the 'scientific method'. According
to Karl Popper certain assumptions are made, and then statistically
testable hypotheses are formulated, as for example in astronomy.(13)
Values in such a view only play a part in choosing the area of
investigation. This means therefore that economists can choose to
ignore the important issues of the day and for example, it is often
asked why it took so long for a theory of effective demand for
unemployment to be developed. Similarly (as I point out later),
marxist theory turned its attention to the development of monopoly
elements wit~~n capitalism from the 1870's onwards far more promptly
than did the orthodox neoclassical school of thought.
An alternative view of science is that of Kuhn, where science
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consists of solving the puzzles generated by a paradigm or 'world
view'.(14) Examples would be Newton's three laws before Einstein
or Marshallian supply and demand. Thus research programmes will be
based on for example, the classical or the neo-elassical paradigm.
A build up of unsolved puzzles leads to the introduction of a new
paradigm, a scientific revolution. Notice that in the view of
positive economics this latter is what a science consists of. Kuhn
in contrast, argues that outside of the occasional scientific
revolution, empirical work doesn't test the hypothesis, but matters
of detail only. Be that as it may, the Kuhnian view leaves no role
for ideology. Let me interject that, as already stated, my study is
made within the marxist paradigm. How adequate is that paradigm to
the puzzles posed by late twentieth century capitalism? Is a
'scientific revolution' necessary in the light of the autonomous
changes in the problem situation with regard to competition and
monopoly since Marx was writing? Put more concretely, is the develop-
ment of the monopoly phase of capitalism adequately characterized by
Marx's concepts, or is there a need for conceptual innovation? Such
questions are at the heart of this thesis, and whilst a thesis is
scarcely the place for categorical answers to matters of such moment,
some general directions for a response will be indicated.
Secondly, there is the Schumpeterian view of ideology. As
indicated in the title of his monumental work, Schumpeter insisted on
distinguishing' economic analysis' from' economic thought'. He
looked for progress in 'analysis' between Smith and J.S. Mill and saw
Walras' schema as a supreme achievement. Yet Schumpeter pointed
out that "the historical or 'evolution~~' nature of the economic
process unquestionably limits the scope of general relations between
L the economic laws] that economists may be able to formulate"( 15)
saying that Marx and Engels recognised the fact that people's ideas
tend to glory the interests and acts of the ascendant classes. For
Schumpeter there is a pre-analytic cognitive act, which he names
'vision' (a coloured perspective), so that ideology enters into
economics on the ground floor. However, Schumpeter then defines
'economic analysis' as independent and objective: a core of formal
techniques. In this respect he could not admire Joan Robinson
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enough: economic theory as a box of tools is an "insurpassably
felicitous phrase".(16)
This brings me on to the 'box of tools' view where economics
is seen as purely instrumental. It is a set of techniques capable
of application. Undoubtedly, the growth of mathematical economics
has encouraged such a distinction. But, although a mathematical
model can be examined in its purely formal aspects, the very way in
which it is drawn up is relevant to the statement it makes about
reality. In other words, increasing formalisation is not identical
with neutralisation, as Dobb points out.(17) He shows that policy
ends cannot be dismissed from economics, for economics is an applied
science. When we look at the history of economic thought, we find
that theory is closely linked with advocating policy, and this is no
less true within the marxist paradigm than within the orthodox one.
Thus, for example, the theory of state monopoly capitalism is linked
with the economic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union from the
1930's onwards. An alternative way of expressing this is to say
that thinking is shaped by the problems thrown up from a particular
social context. As already suggested, analysis of a monopoly stage
of capitalism is unlikely to pre-date the historical development of
such a stage within capitalism, any more than a general equilibrium
model is likely until the growth of market relations and economic
mobility reached the level that they did in the mid-nineteenth
century. Meek pinpoints this relation aptly when he says, "as so
often happens in the history of thought, the emergence of a new
theoretical problem was accompanied by the emergence of a new set
of principles and concepts capable of solving it."(18)
Let me draw together the points that have been made so far on
the method of the history of economic thought. Firstly, one cannot
simply examine theories in terms of their logical structure: I
would concur with Schumpeter that 'vision' enters on the ground
floor, but disagree that it is then possible to separate off
'economic analysis' as such. Doctrines need to be assessed in terms
of the problems they were supposed to illuminate. The competitive
capitalism of Marx's day has undergone historical development since
12
he was writing, and it is necessary both to appreciate the original
circumstances in which Marx wrote, and the changes that have since
taken place. On the other hand the Kuhnian paradigm approach
suggests that it is also important to assess theories in terms of
the ideas of the times, placing them, as it were, in the context
of the central thrust of the paradigm.
The final view of ideology is the marxist one, that ideology
reflects the mode of production underlying the economy. In other
words, economic ideas are not born in a vacuum, but often arise
directly out of social conflicts and class struggle. As expressed
rather starkly by Rubin, economists forge '1the ideological weapons
for defending the interests of particular social groupsll.(19) The
marxist would see all learning as arising from practice, and given
the practical application of the social sciences, they have a class
character. It is important to realise however, that it is not only
'bourgeois' economics that possesses this class nature, but
'proletarian' economics too. E~~arin's aptly named "Economic Theory
of the Leisure Class" provides a critique of the .t;ormer, in its
analysis of the Austrian School, which however runs the danger of a
rather mechanical interpretation of class interest. Thus Eukharin
characterises this school as a consistent carrying out of the point
of view of consumption, based on the social consciousness of the
rentier, who he argues has become important at this date. To summa"'!'
rise the school as "the scientific implement of the international
bourgeoisie of rentiers, regardless of their domicile"(20) is surely
too sweeping. Nevertheless the i1<ological implications of the
concept of, for example, 'consumer sovereignty' for capitalism can be
readily appreciated. Or, as Joan Robinson puts it, economic termi-
nology is coloured, so that '1bigger is close to better; equal to
equitable; goods sound good; exploitation wicked; and abnormal
profits, rather sOO. II(21).
Ideology then, (and Dobb sees it this way) refers to the
historically relative character of ideas, implying a philosophical
standpoint. Such a relativity will be present in marxist political
economy itself, seeing as it does, the proletariat as the most
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advanced class. Marxists however would reject the fact/value
(or positive/normative) dichotomy. There are always practical
implications involved in an economic theory so that facts will be
perceived through theories. It would nevertheless be possible to
marry a marxist and a Kuhnian approach, where for example, one could
argue that Keynesianism was not simply a Kuhnian scientific revo-
lution or paradigm change, but also a (limited) resolution for
capital of the contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of
production.
Such a view of ideology does not entail a rejection of
theoretical meaning, it is important to realise. There are both
historical conditions out of which economic doctrines arise and .
develop, as well as theoretical meanings (although one must in the
latter case be aware of the inherited framework of thought or
Khunian paradigm). Intellectual and pedagogical value is found in
pUrsuing the history of economic ideas. As Rubin points out: "we
do not analyse the doctrines of Smith simply to gaze at a vivid
page from the history of social ideology, but because it permits us
to gain "a deeper understanding of theoretical problems."(22)
Whilst not contradicting a Kuhnian view of science, the marxist
analysis of ideology does entail rejection of the 'positive' view,
but it is not marxists alone who see problems with this latter.
Gunnar Myrdal is no marxist, yet he expresses himself trenchantly
on the issue: "Implicit belief in the existence of a body of
scientific knowledge acquired independently of all valuations is,
as I now see it, naive empiricism. Facts do not organise them-
selves into concepts just by being looked at; indeed, except with-
in the framework of concepts and theories, there are no scientific
facts but only chaos."(23)
A detailed criticism of the positivist approach to economics
can be found in Hollis and Nell's "Rational Economic Man", whilst
in the next chapter I contrast orthodox and marxist approaches to
the study of competition and monopoly. It may however be useful
at this juncture to point to the general characteristics of a
positivist approach, and to the problems this gives rise to. A
14
logical positivist distinguishes two kinds of statements: analytic
statements are statements of language which cannot be denied
without contradiction, whilst synthetic statements are matters of
fact, so that there are possible circumstances in which they may
be false. For the positivist, all statements fall in to these
two categories. In addition, the test of any theory lies in the
success of its predictions. There is, however, a problem in the
relation between theory and facts in an empirical science. From
their definitions, synthetic statements, being refutable, cannot be
known a priori, but analytic statements have no factual content.
The problem with testing theories is that one has no means of
knowing whether the theory should be rejected, or the facts re-
interpreted. There are indeed extensive disputes in economic
theory, which testing has been unable to settle. How can the
predictions of economists be tested, when economic effects do not
have exclusively economic causes? Economists attempt to escape
this catch-22 situation by 'ceteris paribus' clauses, but they are
then caught in circular arguments. As Hollis and Nell put it with
regard to one of the examples they consider: "The whole idea of
testing the marginal analysis is absurd Negative results only
show that the market is defective."(24)
As I have already pointed out, taking a history of thought
perspective is an important element in Marx's methodology. Thus
it is through a minute study of the theories of Rodbertus, Smith,
Ricardo and others that Marx initially develops his own theories of
surplus value in Volume IV of "Capital". For instance Marx shows
that Ricardo sees only differential rents and so fails to credit
the ownership of land with any economic effect. Yet Marx sees the
Ricardian mode of investigation as a necessary stage in the develop-
ment of political economy. Smith, it is true, first grasps the
problem of value in its inner relationships and then in its reverse
form, as it appears in competition, but in Smith's work these are in
contradiction without his even knowing it according to Marx.
Ricardo consciously abstracts from the form of competition to com-
prehend the laws as such. In Marx's own flamboyant language:
"But at last Ricardo steps in and calls to science: 'Halt: The
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basis, the starting point for the physiology of the bourgeois
system is the determination of value by labour-time,n.(25)
But although Ricardo gets "science out of its rut", Marx develops
his own theory of surplus value from his critique of Ricardo.
For 1'1arx, Ricardo on the one hand does not abstract enough whilst
on the other he regards the phenomenal form as immediate and direct
proof of general laws. I shall have more to say on Marx's method
in the next chapter. Meanwhile, it is perhaps surprising in view
of the implicit importance of the historical dimension in the
marxist paradigm that there have not been more marxist historians
of economic thought. Rubin and Bukharin have already been
mentioned, and in Britain, Meek and Dobb are names that immediately
spring to mind. Whilst I follow Marx in taking a history of
thought approach, I shall not be examining the roots of marxist
approaches to competition and monopoly in Marx's predecessors.
For reasons of space I shall restrict myself to a consideration of
what Marx and his marxist followers have to say on the subject.
What then is specific to a marxist history of thought? One
would expect the links between the development of thought with
economic development and its concommitant class struggles to be made.
Rubin does indeed attempt this in his textbook, and each section
whether on the ideas of the mercantalists or of Smith or Ricardo is
prefaced by an historical chapter. This is also helpful because
the exigencies of economic policy can influence economic theory.
Yet other marxist historians of thought have not lived up to Rubin's
ideals, and it is noticeable that Marx himself did not deal with
economic development or the historical class struggle in his
"Theories of Surplus Value". There are several possible reasons
for such omissions. One obvious one is the sheer enormity of the
task: if a history of twentieth century economic thought also
requires a background history of the period, this does indeed demand
much of the potential historian of ideas. A second important
reason arises from what I have already said about ideology. Whilst
it is true that the social and economic context influences the
development of theory, there is also a theoretical meaning which
may stand alone. Economic theories do not always fulfil the
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direct interests of a particular social class. What, say, are the
'interests' of finance capital in the 1980's in Britain? If we
could be clear on what these interests are, is 'finance capital'
itself clear? To what extent, one might then ask, do the policies
of the Thatcher government fulfil these interests? Finally, how
far are Thatcher policies in line with monetarist theories? Many
a slip twixt cup and lip is possible in the thread linking
theories, policies and class interests. Such difficulties in a
marxist history of thought go some way to explaining why there have
been few such historians, and that there has been a tendency to
concentrate on the development of ideas, with the historical back-
ground often merely implicit.
How, finally, does the methodology of marxist history of thought
inform and illuminate my subject matter as outlined in the first
section of this chapter? My first aim is to tease out the strands
of thought within the marxist tradition on competition and monopoly:
where do these strands contradict each other, and where is there
continuity? I shall for instance argue that there is continuity
between Marx and Lenin in the descriptive analysis of the develop-
ment of large scale enterprise, but that Lenin does not make any
use of Marx's analysis in terms of the average rate of profit.
This exercise will, I hope, help to clarify the current state of
marxist discussion on competition and monopoly, where, as I shall
argue in Chapter 5, there is a confusing diversity of approach.
Secondly I want to ask whether the changes in the nature of
capitalism that have taken place since 11arx was writing necessitate
conceptual innovation within the marxist paradigm. Are we now
experiencing a new stage of capitalism - a monopoly stage, rather
than the competitive stage that Marx was writing about? This is
the point at which an historical background to the development of
,
ideas is needed. I will not pretend to be able to tackle such a
vast subject as twentieth century capitalist development, and will
restrict myself to sketching an outline of views of what the concept
of a stage of capitalism involves. This historical background will
thus fall short of Rubin's more comprehensive efforts. My central
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concern on the thought side is to ask how far marxists' concepts
have changed in response to changes in the problem situation and
then to ask how far they need to have changed. Have changes in
the nature of competition and monopoly justified a change in the
concepts and if they have, does ttus entail a revision of the
labour theory of value, central as this is to the marxist paradigm?
Does the law of value remain a fruitful concept?
There is, finally, a negative reason for using a history of
thought approach to my subject. The dearth of empirical studies
using marxist categories makes it difficult to take an empirical
approach to competition and monopoly in its relation to the
labour theory of value.
c. Parameters of the work
The comprehensive coverage of marxist methodology inevitably
makes it difficult to define the limits for any study done within
the paradigm. This is also the case for looking at competition.
The parameters of my work can be more readily understood by
defining the level at which my investigation of competition is
taking place. Both Uno and Fine and Harris propose methods of
distinguishing levels of investigation which are helpful here.
Kozo Uno identifies three levels of investigation in his
"Principles of Political Economy". The study of political economy
can, he argues, be structured as follows: firstly, there is the
pure theory of capitalism which presupposes an abstract context
and deals with basic concepts; secondly, the process of capitalist
development in which the economic phenomena representing the abstract
principles of capital appear in concrete and stage-characteristic
forms, while the third and ultimate aim is an analysis of the actual
state of capitalism.(26) My study of competition and monopoly is
at the second level.
Let me expand a little on what this implies without straying hoo
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far into the issue of Marx's methodology, which is the subject of
the next chapter. In his critique of political economy Marx was
concerned with the theory of capitalism as a specific mode of
production, and put forward what he saw as the laws of such a mode.
This is at the level of Uno's 'pure theory of capitalism'. There
is then the mode of realisation of those laws, and it is at this
level that the transformation from free competition to monopoly is
located. What is involved in this historical transformation will
be discussed in the context of periodising capitalism. What is the
monopoly stage? I shall argue that the capitalist mode of
production itself is not at issue here. Twentieth century capita-
lism is still characterised by the prevalence of the capital
relation, entailing a specific mechanism for exploitation.
Competition, however, is the mechanism which sets the internal
laws of capital into motion. What effect have historical changes
in the nature of competition had on the concrete form of those laws?
Whilst it may be important to demonstrate that capitalism is still
capitalism, it is also important to ask what kind of capitalism it
is. As Pekka Kosonen argues, theories of new stages in the
development of capitalism have their own historical preconditions,
and cannot be deduced by 'pure logic' from Capital.(27). At the
heart of my concern is the extent to which the laws of twentieth
century capitalism can be analysed using the categories from "Das
Kapital", based as it is on the operation of nineteenth century
capitalism. I will be examining the way in which the economic
phenomena representing the abstract principles of capital (the law
of surplus value) and the relations between many capitals appear in
stage characteristic form through the operation of competition and
monopoly.
Like many other marxists, Fine and Harris make a distinction
between the capitalist mode of production and a particular social
formation. (28) This distinction is one that will be further
developed in the next chapter in dealing with periodisation. For
present purposes it is sufficient to be aware that the former concept
is far more abstract, whilst the society in which we actually live
is a social formation. Fine and Harris use this distinction to
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classify work on the state depending on the levels of abstraction
used (29), and a parallel classification can be used for the study
of competition and monopoly. Thus the study of a social formation
is at Uno's third level of investigation. This level I will not
be dealing with.
Now Marx does in fact see competition acting at this third
level of analysis when he deals briefly in Chapter 10 of Volume III
with the specifics of the movement of market prices. This level
of operation of competition has, I would argue, been the predominant
level at which orthodox analyses of competition and monopoly have
been carried out. (See Chapter 1 section B and Appendix A.) At
the level of analysis of market prices it seems to me that the
Marxist paradigm has no unique contribution to make. Marx in fact
spends substantially more time presenting competition at a general
level, as a realisation of the abstract laws of 'capital in general'
at the level of the relation between 'many capitals'. This will
be my concern too; for which a history of ideas approach seems
particularly appropriate. Were I dealing with Uno's third level
of analysis, that of a specific social formation, empirical
material would be of more relevance.
What of the overall context within which competition takes
place? This is represented diagramatically in Diagram I.1.
Competition within the capitalist class is the focus of my attention:
in Marx's terms, the relationship between 'many capitals'. The
capitalist class can however also be divided into fractions:
banking, industrial and commercial capital and in the twentieth
century is has further often been separated into types: monopoly
and non-monopoly. But competition among capitalists both affects
and is affected by the institutional forms taken by accumulation
(whether non-monopoly, monopoly, finance or international capital).
The credit system provides a link here. Accumulation and compe-
tition cannot readily be separated and both form a central feature
of this study. However state policies, class struggle and crisis
are also linked to competition within the capitalist class. These
are obviously each huge areas for study and controversy in themselves.
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The diagram contrasts the market mechanism with state
intervention, and since these two obviously impose different modes
of relating between capitals it seems important to devote some
attention to the role of the state in competition. My coverage
of the theory of th~ state however is strictly limited to what
is of relevance.to capitalist competition. Crisis and class
struggle in contrast are not considered separately, although
occasional reference is made to the issues raised by each of
these. The study of the changing form of the wage relation as a
mode of regulation of capitalism is in fact a whole area of study
arising out of the labour process debate.
More contentious is the fact that I have not dealt with the
international aspects of competition. Many marxists consider
that a study of competition must inevitably include a consideration
of its internationalisation. Indeed I would myself argue that a
specific contribution of the marxist paradigm to a study of
competition and monopoly is in terms of its international dimension.
My main reason for excluding this dimension relates to the level
at which I am conducting my study, for a consideration of inter-
nationalisation would entail taking particular national social
formations into account. Internationalisation is of course a huge
area of controversy. Should internationalisation be seen in terms
of United States hegemony or in terms of its decline? Whilst it
is true that the debate has certain theoretical underpinnings,
much of it must inevitably be conducted at the level of empirical
evidence. A further problem is that the internationalisation of
competition cannot simply be considered in terms of the relations
between the advanced nations, but must also examine the inter-
relations between these and the Third World. It then becomes
impossible to ignore the articulation between the capitalist and
other modes of production. In descending from the abstract to the
concrete I therefore follow Marx in abstracting from the national
state. Internationalisation of competition needs either to be
considered at the level of the interrelations between concrete social
formations or at the theoretical level of world capitalism as a whole.
Neither of these approaches fits in with the level at which I am
conducting my analysis.
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Chapter 1
THE MARXIST PARADIGM L~ RELATION TO COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY
A. Methodology in Marx
It is well known that Marx wished to develop a proletarian
philosophy as exemplified in that familiar phrase, "Philosophers
have only interpreted the world ••• the point is to change it."
He saw his methodology for achieving this committed philosophy as
that of dialectical or historical materialism. An orthodox
exposition would see three elements here. The first is the
dialectic (drawn from Hegel) which provides a theory of development
where the union of opposites leads to change, so that nothing is
eternal or unchanging. Materialism is the second elemeh~; It
was the influence of Fuerbach that lead Marx to declare that Hegel
(an idealist philosopher who saw the essence of reality as spiritual)
must be inverted. Thus it was that Marx saw class struggle as a
dialectical opposition between bourgeoisie and proletariat, providing
a basis for his proletarian philosophy. The third element is the
historical component. Historical materialism combines the dialectic
and materialism, and sees history as made by people, not destiny or
the hand of god. Historically, different modes of production
succeed each other, each containing such class contradictions as to
sow the seeds of its own destruction. Marx's predominant concern
was to analyse the historical laws of the specifically capitalist
mode of production.
Such a brief resume of the orthodox view of Marx's methodology
runs much danger of caricature. In recent years a lot of det?iled
work has been done on the subject of methodology in Marx, which has
involved arguments of considerable subtlety and sophistication.
This section will emphatically not provide a detailed critique of
these developments and will rather be restricted to some comments
on what has been seen as significant in Marx's methodology, aimed
particularly at putting my ensuing expos.tt.ion in perspective.
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(My consideration of periodisation and of the labour theory of
value both arise directly from Marx's methodology.)
A recurring theme in Marx is his concern that 'appearance'
belies 'reality' so that political economy is a science explaining
'reality' rather than mere 'appearance'. Commentators have seen
this distinction between appearance and essence as a crucial one
in Marx's methodology, though alternative terms have been used in
the attempt to clarify their significance. For instance Sayer
refers to 'phenomenal forms' and 'essential relations', while
Zeleny uses the term 'substantial relations' to refer to essence.
Marx, then, saw his method as penetrating beyond the "surface
of phenomena", enabling us to free ourselves of "vulgar thinkingl ' ,
as Bukharin puts it.(1) Time and again he emphasises that the
appearance of phenomena belies their reality, so that for example
with respect to the wages form of the value of labour power Marx
has this to say: "This phenomenal form, which makes the actual
relation invisible, and indeed shows the direct opposite of that
relation, forms the basis of all the juridical notions of both
labourer and capitalist and, of all the mystifications of the
capitalistic mode of production, of all its illusions as to liberty,
of all the apologetic shifts of the vulgar economists".(2) This
is also the case, as I shall be concerned to argue during the course
of this thesis, for the nature of competition, the main object of
investigation here. "Everything appears upside down in competition.
The existing conformation of economic conditions as seen in reality
on the surface of things ••• are not only different from the
internal and disguised essence of these conditions, and from the
conceptions corresponding to their essence, but actually opposed to
them or their reverse."(3) The fact that competition seems to
contradict the determination of value by labour time is an important
contradiction between appearance and reality which I shall be
dealing with. For Marx then, the capitalist mode of production is
frequently opaque, and a substantial part of his method involves
laying bare the reality.
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What then is the nature of this distinction between 'appearance'
and 'reality'? In the "Logic of Capital", Zeleny contrasts the
thought of Ricardo and Marx, arguing that they have a similar
approach to relations at the level of appearances, but that Marx
paid far more attention to I substantial relations'. Essence
for Ricardo is something qualitatively fixed, but for Marx it is
historically transitory, having phases of development. "As
opposed to Ricardo, Marx perceives the elasticity and alter Lability
of concepts, in that he considers transitory, qualitatively
different forms of distribution as aspects of qualitatively
different modes of production."(4)
How does Marx obtain the "essential relations" lying behind
the level of appearances? Derek Sayer argues that the derivation
of essential relations must be historically specific. True,
Marx makes use of some 'transhistorical' categories. When for
example he starts his General Introduction of 1857 with material
production, production in general is an abstraction, and use-value
too is a transhistorical category, although these simple abstrac-
tions are historical in their reference. Marx starts, as do all
scientists, from material reality, from phenomenal forms, but as
we have already seen, Marx sees no straightforward relation between
what experience shows to be the case and essential relations. It
is through his specification of social forms that Marx moves from
reali ty to essence. Thus Marx's approach to the value form allows
him to distinguish the economic phenomena of a particular mode of
production which are not shared by counterparts elsewhere. Yet
there is a problem here. As Sayer puts it "To give an adequate
explanation of social forms, it is necessary to grasp them histori-
cally, while to grasp economic phenomena historically is necessarily
to apprehend them in their specific social form."(15) How then
does Marx initially identify the social forms? It is obviously
impossible to derive historical from transhistorical categories,
but at the same time the analysis of production in general is basic
to the identification of social forms. The conclusion that Sayer
draws is that Marx does not apply a pre-constituted theory to
phenomena, but derives adequate concepts from their analysis.
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Marx therefore doesn't provide a theory of value, but an investi-
gation of the concrete social forms of value as will be demonstrated
more fully in section D below. Marx does indeed start from
phenomena, from the commodity as a concrete social form, and not
from concepts or abstractions. Marx then reasons towa=ds the
essential relations which explain why the phenomena isolated take
the form they do.
Such a relationship between concrete phenomena and essential
relations implies a particular notion of causation which can perhaps
best be seen as an application of the dialectic. Zeleny argues
that dialectical derivation departs most noticeably from traditional
derivation in the theory of value and the transitions of the value
form, which of course is an important area of concern in this thesis.
Zeleny characterises this derivation as 'logical-historical' in
character, rather than simply 'logical'. "Marx interprets the
development of the forms of value as an expression of a particular
necessity."(6) The genesis of a particular form is not identical
with its historical origin; it is the ideal expression of that
genesis, a process which is neither purely historical, nor purely
logical. Again using Zeleny's words: "To formulate the 'ideal
expression' means for Marx 'to discover the inner necessary
connection'. 'To trace logically the inner connection of the
historical process' is only another expression for 'uncovering the
inner necessarY connection,n.(7)
Sayer expresses this notion of causal relation in Marx somewhat
di£ferently. Essential relations explain why phenomena take the form
they do. "They are essential~ therefore, not in any mystical or
immanentist sense, but simply as conditions for the existence of the
phenomenal forms themselves.n(e) Marx's analytic entails a dia-
lectic of establishing the 'extent and limits' of categories. Put
another way, Marx reasons from the phenomenal to its grounds of
possibility, the conditions that must prevail if experience of that
kind is to be possible. This reasoning is neither deductive from
transhistorical covering laws, nor is it inductive, inference of
general laws simply from observed empirical realities, since these
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can be misleading. For Sayer the logic of Marx's analytic is
essentially a logic of hypothesis formation, and he uses Hanson's
term 'retroduction' to describe it. For Zeleny too, the marxian
dialectical derivation presupposes a new form of the relationship
between cause and effect. This is because Marx's notion of cause
and effect is based on essence as self-developing, rather than on
the concept of a fixed essence. "Marx works with different forms
of effect from those recognised by Galilean causality. Everything
that exists ••• has an effect of some sort; to exist equals to
have an effect. Marx's conception of the different forms of effect
is inseparably linked with two principles ••• the principle of the
unity of the world and the principle of self-development."(9)
This means that cause turns into effect and effect into cause. For
example, money is a presupposition in the process of development of
capital, but is also a fruit of that development.
Further examination of Marx's distinction between essence and
reality has helped us to understand the nature of the marxian
dialectic and to be clearer about the role of the histor~cal
dimension. Marx's emphasis on phenomenal forms is obviously
crucial in this context andthis methodological discussion has
helped to demonstrate the importance of an analysis of the transi-
tions in the forms of value. My concern with the changing nature
of competition and its relation to the labour theory of value is
thus firmly rooted in Marx's methodological procedure. "Capital's
exposition is organised as an ascent, albeit by way of analysis of
phenomenal forms, from the essential relations of capitalism to the
diverse concrete forms in which they manifest themselves ton the
surface of society', its underlying structure of that of a hierarchy
of conditions of possibility" concludes Sayer.(10) What
alterations do changes in the nature of competition make to the
phenomenal forms of value, and do the concrete forms found in
monopoly capitalism justify alteration or adjustment in the
essential relations of capitalism?
Before leaving the subject of methodology I would like to
return briefly to m~5.m as a 'theory of liberation'. A committed
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philosophy sees people as able to change the way they interact
with nature and to transform it. The ability to change is ob-
structed by class conflict and by alienation, but in reaching an
intellectual understanding of the problem it is possible to start
to overcome them. For Marx class structure and social relations
are dominated by crisis rather than equilibrium, and lead to
revolutionary change. Yet despite his prognostications, capita-
lism has survived, at least in the Western world. It has proved
more resilient and adaptable than he anticipated. The reasons
are varied and controversial, but the changing nature of compe-
tition and the development of the monopoly stage are one contribu-
ting factor. To understand the way something works is the first
step on the road to changing it. Capitalist competition has a
profound effect on the functioning of capitalist society. An
understanding of how it operates at the monopoly stage of capitalism
is a precondition for liberating oneself and society from its
influence. In placing my emphasis on capitalist competition, I am
in no way asserting that class conflict is no longer important. I
do,however, wish to focus my attention on intra-eapitalist struggle,
since it may throw light on the question of how capitalism has
survived, even if it cannot decisively answer why it should have
done so. Consideration of the changing nature of competition and
monopoly within a marxist paradigm may also provide implications
which provide support for a particular approach to political strategy.
There is however always the danger in a 'committed philosophy' of a
religious-type appeal. Let me now therefore move to more concrete
ground, and provide an assessment of the place of the marxist
paradigm in the study of competition and monopoly.
B. The place of the marxist paradigm in a study of competition
and monopoly
In this section I want to make a broad comparison between the
marxist and the orthodox paradigms with particular reference to
their differing approach to the study of competition and monopoly.
By no means is this to be a complete or minute detailing of the
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specific contributions from each paradigm. There is by now a very
large literature within the orthodox tradition on these issues, and
in one recent survey the authors started with the caveatl~e believe
that we have ••• taken account of most of the relevant literature,
but wish to apologise in advance for any unfair omissions."(11)
Appendix A proposes a classification of the diverse contributions
within the orthodox tradition, whilst of course the variations
within the marxist paradigm are the subject of ensuing chapters.
Adding to my own caveat, it is important to realise that it is not
possible to make a choice between the marxist and the orthodox
systems on empirical grounds. Taking the Lakatos view of a paradigm,
there is a hard core of unquestioned propositions with_a set of
procedures for generating and testing a series of refutable hypo-
theses which form a protective belt around that hard core. Paradigms
are thus essentially intellectual tools permitting a concentration
on short run questions and restricting the agenda for enquiry.
Paradigms therefore need to be judged by their fruitfulness, and not
by their truth, since they are in any case abstractions. What then
is the context within which competition and monopoly are placed in
the two traditions being considered?
Let me set the scene by an initial contrast between their views
of political economy. These are well summarised in two diagrams
provided by Hollis and Nell, the first of which is familiar to all
students on introductory economics courses (see I.1a). In this
(neo-classical) schema, equivalents are traded for equivalents in
each set of markets. Homogeneous units supply these markets:
factor markets are supplied by households, while product markets
are supplied by businesses. No exploitation is possible in
competitive equilibrium.
The second diagram (the classical/marxist one, see Diagram I.1b)
is much less familiar. Household and factor markets disappear and
are replaced by a pyramid of social classes. The basic concern is
with structure and dependencies between institutions. For the neo-
classicist there are consumers and firms, both with optimising
behaviour, and the object is to predict such behaviour. The prim~J
DIAGRAM l.la THE NED-CLASSICAL SCHEMA
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factors of production each receive their own reward for the
contribution they make to the final product. In the marxist
schema, capital has a dual nature: capital as property relates
to the distribution of income, while capital as goods relates to
the study of production. The distribution of profit is th~s not
an exchange, "since the only 'service' which the owner of a
business ••• need supply in re~ for its profit is that of
permitting it to be owned by him."(12)
A fundamental difference between the paradigms is immediately
apparent from these diagrams. For the marxist, social classes
are seen as crucial to economic analysis, whereas sociological
and political dimensions are substantially ignored by the orthodox
approach. Property relations for the marxist mean that the capita-
list clas~ is in a position to exercise power over the working class
through the extraction of surplus value in a process of exploitation.
Implicit in the factor of production nomenclature of neo-classical
economics is the idea that land, labour and capital are qualitatively
similar, and an exchange between equals is seen to take place in the
market. Preiser points out that conventional economics denies that
the possession of property can influence distr~bution between the
factors of production. The theory of distribution is concerned with
shares appropriate to the productive importance of each factor, based
on its marginal product. Under perfect competition, the owner of
each factor receives the marginal product. The possession of
property does indeed affect distribution between persons, but not
amongst factors, and the former is seen as sociology, with only the
latter as economics.(13) It goes without saying that each paradigm
involves an ideological perspective: for the marxist a class
structure is inherent in economic relations, while for the orthodox
economist there is a basic assumption of equality in the relations
between economic agents.
Another way of expressing this difference is that the orthodox
approach tends to ignore power relations. Monopoly, however, pro-
vides an exception, and it is interesting to examine the way in
which this undeniable power phenomenon is dealt with. For monopoly
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is a relation between persons and not between factors, demonstrating
that the marginal product, as the essence of the functional distri-
bution of income, is obtained by a factor of production only by
virtue of the existence of a particular market form, perfect compe-
tition. In the eyes of the neo-classical economist, imperfections
in market structure lead to 'abnormal' profits. The monopolist or
oligopolist is in an exceptional situation which allows him to gain
an additional form of profit which is seen as quite different from
the 'normal' or 'equilibrium' profit. For the orthodox economist,
only monopoly profits are based on exploitation, whilst for the
marxist all profits have this basis. It is monopoly power that
allows of this exploitation, based on market imperfections, and
leading to the earning of a surplus often called monopoly rent.
Monopoly highlights the fact that businesses are not the homogeneous
units they are assumed to be in the basic model, and the existence
of oligopolies and monopolies raises the issue of how profits are
distributed amongst business units. Galbraith for instance lambasts
the great fortunes earned by monopolies and the resulting inequali-
ties of income in a chapter entitled 'The unseemly economics of
opulence'.(14) Nevertheless, as we shall see in a moment, the
distributional aspects of monopoly receive far less attention from
the orthodox economist than do the allocative implications. Summing
up the contrast between the two paradigms on the issue of monopoly
and profits, I would argue that in the orthodox schema monopoly rent
is introduced as a kind of theoretical afterthought, necessitated
by the lack of correspondence between the abstract model of perfect
competition and the real world of large scale business enterprise.
For Marx in contrast, profit has a unitary explanation. Profit,
whether 'monopoly profit' or the 'normal' profit of competitive
industry, derives from surplus value and the power relationship
between capitalists and workers based on their ownership of the means
of production. (The theory of surplus value is examined in more
detail in section D.) Distribution for marxists is therefore
related to class and class power in the first instance. Power is a
later addition for the neoclassical economist, introduced only when
it has become an unavoidable economic issue, but excluded from a
fundamental framework which evades dealing with the sociological and
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political dimensions of class in its basic model.
An associated contrast arises from differing treatment of the
institutional framework. This framework is largely ignored by the
nec-cLaaai.cda't , General equilibrium theory has a very simple
classificatory system which consists of individuals (whether they
be households or firms) on the one hand and the economy on the ather.
As Brian Loasby puts it: "In a fundamental sense, the general
equilibrium theorist is not concerned with the organisation of the
economic system, but only with the working of a system that has been
designed by someone else."(15) Economic agents, households and
firms, are seen as more or less homogeneous units. Each unit is
then assumed to pursue a maximising goal: maximising utility in
the case of households and profits in the case of firms. Neo-
classical thought predicates the behavi~ral functions of individual
decision makers, paying little attention to institutional detail,
except where it can be expressed in behavioral functions. We have
already seen that this is the case when market imperfections arise
(e.g. the downward sloping demand curve of imperfect competition
or the kinked oligopoly demand curve). Such cases however are the
exception rather than the rule. Consumers and producers have to
be identifiable agents for neo-classical economics, but they are
actually organisations whose institutional form is largely ignored.
As Hollis and Nell put it, there are in fact no 'bearers' of economic
variables in neo-elassical economics, and they argue that, for
instance, the law of diminishing marginal utility is formulated quite
independently of consumers. Yet in the real world, neither firms
nor households are homogeneous entities. The marxist paradigm does
not assume individual decision-making units determining their
behaviour by maximising. Maximising behaviour by business is
rather the result of the exigencies of a capitalist system. For
the marxist the institutional framework is of fundamental importance.
It is not surpr~s~ng given their predilection for homogeneous
economic agents, that orthodox economists should give pride of place
to the market and to market price. This emphasis is not present
for the marxist, whose criticism of the market would start by
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pointing out that at the level of exchange individuals are indeed
free and equal, and it is only when the institutional power and
class framework lying behind the market are examined that in-
equality becomes apparent. Orthodox economics has concentrated on
market phenomena, especially price and income components, despite
the fact that the price system is but a fragment of the whole
economic system. This preference is understandable given the
possibilities of model building that derive from price theory.
Yet a distinction can be made between the logic of price formation
and the sociology of price formation. It is the logic of planning
or decision making that predominates in neo-classical economics.
Now of course marginalism and equilibrium thinking have an important
place in decision making, but they have little to do with social
market phenomena. As Albert puts it "The central problem of
classical economics, the search for the laws of price determination,
is looked upon by Walras - in common with the two other founders of
the marginal utility school - as a purely economic problem i.e. as
a value problem to be solved on the basis of a principle of rational
action~.(16) This does indeed lead to some impressive economic
model building, but it ignores the social reality of the conflict
between persons who in their varied ,social roles occupy positions
of power. The market place for the orthodox economist is an
orderly shopping centre, while for the marxist it is a battlefield~
The bias of neo-elassical economics towards the problem of the
market and particularly price formation gives 'rational economic
man' an important role. (The alternative phrase 'homo economicus'
is sexist too~) Economic agents are pressured by neo-classical
economics to pursue economic rationality. Who is this rational
economic being? "We do not know what he wants. :But we do know
that, whatever it is, he will maximise ruthlessly to get i t." As
a producer she will maximise market share or profit, liAs a consumer
he maximises utility by omnicient and improbable comparison of, for
instance, marginal strawberries with marginal cement". (17) The
predictions of neo-classical economics are thus not the predictions
of what any agent would do, but of what a rational economic person
would do. In the classical and marxist tradition, it is classes
who compete for the net social product, and not individual decision
makers exercising choice in the market. It is significant that
there is no danger of empirically testing rational economic
behaviour. Any test of an economic theory against the actual
behaviour of the rational producer or consumer is impossible, since
they are rational precisely insofar as they behave as predicted,
and the test only shows how rational they are. We are caught in
a circular argument, and irrational behaviour would simply make
prediction impossible. This is not to deny that neo-classical
economics has developed more sophisticated models of what economic
rationality includes. The shift from small scale to large scale
enterprise has lead to a shift from simple to complex maximising
models. As Hollis and Nell see it, "what is economically rational
depends on time and place". For Marx, however, maximising
behaviour is a consequence rather than as assumption of the system.
Within their predominant concern with the market and the logic
of price formation, neo-elassical economists pay more attention to
demand, and consumer variables than to supply or production
variables. This derives from their view of the paramount importance
of the exchange system as an allocative mechanism for scarce re-
sources. Marxists on the other hand, as has already been suggested,
see capitalist exchange as a means for achieving social reproduction
and exploitation at the same time, so that the market place becomes
an arena for the exercise of economic power between classes and sub-
classes. Marx therefore focusses on the primacy of the production
process. The formation of individual preferences which lies at the
heart of neo-elassical economics does moreover depend on what is
produced and how it is produced: it is employers who make this
choice and choose the place of production, the timing of production,
the nature of the product. Preferences depend on work habits which
are dictated by technology, which is chosen by business. Tastes
then, are not given, but are determined by an inter-dependency
between the process of consumption and the process of production.
This is acknowledged in the specific case of advertising, on those
occasions when orthodox economists recognise that advertising may
indeed persuade wage earners (or householders) to consume more than
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they otherwise would have done.
Andrews considers that the introduction of the individual
demand curve for the firm distinguishes the theoretical methodology
which has dominated post-Chamberlin economics.(18) Two main
types of demand curve have been introduced - the particular demand
curve of a firm, either of the monopolistic kind or of the more
elastic kind when an oligopolist changes his prices whilst his
rivals do not; and the share of the market demand curve when
oligopolist rivals change prices simultaneously. The exception to
this concern with demand conditions are limit-pricing theories,
which look to cost structures for an explanation of barriers to
entry in terms (for Eain) of absolute cost advantages, product
differentiation advantages and economies of scale advantage of
existing firms. Non-marxist models thus relate almost entirely to
market demand conditions, and this emphasis on the state of demand
means that competition, oligopoly and monopoly are conceived of as
opposing forms~ Poulantzas picks up the resulting confusion which
occurs when a non-Marxist economist is faced with the theory of
monopoly capitalism, for the result of the emphasis on market classi-
fication is that non-Marxists see competition and monopoly as polar
opposites. tiThe existence of monopolies with a dominant market
position does not abolish market competition, but merely reproduces
it at a different level. The objections to the theory of monopoly
capitalism that are put forward from the standpoint of the market,
claiming that there are in fact no such things as monopolies but
merely "oligopolies", that there is no abolition of competition but
rather an "imperfect competition", are both situated on a different
terrain from Marxist theory and attribute to it positions that are
foreign to it."(19) The Marxist approaches the problem of monopoly
and oligopoly structures from the viewpoint of the production process.
The capitalist production process is dependent on the production of
surplus-value, and as will be seen in Chapter 3, monopoly analysis
rests on the ideas of exclusion from the formation of the average
profit rate. Within the orthodox approach there is a danger that
economic theory dissolves either into a logically exhaustive classi-
fication of possible market forms and market behaviour patterns or
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into empirical case analyses.
In orthodox theory the problems of monopoly and oligopoly are
largely considered within that branch of economics known as the
theory of the firm, whose methodology is predominantly microstatic
equilibrium theory. This, as has already been seen, leads to
concentration on the problems of pricing and output decisions of
the individual firm. True, elements of non-price competition, such
as invention, innovation, information gathering and dissemination are
considered in the more recent literature, but the problem of new
types of organization for instance have been incompletely dealt with.
Only a limited number of attempts have been made to incorporate
this essentially micro-economic tradition into a macro-economic
context. Yet Howard J. Sherman points to the characteristics of
modern economics in these terms: "For several years economists have
discussed the necessity of basing the analysis of economic stability
on something more than a few indicators of aggregate economic activity.
What is needed is a theory of the working of the economy as a whole
derived from knowledge of the behaviour of individual enterprise
units and of the industries formed of these units. Yet specialists
in the investigation of enterprise behaviour and industrial structure
(micro economics) and specialists in long-run and cyclical behaviour
of the economy as a whole (macro-economics) seldom co-ordinate their
findings. "(20) Such a split within the subject matter of economics
is not conducive to a full understanding of the phenomena of the
growth of monopoly structures, described as long ago as the turn of
the century, although certain economists do recognise that if mono-
polistic situations are diffuse the price-distortions which the
theory of the firm analyses are superseded by the interactions
between the strategy of the firm and the dynamics of the economy.
Thus Siro Lombardini: "In my opinion the pattern (and even the
criteria) of firm behaviour cannot be studied independently of the
total system."(21)
Whilst the base of the theory of the firm in micro-economic
static equilibrium theory has allowed of definite advances in the
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sophistication of the analysis of the behaviour of the firm, this
method also imposes limitations by its lack of integration with
macro-economic analysis. This lack of breadth is linked with the
essentially non-dynamic and a-historical approach of traditional
economic theo17 in this area. I have already suggested that the
theory of the firm tends not to go beyond comparative statics, for
as P.W.S. Andrews has it, "one does not get a dynamic theory
merely by writing time into a static analysis".(22) Schumpeter is
of course one of the most vigorous proponents of a theory which takes
account of economic change. The a-historical approach of say, a
Stigler or a Prais, is attacked by Schumpeter when he talks of
economists looking at the behaviour of oligopolistic industry:
"They accept the data of the momentary situation as if there were no
past or future to it." Behaviour, Schumpeter continues, is never
seen as the result of past behaviour or as an attempt to deal with a
situation which will change later. "In other words, the problem
that is usually being vizualised is how capitalism administers
existing structures, whereas the relevant problem is how it creates
and destroys them."(23) Andrews links the need for a dynamic
analysis with the need to integrate micro and macro analyses: "We
should thus hope for a framework of further work on individual
industries of a truly analytical kind, in which relevant factors in
the internal structure of the firm would be linked with the analysis
of the external circumstances in the industry, where again, a
structured theory would tie onto the analysis of theeconomy as a
whole. And, from the other end, macro theories could be linked with
classifications of industries which would be operationally signifi-
cant,"(24) and concludes by saying that the individual firm is so
very much in a changing world that static micro-equilibrium analyses
might turn out to be invalid. I would agree with commentators
such as Schumpeter, Lombardini and Andrews that orthodox theory is
indeed limited by its methodological base in micro-static equilibrium
theory, this being one of the essential features of the orthodox
approach. Loasby indeed goes so far as to suggest that the theory
of the firm was developed, in accord with Sraffa's advice, to
preserve the static equilibrium method of analysis.(25)
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In this comparison of the orthodox and marxist paradigms I
have attempted to concentrate on what I see as the fundamental
attitudes of each to the issues of competition and monopoly. It
is inevitable that in such a broad review many of the details of
each tradition have been omitted. The appendix classifying
orthodox approaches to competition and monopoly covers some of the
more sophisticated mainstream studies, whilst the following chapters
deal in more detail with the various marxist analyses. Some might
wish to use these developments as ammunition to refute the broad
distinctions I have drawn. For example, it might be argued that
the existence of studies in the tradition of Edith Penrose's
"Theory _ of the Growth of the Firm"(26) contradict my assertions
that static price theory is the major concern of the orthodox
approach, whilst from the other side, R.L. Meek's marxist "Studies
in the Labour Theory of Value" shows considerable theoretical
concern with the pricing policies of monopolies.(27) To me such
examples do not disprove the essential approach of a paradigm, but
rather show awareness of its limitations from within each tradition.
Let me now attempt a summ~-y by pointing to a range of aspects
of the study of competition and monopoly which are inherent within
a marxist paradigm, but which are exogenous for the orthodox approach.
Firstly, consideration of the state and its role in the competitive
struggle is inevitable within a paradigm which starts from political
economy, whilst the state is introduced (if at all) as an exogenous
variable by neo-classical economics, whose homogeneous units are
ill-suited to accommodating the institutional fact of the state.
Secondly, the marxist paradigm has always seen the internationalising
tendencies of capitalism as one of its fundamental features. The
non-dynamic, a-historical approach of the orthodox paradigm also
leads to a general failure to link the behaviour of monopolies to
how and why they grow. Also, whilst both paradigms are attentive
to the technology of production, marxists see the relations of
production as important. Finally, as I shall argue in the next
chapter, competition is primarily a process for the marxist, whilst
it is usually taken as a situation in the orthodox approach.
41
I want finally to argue that an essential feature of the
orthodox approach is its assumption of perfect competition. I
would like to bring out some of the implications of this model
within the orthodox paradigm, contrasting it with the marxist
approach which is of course not without its own ideological
perspective. In discussing orthodox theories of the origin of
monopoly profit we saw that monopoly profits are seen as 'abnormal'.
The orthodox economist is thus implying a value judgement of the
profits which the monopolist receives. But why should a change
in the market situation lead to an undesirable result? If perfect
competition is simply an abstraction made to allow of more
manageable analysis of whatever form of market imperfections may be
analysed, it is just that the assumptions of perfect competition
have been modified, and a modification of assumptions can hardly
be seen as anything undesirable.
Perfect competition is, however, more than a set of abstract
assumptions, it is also seen as politically desirable since free
competition is not merely a scientific explanation, but also
ensures, it is felt, the greatest possible satisfaction of needs
in society as a whole, with optimum allocation of society's
resources. Perfect competition thus serves the purpose of recon-
ciling the interests of the individual with those of society: the
invisible hand is the competitive market. "In a free enterprise
system competition is viewed as the most generally effective device
for limiting the economic power of privileged individuals or groups
to exploit others, the process whereby individuals can gain
economic rewards to the extent they satisfy the wants of others".(2S)
Perfect competition ensures harmony in the interests of society, and
provides an ideal solution to the problems of social control in the
economic realm.
Why is perfect competition required to fill this normative role
in economics in addition to constituting a set of abstractions?
Gunnar Myrdal in his respected work, "The Political Element in the
Development of Economic Theory" offers a convincing explanation
when he goes into the origins of economic theory in utilitarianism,
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itself derived from the philosophy of natural law. The utili-
tarians used the argument of the harmony of interest to resolve the
logical difficulty in computing individual quantities of happiness
into a social sum. In the development of economic doctrine says
1>1yrdal, "the terminology changes, special assumptions are intro-
duced for the treatment of special problems, but there is always
the same notion of measurable amounts of utility which are later
openly called 'values'. There is always the attempt to add
these subjective amounts of value into a social sum which is to be
maximised. Usually there is also the assumption of a social
harmony of interests".(29) Orthodox economics, despite the
initial appearance of being value free, in fact serves an ideo-
logical purpose, and this ideological purpose is clearly visible
in the case of perfect competition. As Perroux points out,
liberalism is no longer (if it ever has been) the natural order.
"The domination effect, far from being a rarity found only after
long searching, can be discerned almost anywhere in the relations
between individual UL~ts and unified groups of production and trade.
Competition is not a regime which leaves out economic domination,
but one where the domination effect is kept in check, directed and
utilized, with the object of achieving a better economic result".(30)
The growth of monopoly structures was really embarrassing for
the Neo-classical school then. Not merely did the assumptions of
perfect competition tend to look irrelevant and even ridiculous in
face of reality, but the very foundations of the postulated equity
and efficiency of the allocation of resources in society were
undermined. The spread of monopolistic structures reverses the
tendency to favour maximum productive performance which is seen as
associated with perfect competition. Orthodox economists thus
devote much theoretical effort to ascertaining degrees of departure
from the perfectly competitive model, on the basis of which policies
for the control of monopolies are put forward. Thus oligopoly
structures become the bogeymen of the system, and the attempt to
nullify the noxious aspects of each individual monopoly replaces
any attempt at systematic understanding of a monopoly system.
Monopolies were once the exception, but when they become the rule,
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non-Marxist economists are also hampered by their a-historical
approach to the subject matter. The economiS~looking at the
behaviour of an oligopolistic industry asks what current behaviour
is and does not pose the question of how such a structure comes
about in the first place. The existence of anti-trust legislation
in the USA and of monopolies legislation in Britain testifies to a
general concern to control monopolies but whilst analgesics suppress
pain, they do not eliminate any disease which is at its source.
Legislation may mitigate monopoly price increases, but this ignores
the dynamic in capitalism which leads to the development of
monopoly. Anti-trust legislation attempts to turn the clock of
history back, and this attempt is made because perfect competition
is not merely an analytical abstraction for economists, it is also
a political desideratum.
In no way do I wish to belittle the undoubted contributions
of the orthodox paradigm to the study of competition and monopoly.
What this section has attempted to show is that the marxist
paradigm is different, and that those differences open the possi-
bility of fruitful insight into the nature of competition and
domination in the modern world where, as I have suggested, it is
difficult to ignore the constraints of class, institutions
(including the state), international and dynamic factors. The
growth of monopoly capitalism challenges not only the orthodox
model, rooted as it is in an assumption of a perfectly competitive
system, but also Marx's model which examined a competitive capitalism.
The marxist paradigm has proved extremely fertile in relation to
development economics for example, and at least some contribution
to the study of competition and monopoly seems likely to arise from
the differences in approach that have been brought out in this
section. My next task, then, is to consider the contribution of
periodisation within marxism, before clarifying the role of the
value theory of labour in Marx's political economy. These
preliminary tasks are essential prerequisites for studying the
changing nature of competition within the Marxist paradigm and
considering its relation to the law of value and to the monopoly
stage of capitalism.
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Concluding on the marxist paradigm, the perspective lying
behind my study is that economic life is a network of forces,
rather than a network of exchanges; that power, domination and
aSYmmetries within the economic system are the rule rather than
the exception. For the .aarxi.s t , class inequalities are of prime
importance and this study takes these as given. I am examining
inequalities within the capitalist class, intra-class struggle,
rather than inter class struggle, for collaboration between equals
in free exchange is as mythical in the relations within the
capitalist class as it is between classes. I nevertheless feel
that such a study will not be without its implications for class
political strategy.
C. Periodisation
It must be apparent by now that a study of competition and
monopoly within the marxist paradigm needs to include an analysis of
stages within capitalism. It was pointed out in the introduction
that many marxists have raised the question of how far Marx's laws
are applicable to twentieth century capitalism. The changing
nature of competition needs to be placed in a context of historical
change. What basis for historical periodisation is provided by
Marx and the marxist tradition? What historical framework does
marxism furnish for a consideration of competition and the changes
it undergoes?
As was suggested in the section on methodology, the study of
historical change is firmly rooted in Marx's methodology, based as
it is on a materialist conception of history. One would therefore
expect Marx and his followers to have a good deal to say about
periodisation. It must however be remembered that the heart of
Marx's life work was the analysis of a pure capitalist mode of
production. Marx thus concerns himself with previous modes of
production only insofar as they provide the foundation for capitalism,
and primarily concerned with the problem of how capitalism arose.
As Mandel puts it: "Marx only spends time on the 'pre-capitalist
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forms of production' in order to show up, negatively, the factors
which in Europe have led, positively, to the flowering of capital
and capitalismu.(31)
In Das Kapital, Marx provided (to use Zeleny1s term) a
'logical-historical~ analysis of mid-nineteenth century capitalism.
This means that an analysis of historical change in terms of
theories of new stages in the development of capitalism cannot be
derived by pure logic from Marx's magnum opus. Indeed can
twentieth century capitalism be analysed at all by using the cate-
gories and laws that Marx derived? Marx, as we shall see, did not
clearly forsee any new stages of capitalism, and his focus was rather
on socialism as the mode of production which would succeed the
capitalism that he was analysing. Indeed Bernstein's revisionism
at the turn of the century was based on the argument that capitalism
was actually likely to last longer than Marx had predicted.
Taking these reservations into account then, how can Marx's
pure theory of capitalism be linked to his historical method?
Here I think it is useful to recall Uno's three levels of
abstraction in the study of political economy: the pure theory
of capitalism, the process of capitalist development in which the
economic phenomena representing the abstract principles of capital
appear in stage-eharacteristic forms and the empirical analysis of
the actual state of capitalism.(32) As Zeleny suggests, Marx's
analysis operates at two levels - theoretical development, and real
historical events. "Theoretical work constantly touches on the
facts of historical reality".(33) The critique of political
economy is the theory of capitalism as a specific mode of production,
and moves from abstract to concrete. These levels are on the one
hand, the internal laws of capitalism and on the other, their mode
of realization. In a major recent work concerned with periodi-
sation Mandel attempts to explain post-war capitalism in terms of
Marx's basic laws of motion. He does not accept "that these
economic laws of motion are so 'abstract' that they cannot manifest
themselves in 'real history' at all, and that therefore the only
function of the economist is to show how and why they become
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distorted or deviated by accidental factors in its actual develop-
ment - not to show how they are manifested and confirmed in
concrete and visible processes".(34) What is at issue then in
developing a schema for periodisation, is the need to forge links
between abstract and concrete levels of analysis. Mandel also
puts this task in terms of the relationship between essence and
appearance, terms which were used extensively in the section on
methodology. "Marx did not see the task of science solely as
the discovery of the essence of relations obscured by their super-
ficial appearances, but also as the explanation of these appearances
themselves, in other words as the discovery of the intermediate
links, or mediations which enable essence and appearance to be
reintegrated in a unity once again".(35) Whilst Marx gave a theory
of capitalism in the abstract, he well knew that the real world
could not be reduced to the play of pure economic abstractions.
"The creative tension between theory and historical specificity in
Marx's writings", says :Brewer, "is one mark of his greatness".(36)
As Kosonen poin~out, competition is itself a concept bridging
abstract laws and their realization in the world.(31)
It will be shown in the next chapter that Marx distinguished the
internal nature of capital (innate laws) and competition (the
realization of those laws). Competition is in fact the mechanism
which sets the internal laws of 'capital in general' into motion in
the form of 'many capitals', thus providing a link between levels
of abstraction.
Our task then in periodising, is in some sense, to meld
abstract and concrete levels of analysis. What methods of periodi-
sing can be adopted? How can one classify historical change?
This will entail distinguishing between a mode of production, stages
within modes of production and specific social formations. There
is of course a huge literature covering the mode of production
debate looking at it both from the historical and the developmental
perspective. Relatively little however has been written on
periodisation into stages. Poulantzas, :Braverman and Mandel are
here the main authors who spring to mind, but both Poulantzas and
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Braverman are concerned with the class dimensions of monopoly
capitalism, with Braverman concentrating on the changing forms of
the working class.(38) It is rare to find an explicit discussion
of periodisation into stages as opposed to an analysis of monopoly
capitalism, and Fine and Harris provide a welcome exception.
They suggest two methods of periodising history, the first a
highly abstract division into the stages of a mode of production,
the second involving the far more complex concepts of the stages
of a social formation.(39)
However, before examining the current state of the debate on
periodisation, what of Marx's own views on the matter? Whilst he
had a lot to say, his comments are scattered throughout his
writings. (40) I can identify five aspects of his thought here:
his concept of the mode of production, his discussion of the social
forms of socialism, capitalism, serfdom, slavery and the asiatic
mode, his periodisation of feudalism, his discussion of the
transition to capitalism, and his identification of stages in the
development of capitalism.
Nowadays a mode of production is usually defined by the forces
of production on the one hand and the relations of production on the
other and the articulation between the two.(41) As Cohen points
out, Marx used the term in three ways: a 'material mode' referring
to the technique of production, a 'social mode' denoting the social
properties of the production process, including the purpose of
production, the form of producers' surplus labour and the mode of
exploitation, and a 'mixed mode' giving a comprehensive cover to
include the other two.(42) I do not propose to discuss Marx's
analysis of different specific modes of production. (As already
mentioned, there is an enormous literature on this.) Cohen
suggests that the most important task. is to determine how to dis-
tinguish between socialism, capitalism, feudalism, slavery and the
asiatic mode. He feels that this is best done by correlating them
with types of economic structure, as "the entire set of production
relations obtaining in it lf.(43) It is important also to realize
that the main socioeconomic formations that Marx considers are
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analytic rather than chronological stages.
What contribution does Marx have to make to periodising within
a specific mode of production and to the transition between one
mode and another? In Volume III of Capital Marx periodises
feudalism according to the institutional arrangements through which
surplus labour is appropriated, as labour services or as rent.
Part VIII of Volume I examines the classical deve20pment of
capitalism in Britain. As Cohen points out, Marx is here not
concerned with the demise of serfdom proper, but with the trans-
formation of the independent peasant producers (Who arose as
feudalism broke down) into a proletariat. Crucial in this process
for Marx was the conversion to private property in land. Despite
its limited historical coverage Marx's analysis of the transition
to capitalism is a complex and detailed one, in which the concept
of primitive accumulation plays an important role. (Primitive
accumulation is the process whereby means of production and labour-
power which were not previously capital are converted into it, but
also including plunder and mercantile wealth as well as the role of
the state in supressing the new working class.)
Perhaps most importantly for our purpose of periodising a mode
of production into stages, is Marx's own division of the stages of
the development of capitalism.(44) During the first stage,
merchant capital predominates and the methods of production are
essentially those of pre-eapitalist times. This stage can itself
be divided into two: the stage of 'co-operation', in which the only
change in technique is that of massing a large number of workers in
a single place of work; and the stage of 'manufacturing' where the
"2.li-
process of production involves detail division of labour carried out
with specialised tools, but with no genuine mechanisation. The next
stage M~~ variously calls 'modern industry' or'machinofacture'.
Tools are now moved and regulated directly by machine, and capitalist
production has a decisive productivity advantage. Pre-capitalist
modes of production and merchant capital decay very rapidly. But
as Brewer points out, the transition to 'modern industry' was a long
one. "The transition to modern industry, generating these great
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disproportions between different industries, lasted for a whole
historical epoch, broadly, the whole nineteenth century".(45)
As I shall show in Chapter 3, Marx did also point to the tendency
towards centralisation and concentration of capital in contemporary
capitalism, but did not identify i~ with a new stage of the
capitalist mode of production.
It would seem from this brief overview of Marx's analysis of
historical change that the historical progress of social formation
can be understood as the effect of three possible transformations
in the mode of production. These are: the supersession of one
mode by another (e.g. feudalism by capitalism), the articulation of
different modes in the process of transition, and within one mode,
from one stage to another (e.g. manufacture to machinofacture).(46)
To have the tools to periodise capitalism adequately for a study of
competition, a number of problems of definition now need to be
clarified. Firstly, what is the distinction between a mode of
production and a social formation? Seconcily, how does one define
a new mode of production? Since it is important to be sure ~hat
the late twentieth century mode of production is indeed capitalist,
how is the capitalist mode of production defined? Finally, how
does one define stages within a mode of production?
It is first of all important to be clear that a mode bf
production is an abstraction, whilst a social formation is more
concrete. The capitalist mode of production concerns the theory of
the relations between two classes (bourgeoisie and proletariat), but
a social formation may contain other classes as well, such as
peasants. Unlike modes of production, social formations unfold
over a scale of chronological time. A social formation is an arti-
culation of different modes of production, so that a capitalist
social formation will have the capitalist mode of production
dominating, but with other mode(s) present. Now Poulantzas would
argue that you can only have stages of a concrete social formation.
The problem here is that periodising will then be a highly complex
matter, and will need to be closely related to the real world at the
level of appearance. More appropriate for the theoretical study of
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the changing nature of competition is Fine and Harris's more
abstract method of periodising history into stages.
It now becomes crucial to distinguish between stages within a
mode and new modes of production. For Fine and Harris (as indeed
for most marxists) a new mode is characterised by basic changes in
the relations of production, including any change in the possession
or control of the means of production. A change in the form of
social relations on the other hand indicates a distinct stage.
But before looking at the types of change in the form of social
relations involved in a new stage, let me pause for a moment to
clarify what is involved in the capitalist mode of production.
Cohen provides two definitions of the capitalist mode of
production, a 'structural' and a 'modal' one, and then demonstrates
that each definition also satisfies the other.(47) The structural
definition refers to the dominant production relation in capitalism;
that the immediate producers own their own labour power, and no
other productive force •. This is the economy of the 'free' labourer
with the double meaning expounded by Marx. The modal definition
refers to the purpose of capitalist production, where production
serves the needs of the accumulation of capital, involving the
production of exchange value to produce more exchange value. In
what sense then, do late twentieth century social formations remain
capitalist? First of all capitalism must feature the dominance of
the capitalist mode of production, although this does not exclude
the continued existence of non-capitalist modes of production. In
the third world non-capitalist modes of production may be quite
significant, and although this thesis is concerned with developed
capitalist formations, even there housework and childcare are
important examples of productive activities which remain substantially
outside the capitalist mode of production. What then are the
features of this capitalist mode of production? Neither the
existence of exploitation nor the existence of classes are features
of capitalism alone: other modes of production, such as feudalism,
also depend on exploitation and contain different social classes.
Unique to capitalism, however, is the law of value as it will be
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described in the next sections, and the prevalence of the capital
relation. What is individual to the capitalist mode of production
is then the form taken by class relations, and the mechanism
whereby exploitation takes place.
Having determined, at least in principle, that advanced
economies today are capitalist social formations, let us now turn to
the types of changes in the form of social relations which might
indicate a distinct stage of capitalism. Here different authors
see different aspects of the social relations of capitalism as of
crucial importance. Braverman in emphasising the need to under-
stand the historical evolution producing modern social forms is
concerned with the changing forms of the working class which
"presents itself in history as the progressive alienation of the
process of production from the workerll.(48) For Mandel, in
contrast, the world economy is an articulated system of capitalist,
semi-capitalist and pre-eapitalist relations of production, and he
periodises on the basis of phases ·in this articulation. The form
taken by uneven development is Mandel's major concern, although this
in turn is dependent on the accumulation process of capital.(49)
Wright also places considerable emphasis on the accumulation process,
though in particular its effects on the form of capitalist crisis.
"The point of an analysis of contradictions in and impedii\~ts to
the accumulation process is not to prove the inevitability of the
collapse of capitalism, but to understand the kinds of adaptations
and institutional reorderings that are likely to be attempted in
the efforts to counteract those contradictions".(50) What is
important for Wright, then, becomes changing structural and
institutional forms.
Fine and Harris provide the most extensive cover of changes in
the form of social relations. Capitalism for them increasingly
socializes production and "it is the reflection of this in the
development of social relations that we will use to periodise
capitalismll.(51) In particular such a periodisation will come about
through changes in the methods of appropriating surplus value (as
profit or as interest with the development of the credit mechanism
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and as tax with the growth of the state) and controiling it
(through new forms of control of the production process). Also
of importance are the forms taken by accumulation, by class
struggle and by capitalist crisis as well as the forms taken by
political relations and in particular the state.
How can one assess the relative merits of the difference of
emphasis amongst these authors? It seems to me that this will
depend, at least in part, on the purpose which the author has in
mind. Returning to the two methods of periodising history which
Fine and Harris suggest (the abstract stages of a mode of production
or the complex concept of the stages of a social formation), I have
already rejectea the Poulantzas approach of stages of a social
formation as too complex and too close to the real world as a
framework for examining the changing nature of competition. Since
I am pitching my study at an essentially theoretical level using the
method of the history of economic thought, the more abstract method
of periodising history into stages is appropriate. The broad
sweep of analysis involved in Mandel's "Late Capitalism" explains
his use of a method of periodisation which lies mid-way between the
two methods proposed by Fine and Harris. Mandel's taste requires
a melding of the abstract and the concrete that embraces both
specific historical detail and abstract laws. Braverman can
embrace these two aspects of the dialectic by concentrating on a
particular facet of the changing nature of capitalism, notably
labour.
I would suggest, then, that it very much depends on perspective
and the purposes for which periodisation is undertaken as to just
what stages are identified within capitalism. The names given to
stages are often indicative: Braverman uses manufacture, machino-
facture and scientific-technical; Mandel names freely competitive
capitalism, foreign railway production, imperialism and late
capitalism; Fine and Harris identify laissez-faire, monopoly and
state monopoly capitalism while Wright has six divisions (primitive
_ccumulation, manufacture, machinofacture, monopoly capitalism,
advanced and state directed monopoly capitalism). Given that my
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perspective is a study of competition, some periodisation of
capitalism is indeed required, but as I shall be arguing in Chapter
5, not a very detailed one. This section, however, has simply
aimed at identifying the m~-xist principles involved in periodi-
sation. Chapter 5 will be concerned with the state of the modern
debate on the stages within capitalism, purporting what is of
relevance to a study of competition. As has already been suggested,
changing forms of competition are linked with changes in the form
of value through the capitalist regulatory process. This section
has spelled out how changes in the form of social relations (which
include value relations) underlie the periodisation of the
capitalist mode of production. The final sections of this chapter
will therefore examine Marx's theory of value.
D. Marx's theory of value
Marx's labour theory of value is usually regarded as the
theoretical hard-core of his critique of political economy. As the
methodological section pointed out, however, Marx rather than
providing a pre-constituted theory, was making an investigation of
the concrete social forms of value. This section demonstrates
that such an approach does indeed provide the most satisfactory
interpretation of Marx's labour theory. It also relates well to
the concerns of this thesis for in later chapters I shall be asking
how changes in the nature of competition alter the phenomenal forms
of value. To assist in the exposition of Marx's value theory of
labour in this section, I will be posing the question, twhy have a
theory of value', and more particularly, 'why have a labour theory
of value'? A series of possible answers will be proposed, which
aim to show the importance of considering above all, the forms that
value takes. The discussion will be geared towards those within
the academic marxist tradition and nearest to it, including the
Neo-Ricardians. This is firstly because the criticisms of those
closest to a particular view are often the most telling and
secondly because I have already put the arguments for a marxist
rather than an orthodox paradigm in section B. This discussion
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will, it is hoped be further illuminated by what follows, in the
next chapter, developing the relation between 'capital in general'
and 'many capitals', but some initial drawing together will be
done in clarifying what is meant by the 'law of value' (see
section E) in the light of what has been said of the labour theory
of value.
I do not anticipate being able to 'prove' the labour theory
of value as an irrefutable fact of life in the course of these
sections. Rather what I hope to do is to show the sympathetic
reader that a marxist approach to the problem of value is a
potentially fruitful one, and that there is a prima facie case for
considering that insofar as the labour theory of value i~ accepted
as a useful tool for analysis of the competitive stage of capitalism,
it will also be useful for the monopoly stage.
(a) Proof of exploitation
Frequently the labour theory of value is seen as providing
a proof of the exploitation of labour under capitalism. Marx points
out that the study of exchange relations makes it impossible to
observe exploitation, and he is seen as turning to production
relations to achieve a rigid explanatory proof. Now it is true
that a cost theory of value is superior to a demand theory in that
it gives the concept of surplus a meaning. As Dobb puts it
itA principle which interprets value purely in terms of demand can
define the productive 'contribution' of a person of a class
according to the value of what eventuates: it cannot define this
contribution according to the activity or process in which the
contribution originates, since it includes no statement about any
productive relationship of this kind".(52) But is a labour theory
of value therefore providing a proof of exploitation as for example
Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison see it? ItAny concept of surplus
labour which is not derived from the position that labour is the
source of all value is utterly triviallf.(53) The answer must
surely be no.
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This is because Marx's concern is centred around the form
which exploitation takes. Hence the example that Marx gives of
slavery: in this case exploitation is direct, and so doesn't have
to take the value form. Thus the labour theory of value is
directed towards showing how exploitation works, what might be
called 'exploitation in process', for under capitalism surplus
labour can only be appropriated when its product has been sold for
money. If the labour theory of value is seen in this light we do
not loose sight of the fact that it is able to politicise economic
processes. Thus Morishima is essentially correct when he sees
Marx's theory of exploitation as a postulate. The 'Fundamental
'-'L
Marxian Theorum' says Morishima is "that the exploitation of
labourers by capitalists is necessary and sufficient for the
existence of a price-wage set yielding positive profits or, in
other words, for the possibility of conserving the capitalist
economy".(54)
(b) Making political economy 'scientific l
It must be clear to the reader by now that I see Marx as
taking a particular moral stance in relation to the problems of
political economy which he is analysing. This leads on to a second
possible purpose for the labour theory of value: namely that it
should make political economy 'scientific'. There is no doubt that
Marx saw this as a most important contribution. For instance in
"Theories of Surplus Value", as I have already pointed out, Marx
hails Ricardo for getting science out of its rut. "But at last
Ricardo steps in and calls to science: 'Haltl The basis, the
starting point for the physiology of the bourgeois system ••• is the
determination of value by labour time'''.(55) In arguing that Marx
postulates exploitation, I am resisting Marx's ideas of political
economy as 'scientific'.
But just what is meant by this term 'scientific'? Without
even entering into the controversy as to whether the social sciences
are sciences in the same sense as the natural sciences, it can
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easily be seen that the term is one which may mean all things to all
people. Insofar as Marx used 'scientific' to mean non-judgemental,
I would disagree with him. His economic writings are full of
rhetoric arguing that this or that ought to be the case, and
powerful rhetoric it is too. Thus Marx doesn't hesitate to use the
term 'rate of exploitation' for the ratio of surplus to necessary
labour. There are those who argue for a change between the young
Marx concerned with moral judgements on alienation and so on,
whilst the older Marx has become 'scientific'. I do not feel that
there is such a dichotomy. The argument against it is cogently
put, for instance by I.I. Rubin (whose work is considered in more
detail below) when he sees commodity fetishism as lying at the root
of all Marx's economics. Marx, in other words, is uniformly a
'humanist' who makes value judgements about exploitation, and to
this extent he is no 'scientist'.
Whilst I would therefore not agree with Marx's own conception
of the labour theory of value as 'scientific', Steedman and Morishima
see his value theory as non-scientific in ways which I would wish to
argue against. Steedman sees Marx as unscientific firstly in that
his value reasoning is internally inconsistent and secondly that some
of it is wrong. The charge of internal inconsistency is largely
levelled at Marx's resolution of the transformation procedure,
whilst value analysis is seen as wrong in being either redundant or
indeterminate. (56)
Steedman (and Sraffa) deny the importance of the social
relations underlying capitalist production in their assertion that
it is sufficient to start from the physical conditions of production
and the real wage to derive values (i.e. total labour embodied).
I shall be arguing in relation to the transformation procedure that
it is not the technical correctness of Marx's solution (it was
actually incorrect:) that is the important point. What is
important is that Marx's understanding of value requires its
solution. As Himmelweit and Mohun put it: "The 'transformation
problem' is therefore a necessary result of the contradictory
nature of capitalist production relations, and not at all a problem
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with Marx's theory, which recognizes this result".(57) Since
Steedman's argument centres round the transformation debate, this
is the obvious angle from which to deal with it.
Morishima is more sympathetic to Marx than is Steedman, and
characterises the labour theory of value as pragmatic, seeing one
of its purposes as allowing Marx to aggregate his micro-theory of
price determination and thus reach his two-department macro-theory
of output determination. Perhaps the mistake which both Morishima
and Steedman make is to see Marx's value theory as an empirical
fact, when it is actually a conceptual fact. Thus value theory
is a logical fact which aids our thought in understanding the
actual realities of economic life. In other words the theory
offers elucidation, but could not ever explain in the scientific
meaning of the word. I would thus agree with Croce when he cites
Labriola the Italian Marxist: "The theory of value does not
denote an empirical factum nor does it express a merely logical
proposition, as some have imagined, but it is the tyPical premise
without which all the rest would be unthinkable".(58) As already
emphasised, Marx's method is one of abstraction, rather than being
a model built on assumptions. For the positivists, on the other
hand, since nothing can be deduced from assumptions which is not
already contained in them, theory becomes tautologous. I hope to
show that precisely one of the most important aspects of the labour
theory of value is that it is not narrowly deterministic in this
fashion.
( c) Explaining prices
The third function which the labour theory of value is
seen as fulfilling is that of explaining prices. Yet Marx is
frequently attacked for failing to provide a theory of prices. Is
this justified? Marx starts from production relations, arguing
that the study of exchange relations as superficial phenomena masks
the exploitation process. This does not mean that Marx ignores
exchange relations, but rather that he explains exchange relations
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in terms of production relations, and it is this method which
necessitates emphasis on value relations, with labour as the point
of departure. As Rubin puts it: "the labour theory of value is
not based on the analysis of exchange transactions as such in
their material form but on the ~alysis of the social production
relations expressed in the transactions".(59) Thus Marx does not
ignore theories of relative price or of resource allocation; it
is simply that they are not his starting point. Analysis can be
at the level of prices or of value~ Marx started with the latter,
but in fact a correct theory of prices may be built without any
specific proposition on the origin or nature of prices. It is
here that the debate centres: if a theory of prices can be
constructed without reference to the value framework, why bother
with values at all? The advantage of value theory is that it
allowed Marx to unmask social relationships, and thereby to examine
the process of the formation of profits. Thus for Medio: tlIn
particular value analysis enabled Marx to investigate the process
of formation of profits, which belongs to the relationships between
capitalists and labourers, neglecting as a first approximation the
complications arising from the equalization of the rate of profit
allover the system, which refers to the relations among capita-
lists".(60) It is of course around this theoretical question
that the "transformation debate" revolves, to which considerable
attention will be devoted in the next chapter. With Salama and
other authors I would insist that it is essential to start at the
value level to understand prices of production.
Maurice Dobb and Ronald Meek both saw this function (the
explanation of prices) of the labour theory of value as an important
one, so that as we shall see in Chapter 5, the determination of
prices under the monopoly stage of capitalism becomes an important
issue for Meek. The Neo-Ricardians of course argue that their
'common standard' allows of an explanation of prices without the
detour through value. However, the reduction of commodities to a
common standard depends on the profit rate, so that the production
function cannot actually be constructed from technological data alone.
Once more, what is at issue here is what Neo-Ricardian theory does
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not explain. In similar fashion to orthodox theory, Ricardian
analysis can only answer questions about relative prices, it cannot
deal so easily with the problem of accumulation nor the dynamic
laws of capitalism.
In conclusion perhaps it is helpful to point out that what
Marx is actually doing is to explain how prices inevitably differ
from values in a capitalist society so that 'equality of labour'
is transposed into 'equality between capitals'. Marx in other
words reconciles the existence of surplus value with the reign of
competition. As Morishima puts it: "It is now evident that
the aim of Marx was not to establish the proportionality of prices
and values in a capitalist economy, but, on the contrary, to
explain why they may differ from each other when the workers cease
to possess the means of production, so that they have to sell their
labour power in the market".(61) We have in fact here a clue to
the 'upsidedown' nature of competition which Marx was so
emphatic about.
(d) The social distribution of labour
Rubin places considerable emphasis on the labour theory
of value explaining the social distribution of labour, as for
instance when he says "Value is the transmission belt which trans-
fers the movement of working processes from one point of society to
another, making that society a functioning wholeu.(62) This view
is attacked by Steedman and the Neo-Ricardians when they put forward
the idea of reducing all commodities to a common standard, which
they argue makes value categories redundant.
It cannot be denied that Marx's argument in Chapter 1 of
Volume 1 of Capital is weak when he is arguing that exchange value
must be based on a_C!:ommon something (unlike use value which is
limited by the physical characteristics of the commodity) and then
proceeds to state that human labour in the abstract is what equi-
valent commodities have in common. "That which determines the
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magnitude of the value of any article is the amount of labour-time
socia.lly necessary for its production" asserts Marx.(63)
I think it is useful here to keep in mind the distinction
that Makato Itoh makes between the substance and the form of value.
Itoh points out that the notion of value is inseparable from the
form of value. Deducing that the substance of value is crystals
of abstract labour (as I have just showed Marx doing) relies on
the exchangeability of commodities. It is also a common property
of commodities that they have a price-form, the completed form of
value. Itoh concludes: "Thus exchange-value as the form of
value now appears as indispensable to the notion of value".(64)
A double-bind situation develops so that in a capitalist economy,
labour-time embodied occurs through value relations, so that the
forms and substance of value are inextricably connected. It must
be remembered that the social labour-process is common to all forms
of society. But even under capitalism, labour power is not a
labour product. For labour power is the subject of production and
not its object. Labour power therefore lacks the substance of
value as the embodiment of labour-time, although it is regulated
by the substance of value as the labour-time embodied in the
necessary means of subsistence. Talking thus of the importance of
the forms of value points towards the lack of a narrow determinism
in Marx and demonstrates the importance of seeing labour as the
SUbject and not simply the object of production.
(e) Understanding the 'laws of motion'
A further function of the labour theory of value is that
it provides a basis for understanding the laws of motion of
capitalism. By laws of motion is meant such features as the
theory of crisis, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, and
the replacement of competitive by monopoly capitalism. As we shall
see in the next chapter the process of formation of relative surplus
value lies at the root of Marx's shift in exposition from dealing
with what the individual capitalist does, to the way in which this
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affects the whole capitalist system. Closely associated with the
formation of relative surplus value is the process of capitalist
innovation. (This is something that is well dealt with in liThe
Results of the Immediate Process of Production".(65)) This in
turn is tied to crisis theory and the tendency of the profit
rate to fall.
Once more, a comparison with the Neo-Ricardian approach is
helpful here. This latter takes an essentially static approach,
where the concept of the improvement in the productivity of
labour becomes external to the system. Thus for example Glyn
and Sutcliffe's analysis of the crisis of British capitalism in
the 1970's relies on a rise in wages which is seen as contingent,
as unrelated to a rise in the organic composition of capital.
Amin sees the defect of the Sraffian system in the substitution of
prices, which depend on distribution, for values, which do not.
For Sraffians then, production techniques are external to the
economic problem. In broader terms, Rowthorne argues that what
is lacking for the Neo-Ricardians is a view of capitalism as a mode
of distribution.(66) I shall be arguing later in this thesis that
in providing a basis for understanding the process of accumulation,
the labour theory of value shows the mechanisms by which competitive
capitalism becomes monopoly capitalism.
(f) Social asnects of production
This brief discussion of the laws of motion of capitalism
leads almost imperceptibly towards a sixth area: that of the
ability of the labour theory of value to capture the social aspects
of production. It has just been shown that for Rowthorne it is
important to see capitalism as a mode of production. This
emphasis on the social aspects of production is a common one.
Thus for example Rubin argues that the theory of fetishism is the
basis of Marx's entire economic system, especially his theory of
value. Rubin is much concerned to reach the reality behind the
appearance. "In capitalist society... direct production
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relations between determined persons who are owners of different
factors of production, do not exist. The capitalist, the wage
labourer, as well as the landowner, are commodity owners who are
formally independent of each other". It is only through
purchase and sa.Le that direct production relations are established.
liThe agents of production are combined through the factors of
production; production bonds among people are established through
the movement of things u . (67) Earlier we characterised Rubin seeing
value as a transmission belt explaining the social distribution of
labour. This is perhaps rather unfair, since underlying this
somewhat crude conclusion is an emphasis on the theory of value as
being a result of the form that production-work relations must take
under capitalism; that social labour must take the material form
of value. The concluding section will take up this issue of the
form of value.
That the Sraffians in the nature of their argument omit the
social aspects of production, must be a major criticism of their
approach. Profits on this account are the 4irect consequence of
two factors: the socio-technical conditions of production and the
real wage paid to 'Workers. For Marxists surplus labour is the
determinant of profits, and it is only indirectly, via their
effect on surplus value, that real wages and techP~cal conditions
have their effect. E.O. Wright points to the Sraffian account
being based on a mathematical analysis of the necessary conditions
for formally calculating profits. Thus Neo-Ricardian critiques
of Marx are heavily based on transformation procedure calculations.
Wright dubs this as "thought-experiment": in other words mathema-
tical calculation is given the status of proof about a process of
causation. (6S)
As has been emphasised at several points already, Marx's
theory, based as it is on the social relations of production can
theorise about class relations. In contrast, for the Ricardians
the primacy of the class struggle is an arbitrary assumption. The
advantage of a labour theory of value in capturing the social
aspects of production is that it politicises economics. But let
Marx himself state how he sees the social nature of value:
"Hence when we bring the products of our labour into relation with
each other as values; it is not because we see in these articles
the material receptacles of homogeneous human labour. Quite the
contrary: whenever by an act of exchange, we equate as values
our different products, by that very act, we also equate as human
labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them. We are
not aware of this, nevertheless we do it. Value, therefore, does
not stalk about with a label describing what it is. It is value,
rather, that converts every product into a social hieroglyphic, to
get behind the secret of our own social products; for to stamp an
object of utility as value, is just as much a social product as
language" • ( 69)
(g) The value controversy in retrospect
What I want to emphasise in concluding this section on
the labour theory of value is the extent to which there has been a
movement away from earlier narrowly deterministic models. This
shift is reflected in the work of people like Makato Itoh, Diane
Elson and Erik Olin Wright, but this is not to say that such views
were not visible much earlier in the marxist tradition. Without
presenting any thorough analysis of why these changes have occurred,
it is not difficult to suggest the stultifying effects of the
dogmatic style of marxism which became the rule under Stalinism.
What is so encouraging about this new approach to the labour theory
of value is precisely its lack of dogmatism. Perhaps its most
important result is that space is available for political action,
but as I shall show in later chapters, this shift away from a
narrowly deterministic view of the labour theory of value does much
to confirm its continuing relevance in the analysis of the monopoly
stage of capitalism.
Let me characterise what I have called this new, non-dogmatic
approach. It is based on emphasising the importance of the forms
of value. Earlier it was pointed out that Itoh saw the substance
64
of the value of labour power as inevitably the subject and not the
object of production in any form of society. Elson expresses this
in a somewhat different way when she, sees labour as 'fluidity', as
'potential'. Labour is both abstract and concrete, both social
and private; labour thus has four different aspects, four
'potentia' which do not exist on their own. She is here making
the same point as Itoh when he sees the substance of value as human
self-activity. Elson draws a useful analogy. between labour and
energy: energy is not an absolute entity and cannot be rendered
distinct from the particular form of energy. "In my view, Marx
poses commodities as substantially equivalent in the same way that
in natural science, light heat and mechanical motion are posed as
substantially equivalent, as forms which are interchangeable as
embodiments of a common substance, which is self activating, in the
sense of not requiring some outside intervention, s~e 'prime mover'
to sustain and transform it, i.e. as forms of energy".(70)
Under these circumstances the correlation between the form and
the substance of value does not need to be that of direct proportion-
ality, and Marx's concept of determination is thus not seen as
deterministic. Such a view is expanded upon by Wright when he
argues that the marxian account of profits requires a more complex
notion of causation, and in clarifying this he distinguishes two
modes of determination. The first of these is 'structural
limitation', in which one element sets limits of another element,
but with variations between. The second is selection of specific
outcomes within the above range. "Surplus value, then, would
remain the 'origin' of profits, not in the sense that it is the only
determinant of profits, but in the sense that the effectivity of all
other determinants of profits occurs either by virtue of their
effects on surplus value or within limits established by surplus
value".(71) It is easy to see that such a view fits in readily
Marx's notion of causation as discussed in the section on
methodology.
The focus of attention in the labour theory of value thus
shifts from the idea that there is an already determined independent
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variable in production to a concern with the forms of value.
That this was indeed a concern of earlier marxists can be seen in
the case of Rubin. Having spelled out that production relations
among people necessarily acquire a material form and can be
realised only in that form, Rubin states: "The usual short
formulation of this theory holds that the value of the commodity
depends on the quantity of labour socially necessary for its
production: or in a general formulation that labour is hidden
behind, or contained in value". He argues that on the contrary,
the point of departure is labour, not value. "It is more accurate
to express the theory of value inversely: in the commodity
capitalist economy, production-work relations among people
necessarily acquire the form of the value of things and can appear
only in this material form; social labour can only be expressed
in value".(72) Diane Elson's term "the value theory of labour"
has a long parentage then:
In the course of the next chapter we shall be following various
of the forms that value takes - its forms as surplus value, value in
the form of capital, and the price form of value. The notion of
value cannot be separated from the form of value and it becomes
characteristically marxist therefore to attempt clarification of
the historical nature of value relations. Given that this thesis
is concerned with the changing nature of competition (an historical
concern) such I1 comparat i ve sociological economics l1 (a term Croce
uses to contrast Marxian economics with "general economic science")
is of considerable relevance. The Neo-Ricardians in contrast
cannot understand the forms of value, concerned as they are with an
invariable standard of value on the basis of a technical
determinism.
D. The law of (surolus) value
What then is the law of value? It becomes obvious from the
preceeding discussion of the value theory of labour that the law of
value is not something rigid and deterministic, nor is the law of
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value simply concerned with the relation between value and price.
Indeed those who emphasise the problems of transforming values into
prices might reflect on the fact that with the growth of monopolies
price is in many respects no longer the indicator to capitalists
that it was under competitive capitalism! Whilst the issues raised
by the monopoly stage of capitalism will be considered in more
detail in Chapters 5 and 6 it is apparent that the problem of the
divergence of prices and values may recede in importance under
modern capitalism!
Having started with a negative definition of the law of value
and saying what it is not, let me turn now to the more difficult
task of being positive. Perhaps the simplest picture of the law
of value is given by seeing it as the application of the value
theory of labour to the real world. This means that the law of
value cannot be examined except in the context of the labour theory.
The law of value is the regulatory process of capitalism. Before
developing this point further, however, what does Marx himself have
to say about the law of value?
Marx appears to emphasise two aspects (thus providing an
example of his dialectical analysis, since they comprise opposing
aspects contained within a single concept). On the one hand, Marx
sees the law of value as a permanent law, and yet it is also a law
which changes with changing historical circumstances.
Dealing with the 'eternal' aspects of the law first of all,
Marx talks of the law of value as a 'natural law'; it is the law
of the necessity of distributing social labour in definite
proportions, a law which Marx clarifies in a wellknown letter of
July 11th 1868. "Every child knows that a country which ceased
to work, I will not say for a year, but for a few weeks, would die.
Every child knows too that the mass of products corresponding to the
different needs require different and qualitatively determined
masses of the total labour of society. That this necessity of
distributing social labour cannot be done away with by the
particular form of social production, but can only change the
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form it assumes is self-evident. No natural laws can be done away
with".(73) Engels too took up this aspect, when he wrote in 1895
that the law of value is more than a mere hypothesis; it is in
fact a logical process, with a historical process arising from the
latter.(74) The law of valu.e, as Marx explains in a section of
"Theories of Surplus Value" when he is criticising Adam Smith for
thinking that the law of value can be suspended, is the law of
the exchange of equal quantities of labour. "He., Adam Smith.,
senses that somehow, whatever the cause may be, and he does not
grasp what it is - in the actual result the law of value is
suspended: more labour is exchanged for less labour (from the
labourer's standpoint), less labour is exchanged for more labour
(from the capitalist's standpoint)".(75) It must however be
emphasised that Marx and Engels see the law of value as uniquely
associated with questions of commodity production since when
exploitation is direct as under slavery it does not have to take
the value form.
However the characteristics of the law of value as a law of
nature are by no means the most significant for Marx. Far more
important than the law of value per se, is the form in which the law
operates, a form which changes with changing historical circum-
stances. Marx puts it in the following terms: "The nonsense about
the necessity of proving the concept of value arises from complete
ignorance both of the subject dealt with and the method of science
••• The science consists precisely in working out how the law of
value operates".(76) The criticisms that Marx makes of Adam Smith
in the section of "Theories of Surplus Value" which was cited above
is that the latter allows his confidence in the law of value to be
shaken when this law appears to change into its opposite with the
accumulation of capital and private property in land. What Smith
failed to recognise was that we have here a specific development
which the law of value undergoes when commodities are exchanged as
products of capital, and not simply as products of labour.
As will be argued when the concept of capital in general is
considered in the next chapter, certain marxists use the term "law
-"
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of surplus value", which is a helpful way of emphasising the new
form that the law of value takes with the development of the
capitalist mode of production. What is obvious however, from this
brief discussion of Marx's view of the law of value, is that Marx
pinpoints the importance of the changing form that value takes.
The law of value then, as the study of the changing form that
value takes, is thus the application of the value theory of labour
to the real world.
How then )ioes the law of surplus value operate under capitalism,
as opposed to simple commodity production? The question will be
answered in more detail in the next chapter on the transformation
debate, but a brief pre-view is provided here. The modification
is that the law operates through the formation of an average profit
rate, by regulating prices of production. Prices of production
show us the concrete form of the law of value, which must neverthe-
less be understood at the general level first of all. Prices of
production become the law of value operating at a level nearer to
reality. The law of value thus continues in the modified form
of the average rate of profit, to dominate the movement of prices.
It m~st not be forgotten however that there is a flexibility
in the substance of value as the labour-time embodied in each
commodity. To repeat: the law of value is not something rigid
and deterministic, but is instead elastic in its nature. The
flexibility arises from the distinction between the substance and
the form of value. As I have already pointed out, Itoh pinpoints
this flexibility as arising from asking what the substance of the
value of labour power is. On the one hand, labour lacks the
substance of value as the embodiment of labour-time since it is the
subject of production and not its object. On the other hand,
labour is regulated by the substance of value as the labour-time
embodied in the necess~J means of subsistence. In the space
between the two, surplus value is produced. tiThe correlations
between the form and the substance of value need not be a matter
of direct proportionality. The standard prices of commodities can
stably represent quantities of embodied labour-time which are not
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directly proportional. In contrast, in the case of labour-power,
a sort of equal exchange of labour-time should take place between
labour-power as a commodity and the necessary means of subsistence".
So Itoh contr~ts the reproduction of commodity products with that
of labour, and concludes: "The substance of value as the labour-
time embodied in each commodity has a sort of elasticity in its
regulation of the exchange-ratios with other commodities within
the range of s , L i.e. surplus value] "(77)
It will be argued in the section on the transformation debate
in Chapter 2 that the difference between the substance and the form
of value can be further developed in an interpretation of that
debate. What is interesting to point out here is that (as was
shown above) Wright's idea of two 'modes of determination' leads to
similar conclusions on the 'elasticity of regulation' as does Itoh.
Marx himself is emphatic on the approximate nature and elasticity
of the law of value when he says: "In short, under capitalist
production, the general law of value asserts itself merely as the
prevailing tendency, in a very complicated and approximate manner,
as a never ascertainable average of ceaseless fluctuations".(78)
Anticipating what will be explained in the ensuing chapter
enables conclusions to be drawn on the relationship between the
labour theory of value and the law of surplus value. In overall
terms it can be said that the former relates to capital in general.
In other words, the labour theory of value comprises the abstract
analysis, while the law of surplus value relates to many capitals,
at.a level nearer to reality. It is at this latter level that
competition becomes important. The task associated with the law of
surplus value is that of showing how it operates, to show how a
society made up of many capitals becomes a functioning whole and how
it fulfils the characteristics of capital in general. Thus,
consonant with the method of abstraction which it was argued above
Marx makes use of, the law of value is concerned with the changing
forms of value resulting from the process of capitalist regulation.
Marx in "Das Kapital ll was contrasting simple commodity production
with competitive capitalism and the ensuing change in the mode of
operation of the law of value. The concern of this thesis is to
contrast the basic characteristics of commodity production under
the monopoly stage of capitalism and under the competitive stage.
It is important to be aware of the fact that the law of value
was not seen as rigidly deterministic by Marx even when applying
it to the competitive capitalism of his day.
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Chapter 2
AN INTERPREl'ATION OF TEE ROLE OF COMPErITION
IN MARX'S ECONOMIC WRITINGS
A. Introduction
"Conceptually", says Marx in the Grundrisse, "competition is
nothing other than the inner nature of capital, its essential
character appearing and realised as the reciprocal interaction of
many capitals with one another, the inner tendency as external
necessitY".(1) To examine the nature of competition in a
Marxist framework, therefore, the relation between 'capital in
general' and 'many capitals' needs clarification. As I shall
argue, competition for Marx is part of the inner nature of capital,
and for this reason competition is not simply under consideration
when Marx deals with the interrelations between different capitals
(Volume Ill's 'many capitals'), but it is also implicit in
Volume I's analysis of the general concept of capital. This link
between 'capital in general' and 'many capitals' will be one of the
chief concerns of this chapter, in all its ramifications. I shall
take the stand that an analysis of value must be the starting point
for understanding the nature of 'capital in general'. This being
so, the bridge from there to 'many capitals' will lead me through
consideration of the role of the average profit rate to the
transformation procedure. This will lay the foundation for
examining the changing forms of value and of competition that
result from the development of monopoly in the following chapters.
In addition to the main purposes just outlined, this chapter
will also bring together Marx's many comments on competition
(scattered throughout Das Kapital, and in particular Volume III,
as well as certain comments in the Grundrisse and elsewhere).
This aim has an importance of its own. Let me expand here on what
was said in the introduction where I suggested that Marx intended
to deal comprehensively with competition at some point. Did Marx
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actually have such an intention? An answer requires entering the
controversy over whether Marx changed the plan for his work on
political economy. I propose to make a brief presentation of
Rosdolsky's argument that ¥~X abandoned his original proposal for
a separate treatment of competition and dropped his previous funda-
mental separation of the analysis of 'capital in general' and
competition. Rosdolsky was of course interested in tracing the
changes in Marx's outline to draw attention to their methodological
importance. I too would argue that the scope of analysis of
'capital in general' can be expanded to include the more superficial
phenomena of the relations between capitals.
Rosdolsky distinguishes the 1857 Plan (as contained in Marx's
correspondence) from that of 1866 (the latter being of course the
four volumes of Capital), and then looks at the material dealt with
in the Rough Draft (i.e. the Grundrisse, written 1857-58) and in the
manuscript of 1861-63 (that part dealing with the Theories of Surplus
Value was published by Kautsky). The 1857 outline was as follows:
I The Eook on Capital
(a) Capital in general
1. Production process of capital
2. Circulation process of capital
3. Profit and interest
(b) Section on the competition
(c) Section on the credit system
(d) Section on share-capital
II The Eook on Landed Property
III The Eook on Wage Labour
IV The Eook on the State
V The Eook on Foreign Trade
VI The Eook on the World Market and Crises
whilst the 1866 outline, as Capital was eventually published was:
Eook I Production Process of Capital
Eook II Circulation Process of Capital
Eook III Forms of the Process as a Whole
Eook IV The History of the Theory
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What happens to the section o~ competition (r(b)) of the
1857 outline? Rosdolsky argues for a narrowing down of the
original outline, which however corresponds to an expansion of the
part which remained. In the Grundrisse, Rosdolsky sees Marx
sticking precisely to his original outline, without dealing with the
phenomenon or competition. "We can see then, that the Rough Draft
does not fundamentally go beyond points I(a)1-3 ••• its structure
corresponds exactly to I'1arx's original outline". (2) Rosdolsky
feels that the manuscript of 1861-63 also has the same coverage,
but that there is a change in emphasis which culminates in the
outline published by Kautsky and written by Marx in 1863 when he
had almost finished the manuscript of the Theories of Surplus Value.
This outline dispenses with a separate treatment of competition.
Rosdolsky sees the Grundrisse as repeatedly stressing that a later
analysis of competition will allow full treatment of the problem of
the average rate of profit and prices of production. In the
'Theories' however, to deal with Smith and Ricardo's theories of
value and surplus value, Marx had to deal with these topics, although
several questions are still assigned to the separate section on
competition. Rosdolsky predicts: "However, the fact that so much
of the material originally destined for the special section on
competition was already anticipated in the Manuscript of 1~£1-63~
finally lead ••• to the complete elimination of this section".(3)
The transition from the old to the new outline then finally takes
place when Volume III of Capital was written in 1864-65. True,
Marx still assigns certain specific problems to a separate section on
competition in Volume III, but Rosdolsky sees this as dealing with
the movement of market prices only. (I have already explained that
I do not propose to deal with competition at this level.) The key
is provided in Marx's own statement in the first page of that volume:
"The conformations of the capitals evolved in this third volume
approach step by step that form which they assume on the surface of
society, in their mutual interactions, in competition, and in the
ordinary consciousness of the human agencies in this process."
To summarize with a contrast: whilst the original plan for a
separate section on competition is dropped due to its inclusion
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within the scope of the analysis of 'capital in general', the
intention of writing separate books on the state, foreign trade and
the world market and crises is not abandoned, but held back for
eventual continuation.
Rosdolsky provides a convincing argument that Marx no longer
held to the idea of treating competition separately, unless perhaps
in very narrow terms at the level of the market between supply and
demand. I nevertheless hold that a useful purpose is fulfilled
in bringing together what Marx had to say about competition overall.
Firstly such a task is justified in its own terms, since as far as
I am aware it has not been done before. In addition, since I am
attempting in this thesis to sketch out the lines for the develop-
ment of a specifically Marxist framework for the analysis of
competition and monopoly, it is important to clarify what Narx
himself had to say, as a basis for ensuing chapters. The approach
through the history of ideas is fundamental to the object that I
have in mind.
What is proposed for the remainder of this chapter is to provide
a critical exposition of what Marx had to say, essentially in Volumes
I and III of Capital, on the relation between 'capital in general'
and 'many capitals'. As this is done, Marx's comments on
competition will be brought together, and the interconnections
between competition and the law of value will be brought out through
the medium of examination of the changing forms of value, so that
conclusions can be drawn at the end of the chapter. Let me
provide a preview of the arguments.
The law of surplus value is seen in operation at the level of
many capitals and their action upon one another in competition,
which is analysed by Marx in Volume III of Capital. In Volume I,
he deals with 'capital in general' and shows how value is determined
by the total labour performed (paid and unpaid, comprising variable
and surplus respectively) in producing a commodity, and by the amount
of value transferred from the constant capital consumed (comprising
a portion of fixed capital and the circulating capital). Volume I
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thus shows that the mass of profit available to the whole capitalist
class is determined by the mass of surplus value appropriated by
that class, but the distribution of that surplus is determined by
competition which makes the laws of motion of capitalist society
felt by the individual capitalist, as described in Volume III.
In examining the application of the law of value via the competitive
process, one must however remain aware of what lies behind this
process: "What competition does not show is the way in which value
is determined and the movement of production dominated by this
determination. It does not show that the values that lie behind
the prices of production determine them in the last instance".(4)
As already emphasised, the appearance of phenomena may deny their
reality. The reasons for the contradictions between the appearance
and the reality with respect to competition and the law of value
will be brought out in the course of this chapter, as I deal with the
determination of the average profit rate, and how it affects the
individual capitalist in Volume III of Capital.
Given, as has already been stated, that Marx sees competition
as "the inner nature of capital" the proposal is to start from
'capital in general', and thereby to demonstrate what Marx means by
this proposition. In the concern of this thesis to analyse the
nature of competition, there will be a need to give a practical
demonstration of penetrating beyond the "surface of phenomena" by
bringing out not merely the nature of capital, but also by explaining
what Marx meant by the average rate of profit, for it is this that
provides the basis for the interaction between "many capitals". I
shall be making clear that capitalism is a system of distributed
capitals, but that it is also a system of distributed labour.
Rubin sums this up in his chapter on "Value and Production Price":
"The capitalist economy is a system of distributed capitals which
are in a dynamic equilibrium, but this economy does not cease to be
a system of distributed labour which is in dynamic equilibrium, as
is true of any economy based on a division of labour. It is only
necessary to see under the visible process of the distribution of
capital the invisible process of the distribution of social labour".
(5). So equality of capitals hides equality of labour from view,
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and thus it is not possible to consider competition until the nature
of capital is fully understood$ Only then can it be understood
that the laws immanent in capitalist production assert themselves
for individual capitals as coercive laws of competition.
Thus it is that, in Volume I of Capital, Marx makes very few
direct references to competition as he explains in the following
passage: "It is not our intention to consider, here, the way in
which the laws, immanent in capitalist production, manifest them-
selves in the movements of individual masses of capital, where they
assert themselves as coercive laws of competition, and are brought
home to the mind and consciousness of the individual capitalist as
the directing motives of his operations. But thus much is clear;
a scientific analysis of competition is not possible, before we have
a conception of the inner nature of capital, just as the apparent
motions of the heavenly bodies are not intelligible to any but him,
who is acquainted with their real motions, motions which are not
directly perceptible by the senses".(6)
B. 'Capital in general'
Let me provide a critical summary of Marx's arguments on the
nature of capital in general, and the changing forms of value, which
incidentally provide an example of the "process of abstraction" at
work. It will be familiar to many that Marx derives his labour
theory of value in the first instance from an analysis of the dual
nature of commodities, which on the one hand have a use value
limited by the physical nature of the commodity, and on the other
have an exchange value. This latter Marx argues, must be based on
something which all commodities have in common, i.e. abstract hum~~
labour, which is at the same time socially necessary labour. As
was argued earlier, Marx undoubtedly here provides an assertion
rather than an argument, based on a confusion between the substance
of value and its forms.
In the first chapter of Das Kapital, Marx proposes to trace the
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genesis of the money form of value by examining the forms which
value takes. Keeping in mind that Marx is showing how exploitation
works, but not that he is proving exploitation, these changing
forms can be followed. "The simplest value relation is evidently
that of one commodity to some one other commodity of a different
kind".(7) The simplest form of value is thus the elementary
form where the value of one commodity, for example linen, is
expressed relative to a second, say a coat. The coat is then
the equivalent. The relative form of value indicates that the
value of a commodity is something wholly different from its
substance and properties: a social relation in fact lies at the
bottom of it. A second peculiarity of the equivalent form is that
concrete labour becomes the form in which its opposite, abstract
human labour, manifests itself. "The body of the commodity that
serves as the equivalent (the coat) figures in the abstract, and
is at the same time the product of some specifically useful
concrete labour (tailoring). This concrete labour becomes therefore
the medium for expressing abstract human labour". (8) Summing up
on the elementary form of value Marx draws attention to the crucial
fact that exchange value is not the starting point for value.
"Our analysis has shown that the form or expression of the value
of a commodity originates in the nature of the value, and not that
value and its magnitude originates in the mode of their expression
as exchange value".(9) Rubin expresses the same thing rather
differently when he says: "The labour theory of value is not
based on an analysis of exchange transactions as such in their
material form, but on the analysis of those social production
relations expressed in the transactions".(10)
The second form which value takes is the total or expanded
form in which linen is expressed in terms of many commodities. The
linen is now seen as a citizen of the world of commodities, and it
becomes plain that it is not the accident of exchange that deter-
mines value, but vice versa. All commodities appear at the
equivalent of the linen. By reversing this series we obtain what
Marx called the general form of value. "By this form commodities
are for the first time effectively brought into relation with one
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another as values, or made to appear as exchange values".(11)
This results from the joint action of all commodities. Linen
becomes the "universal equivalent", and all kinds of actual labour,
tailoring, weaving, steel smelting or upholstering are reduced to
their common character of being expenditure of human labour power.
One commodity is excluded from the rest, "and from the moment that
this exclusion becomes finally restricted to one particular
commodity, from that moment only, the general form of relative
value of the world of commodities obtains real consistence and
general social validity".(12) It is thus that the money form
of value is born.
Perhaps it is worth interposing at this point a brief note of
opposition to Ronald Meek's proposition (also voiced by Engels)
that Capital was written in some sort of 'historical order'. It
is true that Marx's style of exposition tends to encourage the idea
that the simple form of value came into real historical existence
prior to the extended form, and only later did the money form
develop. Any such implication, should it seems to me, be seen
simply as a reflection of Marx's expository style, itself a
function of his method of abstraction.
Marx closes this first, and most abstract chapter of Capital
with an analysis of what he calls the "fetishism of commodities", a
section which sums up the foregoing argument by showing how the
appearance of a commodity belies its reality. To the producers the
relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of the
rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at
work, but as what they really are, material relations between
persons and social relations between things. The social nature
of value for Marx has already been underlined in the last chapter
on the labour theory of value. Indeed, Rubin sees the theory of
fetishism as the basis of Marx's entire economic system, and this
view has much to recommend it. He expresses the objective basis
for commodity fetishism in the following terms: "The thing
acquires the property of value, money, capital, etc., not because
of its natural properties, but because of those social production
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relations with which it is connected in the property economy. Thus
social production relations are not only '~bolised' by things,
but are realised through things".(13)
Having analysed money as the universal equivalent, Marx then
raises the question of how money becomes capital. The contra-
dictions of the self-expansion of value lead to the concept of
surplus value, the original labour theory of value being now the
basis of this more complex theory. The process of exchange of
commodities, which Ma.~ exemplifies as C-M-C (commodity - money
commodity) is the unity of selling in order to buy. The
reciprocal alienation necessary for exchange requires private owners
of commodities. The circulation of commodities is a process of the
circulation of materialised labour in which qualitatively
different use values are exchanged.
It is important to realise that Marx here sees a theory of
price as being distinct from a theory of value, something that has
already been emphasised in the previous chapter. Price is a
purely ideal or mental form of value: "Although invisible, the
value of iron, linen and corn has actual existence in these very
~icles: it is ideally made perceptible by their equality with
gold, a relation that, so to say, exists only in their own heads.
Their owner must therefore, lend them his tongue, or hang a ticket
on them, before their prices can be communicated to the outside
world".(14) Marx says that prices are merely "wooing glances
cast at money by commodities"(15) and thus arises an initial
possibility of a divergence between value and price. Since this
possibility becomes of crucial importance in the controversies over
Volume III of Capital, it is well to realise that Marx points to
this very possibility in Volume I. "The possibility, therefore,
of quantitative incongruity between prices and the magnitude of
value, or the derivation of the former from the latter, is inherent
in the price form itself".(16).
To return, however, to the question of how money becomes
capital; money as capital has a different mode of circulation from
the circulation of commodities. M-C~1 appears purposeless, for
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money simply becomes money. Value becomes value in process, and
as such capital. Whence this self-expansion? The secret is that
"r1oneybags" the capitalist is a consumer of labour, he is able to
extract value from the consumption of a commodity, labour power.
Labour power itself has a value determined by the socially
necessary labour-time for its production and reproduction, but the
labourer works longer, producing surplus labour, the basis for
profit. Marx's labour theory of value thus becomes a surplus
theory, leading in turn to a theo~J showing the operation of
exploitation. It seems to me important to emphasise that Marx's
theory deals with the mechanism for exploitation in capitalist
society, and this can be underlined by using the term, the "law
of surplus value" (as has already been done) to describe how value
theory operates in the real world.
It becomes clear at this point that Marx's theory of value
contains within it a theory of classes. Capitalist production,
relying as it does on the production of surplus-labour, presupposes
a new form of class society, presupposes that the owner of money
meets a 'free' labourer in the market, a labourer completely
separated from all property by means of which he can realise his
labour. "Primitive accumulation" was the term used by Marx for
the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of
production during the dissolution of feudal society. Once the two
new classes of wage labourer and capitalist have developed, they
continually recreate themselves as classes. "The labourer there-
fore constantly produces material, objective wealth, but in the form
of capital, an alien power that dominates and exploits him; and the
capitalist constantly produces labour-power but in the form of
SUbjective wealth, separated from the objects in and by which, it
alone can be realised: in short he produces the labourer but as
wage labourer".(17) The capitalist too, is the agent of capital.
"It is only insofar as the appropriation of ever more and more
wealth in the abstract becomes the sole motive of his operations,
that he functions as a capitalist, that is as capital personified
and endowed with a consciousness and a will".(18) Notice that
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accumulation is here seen as inherent in the nature of capital.
Now that Marx's theory of value has become a theory of classes,
what mechanisms are available to the capitalist to achieve an
increase in surplus value? Marx postulates two: absolute and
relative surplus value. Although it is the latter that is of most
relevance to competition, it will be useful to provide a brief
exposition of the former. Without forgetting what was said
earlier of the 'fluidity' of labour, the situation can be
presented in a simplified form as follows.
The value of labour power (its costs of production and
reproduction, which we should note Marx saw as historically
variable) and the value which labour-power creates in the productive
process are two different things, labour power as a commodity being
not only a source of value, but of more value than it has in itself.
Eut by the very act of adding new value, the labourer also preserves
or transfers the value of the means of production to the product,
due to the two-fold nature of labour, the particular form of labour
preserving value whilst socially necessary labour time (general
labour) adds value. Thus Marx distinguishes between constant
capital (c, the means of production, raw material, auxilliary
material and instruments of labour) and variable capital (v, labour
power) the latter undergoing an alteration of value in the
productive process. On the basis of these definitions Marx then
introduces the concept of the rate of surplus value, which he
defines as the relative increase in the value of variable capital,
s surplus labour .
= 1 b • It has already been podrrted out that Marxv necessary a our
is here making a moral proposition: whilst the law of surplus value
does indeed show how exploitation takes place, it does not prove
that exploitation, but takes it as a postulate. Note that the rate
of surplus value is not the amount by which the value of the
product exceeds its constituent elements, for although constant
capital has to be advanced, it bears no relation to the creation of
value which derives rather from the fact that the capitalist has
only to pay for its cost of production in purchasing variable
capital. From this can be seen the crucial importance of the
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length of the working day in the class struggle, for by extending
it, the capitalist can increase the rate of surplus value, creating
what Marx calls absolute surplus value. Marx expresses this in
his usual dramatically moral fashion as follows: "It is now no
longer the labourer that employs the means of production, but the
means of production that employs the labourer. Instead of being
consumed by him, as material elements of his productive activity,
they consume him as the ferment necessary to their own life
process, and the life-process of capital consists only in its
movement as value constantly expanding, constantly multiplying
itself. Furnaces and workshops that stand idle by night and absorb
no living labour are a mere 'loss' to the capitalist. Hence,
furnaces and workshops constitute a lawful claim upon the night
labour of the work peoplell.(19) Again notice that capital is
typified as being a process of accumulation, of self expanding value.
From Part IV of Volume I, the "Production of Relative Surplus
Value" Narx's analysis moves onto a new plane and the laws of
motion of capitalism begin to be explained. It is necessary to
start distinguishing between what the individual capitalist does,
and the way in which this affects the whole capitalist system,
although the threads of the argument will be fully brought together
in Volume III. It is thus from this point that Marx makes direct
reference to the process of competition. Marx moves into the
dynamics of capitalist production through the concept of relative
surplus value, pointing out that the expansion of capital possible
through lenthening of the working day (absolute surplus-value)
has a natural limit. Relative surplus value is increased by a fall
in the value of labour-power, that is, through a cheapening of the
necessaries of life. To effect such a fall in the value of labour
power, productiveness must increase in those industries providing
basic necessities. But why should productiveness increase in such
industries? The concept of relative surplus value has not the
same quality of being immediately applied to the real world as has
the absolute form, although it is derived from the world. "The
general and necessary tendencies of capital must be distinguished
from their forms of manifestationll.(20)
86
There is in fact a motive for each individual capitalist to
cheapen his commodities by increasing the prcducj;iveness of labour,
since by doing so the individual value of the articles produced is'
below their social value. The capitalist can be sure of selling the
articles by naming a price below their social va.lue, but provided he
is still selling them at above their individual value, he obtains an
extra surplus value from each article sold, "Hence the capitalist
who applies the improved method of production, appropriates to
surplus-labour a greater proportion of the working day, than the
other capitalists in the same trade. He does individually, what
the whole body of capitalists, engaged in producing relative
<: surplus-v lue, do collectivelytl.(21) Incidentally, it should be
realised that the concept of 'extra surplus value' is an important
one for Marx, and in Chapter 3 it will be shown how this concept
is used in relation to the formation of monopoly profits.
It must be quite clear what provides the motivating force for
the individual capitalist to obtain this 'extra surplus value', for
it is not competition, as might first appear. The capitalist as
capital personified must make value expand itself, and if we turn
to Chapter 24 we find further elucidation of this. "Only as
personified capital is the capitalist respectable. As such, he
shares with the miser the passion for wealth as wealth. Eut that
which in the miser is a mere idiosyncracy is, in the capitalist, the
effect of the social mechanism, of which he is but one of the
wheels ll.(22) wllat is melodramatically phrased in Capital,
"Accumulate, Accumulate. That is Moses and the prophets!"(23) is
more soberly expressed in the Grundrisse, "The goal determining
activity of capital can only be that of growing wealthier, i.e. of
magnification, of increasing itself. A specific sum of money can
entirely suffice for a specific consumption in which it ceases to
be money. Eut as a representative of general wealth it cannot do
so".(24) Thus, competition reinforces something which is in any
case inherent in capital: the need for self-expansion. The meaning
of the passage from the Grundrisse cited at the opening of this
chapter can now be clearly seen. "Conceptually, competition is
nothing other than the inner nature of capital, its essential
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character appearing and realised as the reciprocal interaction of
many c&pitals with one another, the inner tendency as external
necessity". It is indeed impossible to understand the nature of
competition unless the nature of capital is also understood,
although in competition the inner tendency of capital appears as a
compulsion exercised by other capitals. By summing up with a more
extensive quotation from the Grundrisse, I hope Marx's view can be
made quite clear: "Competition merely expresses as real, posits as
an external necessity, that which lies within the nature of capital;
competition is nothing more than the way in which many capitals
force the inherent determinants of capital upon one another and upon
themselves. Hence not a single category of the Bourgeois economy,
not even the most basic, e.g. the determination of value, becomes
real through free competition alone". (25)
Before concluding the section, may I briefly develop the point
that relative surplus value involves a distinction between what the
individual capitalist does, and the way in which this affects the
capitalist system. It provides an indication of the links between
the law of surplus value and the laws of motion of capitalism. The
increase of relative surplus value is a result of the process of
increasing productivity of labour, when such an increased productivity
has seized on those branches of production connected with the means
of subsistence. Whilst he cheapens commodities, the capitalist also
augments relative surplus value, and he is thus ironically
continually striving to depress exchange value. In adopting labour
saving techniques which increase relative surplus value, the capita-
list process of accumulation produces a progressive decrease of
variable as against constant capital and thus a continually rising
organic composition of capital (the term Marx uses for the
proportion of constant to variable capital, £ ).
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As Marx describes the process of the increase of the productivity
of labour, particularly in the long chapter on Machinery and Modern
Industry, he uses vivid images for the dynamism inherent in
capitalism as production of surplus value. It is a dynamism which
has its progressive aspects: "Fanatically bent on making value
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expand itself the capitalist forces the human race to produce
for production's sake, he thus forces the development of the
productive powers of society, and creates those material conditions,
which alone can form the real basis of a higher form of society, a
society in which the full and free development of every individual
forms the ruling principle".(26)
It has been shown in this section that the motive to increase
productivity lies in the nature of capital, but that it is reinforced
by the effects of competition between individual capitals. In
Volume I of Capital, the emphasis has been on the struggle between
capital and labour, the class struggle, as expressed in the concept
of the rate of exploitation, but in the third volume this struggle
becomes transposed into a struggle between capital and capital,
as Marx turns his consideration from capital in general to that
of the interaction between capitals. "Capital passes through the
cycle of its metaporphoses. Finally, it steps so to say, forth out
of the internal organism of its life and enters into external
conditions of existence, into conditions in which the opposites are
not capital and labour, but capital and capital in one case, and
individual buyers and sellers in another. The original form in
which capital and wage-labour meet one another is disguised by the
interference of conditions which seem to be independent of them".(27)
In Volume III competition enters Marx's analysis.
Does this mean that in Volume I competition has been abstracted
from? I would argue the contrary. I have shown that Marx sees
competition as inherent in the nature of capital, so that in his
concern to analyse the latter in Volume I of Capital, he is
inevitably considering the former. Nevertheless, the central
concern of the first volume is to examine the class struggle, and
to this extent the focus of attention does not rest on competition
between capitals, it is rather present incidentally.
In conclusion, I would like to clarify one further point.
In "Wage Labour and Capital", Marx suggests that the class struggle
is a form of competition: "Industry leads two armies into the
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field against each other, each of which carried on a battle within
its own ranks, among its own troops".(28) It seems to me that
this is the only evidence which Meszaros could present for his
argument that Marx and Engels see two types of competition:
subjective competition between workers on the one hand or between
capitalists and capitalists on the other, ~~d objective or
fundamental competition between workers and property owners.(29)
Meszaros provides no documentation for this distinction, and I would
argue that it is an unhelpful one, that the class struggle should
not be seen as a form of competition.
This is not to deny that the class struggle between. capital
and labour takes place in a" framework determined by market
competition (between capitals), or to deny that the class struggle
at the same time influences competition between capitals. After
all, competition has been shown to be inherent in nature of capital.
This also means that we cannot simply say that the class struggle
'lies behind' competition, and that the latter is subsidiary to the
former. What is important is to realise that competition can mask
the class struggle, can make it appear as something other than it is.
As Volume III becomes the centre of attention, so will the process
of competition. The antagonism between capital and labour will
remain present despite the concern of a thesis which relates to
competition and monopoly, to the interactions within the capitalist
class.
C. Volume III: 'many capitals' and the average rate of profit
From the start of Volume III the 'upsidedown' nature of
competition referred to at the start of this chapter begins to
become apparent. As the book opens, it appears that competition
contradicts the determination of value by labour time. Competition
shows "average profits, independent of the organic composition of
capital in the different spheres of production and therefore
independent of the mass of living labour appropriated by any given
capital in any particular sphere of exploitationn.(30) Under
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competitive capitalism, the average rate of profit figures as an
already existing magnitude for the calculations of the individual
capitalist, determining the transfer of capital from one sphere to
another. Under these circumstances the average rate of profit
"does not present itself as a result of a division of value, but
rather as a magnitude independent of the value of the produced
commodities, as existing from the start and determining the average
price of commodities, that is as a creator of value".(31) How are
these contradictions resolved? Up till this point, it is the
concept of 'capital in general' that has been considered, although
it has been pointed out that competition is inherent in that
concept. Extending this idea, it becomes clear that the existence
of a single capital would be contradictory, and that capital must
exist in the form of many capitals. Just as the creation of
surplus value under capitalism was located in the nature of capital
as self-expanding value, so it is possible to deduce that many
capitals must exist because of the nature of capital as realised
exchange value. "Since value forms the foundation of capital, and
since it therefore necessarily exists only through exchange for
counter-value, it thus necessarily repels itself from itself. A
universal capital, one without alien capitals confronting it, with
which it exchanges ••• is therefore a non-thing. The reciprocal
repulsion between capitals is already contained in capital as
realised exchange value".(32)
The question that such a view immediately invites is: what
regulates the relationship between these inevitably many capitals?
How is it that the movement of 'many capitals' forms a homogeneous
whole?
Marx was not satisfied with the orthodox response that
competition should be assumed as some sort of driving force external
to the system itself. For the 'bourgeois' economist, "competition
comes in everywhere", Marx tells us in the Economic and Philosophical
Manuscrlfls, and what is more, it is explained by external circum-
stances. "As to how far these external and apparently accidental
circumstances are but the expression of a necessary course of
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development, political economy teaches us nothing ••• The only
wheels which political economy sets in motion are greed and the war
amongst the greedy - competition".(33) But it is not the egoism
of the capitalist, his psychological nature, which explains the
process of accumulation, but rather the nature of capital as such,
and indeed the capitalist inevitably functions as exploiter, just
as the labourer must produce surplus-value. "It is not because he
is a leader of industry that a man is a capitalist; on the contrary,
he is a leader of industry because he is a capitalist".(34)
Competition, then, is no 'deus ex machina' for Marx. For Marx it
is unnecessary to assume competition, since competition is inherent
in capital anyway.
Tracing the argument that will be followed there is a need to
clarify three points: firstly, the nature of the average profit
rate and its connection with competition, secondly the nature of the
regulatory process and thirdly, to continue to pursue the forms of
value. The first point will be developed in this section, which
will conclude with the dialectical features of the competitive
process, providing an overall picture of competition in a way that
I feel Marx himself failed to do. This will be discussed accepting
Marx's transformation of value into prices, a summary of which will
be provided. The two latter points however, can only be discussed
in the context of taking a specific stand on the transformation
debate, and will therefore be tackled in the next section.
To understand what Marx meant by the average rate of profit,
it is important to know what he means by the term profit, and to
achieve this it will be useful to provide a brief exposition of the
opening sections of Volume III. Here Marx shows that the concept
of profit mystifies the nature of surplus value, hiding the real
relations of production and the real nature of capital, thus giving
rise to illusions both amongst capitalists and amongst political
economists. "Profit is a transformed kind of surplus value, a form
in which the origin and the secret of its nature are obscured and
extinguished. Profit, is, therefore that disguise of surplus value
which must be removed before the real nature of surplus value can
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be discoveredlt.(35) There are two layers to this disguise as
uncovered in Volume III, the first taking the form of cost prices,
the second that of prices of production. The concept of market
value provides the link between prices of production and market
prices. Profit itself can then take on the different forms of
rate of interest, profit of enterprise and rent. However, let
me deal with cost price first of all.
The cost of a commodity to the capitalist and its actual cost
are two vastly different amounts. "That portion of the value of
the commodity which consists of surplus value does not cost the
capitalist anything for the reason that it costs the labourers
unpaid labourlt.(36) In algebraic terms the value of a commodity
= k (cost price) + s (surplus value). "The capitalist cost of
the commodity is measured by the eroenditure of capital (c+v=k),
while the actual cost of the commodity is measured by the
expenditure of labour".(37) The capitalist sees his profit as a
return on his total capital since he makes no distinction between
constant (c) and variable (v) capital in his cost price, so that
the surplus value changes its form and the formula becomes
= k+p (profit). "The profit such as it presents itself here, is
the same as the surplus value, only it has a mystified form which
is a necessary outgrowth of capitalist modes of production".(38)
Marx thus demonstrates the illusions which arise when political
economy takes the category of profit as its starting point, for it
then appears that profit is created in the circulation process.
"The surplus-value realised by the sale of a certain commodity
appears to the capitalist as an excess of its selling price over its
value, instead of an excess of its selling price over its cost
price, so that accordingly the surplus-value in a commodity is not
realised by its sale, but arises out of the sale itselflt.(39) This
semblance appears all the more real for the fact that it depends on
market conditions whether the surplus value is realised or not.
As Marx puts it, "The surplus value realised by the individual
capitalist depends as much on the outcome of the mutual endeavour
to outwit one another as on the direct exploitation of labour".(40)
So the distribution of surplus value is determined by competition.
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And now to the second disguise: the price of production.
Marx warns us, "to the extent that we follow up the process of
self-expansion of capital, the nature of the relation of surplus-
value to capital becomes more and more mystifying, and it becomes
increasingly difficult to discover the secret of its internal
organism".(41) This further mystification is brought out in
Part 2 of Volume III 'The conversion of Profit into Average Profit'.
Here it is shown that different lines of industry cannot have
different rates of profit corresponding to the different organic
composition of their capitals. The organic composition of capital
is the relation between constant and variable capital so that
capitals with different o.c.c's set in motion unequal quantities
of labour and thus surplus labour. In contrast with this
conclusion "there is no doubt that aside from inessential,
accidental and mutually compensating distinctions, a difference of
the average rate of profit of the various lines of industry does not
exist in reality, and could not exist without abolishing the entire
system of capitalist production".(42) The labour theory of value
seems irreconcilable with the real phenomena of production. As I
put it in the opening paragraph of this section, competition
appears to contradict the determination of value by labour time.
But Marx points out that up to now it has been assumed that
commodities are sold at their value. The apparent contradiction is
resolved by realising that cost prices are the same for the products
of different spheres of production, regardless of the organic
composition of such capitals. "The equality of cost prices is the
basis for the competition of the invested capitals, by which an
average rate of profit is brought about".(43) The price of
production .0\. a commodity is then its cost price with a percentage
of profit added according to the average profit. Thus, "a
capitalist selling his commodities at their price of production
recovers money in proportion to the value of the capital consumed
in their production and secures profits in proportion to the
aliquot part which his capital represents in the total social
capital". (44)
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This has of course been an exposition of the famous trans-
formation procedure of values into prices of production. To
summarize, Marx is saying that the mass of profit available tc the
whole capitalist class is determined by the mass of surplus value
appropriated by that class, but that the distribution of this
surplus value is determined by competition. The relation between
total social capital and total social surplus value in other words,
is expressed in the average rate of profit, which regulates the
process of exchange. In a fully developed capitalist economy
equality of labour is hidden by equality of capital. As Marx puts
it: "The whole difficulty arises from the fact that commodities
are not exchanged simply as commodities, but as products of capitals,
which claim equal shares of the total amount of surplus value if
they are of equal magnitude, or shares proportional to their
different magnitude".(45)
For the rest of this section I propose to leave aside the
controversy over the transformation process as such. I want the
reader to provisionally accept Marx's propositions, so that I can
develop the implications for the average rate of profit, examining
the role that competition plays in regulating the relationship
between 'many capitals', for this is something that Marx himself
did not make altogether clear. In the next section the validity
of the transformation procedure will be considered, but meantime,
how adequate is the procedure put forward by Marx as a means of
explaining the contradictory appearance of competition with which
I opened this section?
In examining the nature of the average rate of profit, immediate
difficulties arise. Prices of production are conditioned on the
existence of an average rate of profit, yet as Marx points out, the
average rate of profit "is evidently a result, not a point of
departure". (46) This SECtion was opened with this contradiction,
and it has already been seen that the problem here arises from the
fact that equality of capitals means inequality of labours. It
will simplify matters to start from the point where commodities
exchange at their values. This is indeed the expository device
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that Marx uses: "The exchange of commodities at their value is the
rational way, the natural law of their equilibrium. It must be the
point of departure for the explanation of deviations from it, not
vice versa, the deviations the basis on which this law is
explained".(47) Now in those spheres with a.n average organic
composition of capital, the price of production of commodities will
coincide with their value, and the mass of profit is here identical
with the mass of surplus value. Marx argues that for spheres of
production with above or below average organic compositions of
capital there are tendencies towards equalisation, and that these
tendencies "seek to bring about the ideal average, which does not
really exist, so that there is a trend towards crystallisation round
the ideal".(48) What is meant by this 'ideal' which itself does
not exist? Marx is surely being rather confusing at this point,
and the confusion isn't helped by his use of two terms to denote
this 'crystallisation': the general rate of profit and the average
rate of profit.
In my own understanding, at its simplest, the general rate of
profit can be associated with the general level of productive forces
reached in the whole economy, so that it- ~j.S the overall result of the
formation of the average rate of profit. This latter exists as a
tendency, and it is competition between capitalists "which is itself
a movement towards this equilibrium",(49) which enforces this
tendency. Given that on occasions Marx seems to use the terms
interchangeably, I propose to use only the average rate of profit
and to ignore the term 'general rate'.
The sphere of competition considered in each individual case
is dominated by accident, says Marx, and this explains how it is
that the individual capitalist is mystified about the source of his
own profit. The law of value with respect to individual capitals
which "enforces itself in these accidents and regulates them, does
not become visible until large numbers of these accidents are
grouped together".(50)
There is then, according to these assertions (and I think that
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as yet they can only be labelled as assertions), an intimate link
between competition and the formation of the average rate of profit.
If the nature of the processes at work can be clarified, the
assertions can be substantiated as argument.
Marx actually sees the process of competition establishing an
average rate of profit taking place on two levels. In the first
place an average rate of profit is established in each sphere of
production, depending on the organic composition of capital, its
rate of turnover and the rate of surplus value. Competition here
averages the different individual values of a given commodity into
one social value, what Marx calls the market value, this being
determined by average conditions of social production in that
sphere. Market value thus exerts a social sanction on the
individual enterprise.(50) (In a moment it will be seen how the
favoured position of the entrepreneur producing under conditions of
production ab~ve the average induces each capitalist to seek such
a position.) The market price of a commodity may deviate from its
market value, due to fluctuations in supply and demand, but the
market value will be the centre .around which market prices fluctuate.
In other words, market prices fluctuate because the total quantity
of social labour utilised in the production of a commodity cannot
be guaranteed to correspond at each moment to society's total
needs for that commodity. (As I have already mentioned Marx does
also see competition acting at the level of market prices, but I am
not concerned to develop an analysis of a level which has been so
exhaustively covered by orthodox economics.)
The second level of competition is that at which an overall
average rate of profit is formed, and this obvously depends on the
relative weight of the different spheres of production within which
an average rate has been established. This second level results
in the establishment of pricesc~ production, a process which only
takes place when capitalism is fully developed in contrast with the
pre-capitalist competition which establishes a single market value.
It can thus be seen that the average rate of profit does indeed
always exist as a mere tendency, for within each sphere there is,
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as it were, a space within which the rate of profit may fluctuate,
and the same is true within the economy as a whole. "A change in
the average rate of profit is, as a rule, the belated work of a
long series of fluctuations extending over very long periods of
time, fluctuations which require much time before they will
consolidate and compensate one another so as to bring about a
change in the average rate of profit".(52)
It is however important to notice that each level of competition
actually requires that differences in profit level exist before
competition can act to eliminate those differences. How do these
differences come about? Not merely is there a tendency for profits
to be equalized as has been shown up till now, but there is also a
tendency towards differentiation of profit levels. I want to look
more closely at the individual capitalist in his relation with the
average rate of profit to develop this point. For the average
rate of profit is present as a regulating element for the
individual capitalist in the form of a wish to place himself in an
exceptional situation. tt The determination of values as such
interests him only to the extent that it raises or lowers the cost
of production for himself, in other words only to the extent that
it places him in an exceptional situation".(53) The average rate
of profit is an actual given for the individual capitalist, and the
aim is to overreach it and make what Marx called an 'extra' or a
'surplus' profit. I have already shown this process at work in the
analysis of relative surplus value, concluding that competition here
enforces a characteristic already inherent in capital as such.
An exceptional position can also be achieved through, for example,
an increase in the rate of exploitation of workers or through an
increase in the time of turnover of his capital by the individual
capitalist. "Market value ••• implies a surplus profit for those
who produce in any particular sphere of production under the most
favourable circumstances".(54) Most importantly, the realization
of surplus profit depends on the process of circulation in the
market: ttIn short, given the surplus value for a certain capital,
it depends still very much on the individual business ability of the
capitalist whether this same surplus value realises a greater
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or smaller rate of profit and thus yields a greater or smaller mass
of profit".(55) In the Grundrisse also, Marx points out how wide
open is the field of exchange. "Into the determination of prices
••• there also enters - fraud reciprocal chicanery. One party
can win in exchange what the other loses; all they can distribute
among themselves is the surplus value - capital as a class.
But these proportions open a field for individual deception etc.,
••• which has nothing to do with the determination of values as
such".(56)
There are two other possibilities for the achievement of
surplus profits which have not yet been mentioned; when certain
spheres of production are in a position to evade reduction of
their profits to the average profit as with ground rent, and
surplus profits due to monopolies.(57) I will return to these
cases in more detail in the next chapter, for they belong with the
scattered comments that Marx had to make about the development of
the forces of monopoly within competitive capitalism. They are
therefore crucial to a consideration of what Marx had to say about
the changing nature of competition.
What is the overall result of the individual capitalist's
effort to place himself in an exceptional situation? It appears
as though deviation from the average profit is the rule. "The
abnormal exploitation, or even the average exploitation under
exceptionally favourable conditions, seems to determine only the
deviations from the average profit, not this profit itself".(58)
Yet in fact this is a further example of reality being contradicted
by appearance, and of the upsidedown nature of competition. The
exceptional situation cannot last, since other capitalists will be
driven to adopt the same methods and in the very process of seeking
to transcend the average rate of profit, that average is actually
effected and becomes a reality. "The special productivity of
labour in any particular sphere, or in any individual business of
this sphere, interests only those capitalists who are directly
engaged in it, since it enables that particular sphere or that
individual capitalist to make an extra profit over that of the
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total capital. Here, then, we have the mathematically exact
demonstration how it is that the capitalists form a veritable
freemason society arrayed against the whole working class, however
much they may treat each: other as false brothers in the competition
among themselves".(59)
I want", to conclude this section by drawing together what might
be called the 'dialectical characteristics' of the relation between
competition and the average profit rate, for this is something that
Marx himself fails" to emphasise sufficiently I feel.
This 'dialectical characteristic' is perhaps most visible in
the process of formation of the average profit rate. It can be
concluded that two contradictory tendencies subsist together here:
the tendency towards equalization of profit rates, and the tendency
towards their differentiation. Capital moves, tending to level
rates of profit since competition then starts functioning, but
differences in levels of profit also tend to reproduce themselves.
As Salama puts it: "Surprofits dans certaines branches, ~ous-
profits dans d'autres constituent la base a partir de laquelle
la concurrence pourra jouer. Cette concurrence tout en deplacant
les capitaux des branches les moins rentables vers celIe qui Ie sont
plus, suscitera parall~lement des modifications des combinaisons
productives".(60) What is found here is a dialectical unity of
equilibrium and disequilibrium. 'Extra' or 'surplus' profits
actually give rise to average profits. Competition thus becomes an
ambivalent reality. TIeviation is the rule, and competition
actually requires differences in profit levels before it can start
to act. Thus the average profit rate is the result of both a
movement towards the average and a movement away from it. Marx
himself, it seems to me, failed to emphasise this two-fold nature of
the formation of the average profit rate, and had he done so the
confusion about 'ideal averages' which I criticised earlier could
have been avoided. This is not of course to deny that Marx pointed
out the two aspects of the formation of the average profit rate; it
is probably the unfinished nature of Volume III that explains the
rather unsatisfactory nature of the exposition. It will be very
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important to grasp the ambivalent nature of competition, because
in the following chapters a further manifestation of this dual
nature will become apparent. Through an examination of the
contradictory nature of barriers to entry to a firm or an industry,
it will be seen that competition both produces monopoly and that
monopoly produces competition.
The second dialectical feature is one which Marx did deal with,
but I think that it is valuable to spell it out. This is that the
average rate of profit represents both solidarity of the capitalist
class and its differentiation. The average rate of profit
represents a "practical brotherhood of the capitalist class" (as
Marx puts it) in that each individual capitalist:, shares in the
common pool of surplus value in proportion to his share of the
investment. Competition thus enforce~ common action on the
capitalist class, and in so doing regulates the process of inter-
action within the class. Competition is thus anarchic, and yet it
contains a regulatory force. The precise nature of the regulatory
process will be discussed in the next section, although some
indication was given in the section in the last chapter on value
theory.
Meanwhile, it is now perhaps clearer why I asked the reader to
accept the transformation procedure as given for this section. For
whilst competition regulates the process of interaction within the
capitalist class, it is not itself responsible for that class being
the capitalist class in the first place. The transformation from
value to price is necessary to show how capitalists comprise a
single class, together exploiting the working class. In the next
section I shall want to argue this case, but for the moment it
remains clear that the individual capitalist will be mystified, for
the determination of the average profit rate takes place behind his
back as it were, and he neither sees nor understands it. True
"at the bottom of all conceptions lies that of the average profit,
to wit, that capitals of the same magnitude must yield the same
profits in the same time",(61) for each capitalist is a share
holder in the total social enterprise. But the mass of the
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surplus value produced in any particular sphere of production "has
any importance to the individual capitalist only to the extent
that the quantity of surplus-value produced in his line plays a
determining role in regulating the average profit".(62)
What can regulation mean under these circumstances? To
this question I now turn.
D. The Transformation Procedure: A Critique
This section can, I hope, be a relatively brief explanation of
my owh stand on this issue, given that I have already expounded at
some length on the transformation procedure as presented by Marx.
The labour theory of value, too, has also received consideration,
and I have suggested that this law undergoes a specific development
when commodities are exchanged as products of capital. The
transformation procedure is of course an issue which has been the
subject of many articles, doctorates, and books; I do not intend
to provide any comprehensive survey of what has already been done,
but rather to present a relatively brief rationale for my own
position.(63) Given the concern of this thesis with the law of
value and the changing nature of competition it is incumbent upon me
to take a stand on this thorny matter.
The crucial question which I propose to address is, do prices
of production involve a revision of the law of value? I shall be
concluding that prices of production do not involve a revision of
the law of value. In essence, I wish to argue that prices of
production are a metamorphosed form of value, but of this more in a
moment.
Participants in the controversy over the so-called trans-
formation 'problem' have tended to centre·their arguments around the
tables used by Marx to illustrate the transformation of values into
prices of production through the average rate of profit. This type
of criticism was initiated by L. von Bortkiewicz with his article
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liOn the Correction of Marx's Fundamental Theoretical Construction
in the Third Volume of Capital ll originally published in 1907. It
cannot be denied t..l-J.at M~""X presented his calculations wrongly, and
indeed Desai points out that appropriate mathematical tools were
not available either to Marx or to Bortkiewicz (64). It seems
important, however, to realise that Marx did not intend his
mathematical formulations as a proof of his argument, but rather as
an illustration. Marx makes use of mathematical examples in a
number of places in Capital besides this chapter; another prominent
example being the reproduction schema of Volume II, which are also
essentially explanatory devices. Thus those concerned to
demonstrate and eradicate errors in the tables provided by Marx
in Chapter 9 are indeed assisting in the clarification of an
argument, but they are neither proving nor disproving the under-
lying theory. Pierre Salama is someone who feels it is impossible
for the transformation procedure to be viewed as simply a
mathematic problem (however complex the maths involved might be)
IIL'analyse de la transformation, est necessaire parce qu'elle
traduit la necessite d'analyser d'abord la loi de la valeur au
niveau du capital en ge'neral. En ce sens, elle ne peut etre une
simple operation mathematique".(65) Wright, as was shown in the
previous chapter goes a step further in attacking the Neo-Ricardian
"thought-experiment" where mathematical calculation is given the
status of proof about a process of causation. I take the view
then, that it is not possible to take an "arithromorphic ll approach
to the transformation procedure, despite the impression that Marx
gives by presenting his tables in Chapter 9 of Volume III. It is
for this reason that I make no further comment on the mathematical
contributions to the transformation debate, many as they are, and
valid in their own right.
There can, however, be no doubt that capitalists calculate
in the "neo-classical calculus" as Desai puts it. Competition, as
a surface phenomenon, is to be seen tending to equalize the money
rate of profit, not the value rate. Value calculus thus becomes a
device to lay bare class relations, a device which is used ex-post,
in other words a calculation which cannot be undertaken 'before'
capitals have acted in terms of price relations.
value method then?
Why use the
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In the section on the labour theory of value I argued that it
is important to distinguish the fom) of value from the substance of
value. If this is done, prices of production as the form of value,
and the substance of value as embodied labour time are in different
categories; they are incommensurable. It follows that although
Marx saw it as important that the total surplus value of society
equalled the total profits, such a statement should not actually
be taken at its face value, since a strict parallel between surplus
value (as the substance of value, embodied labour time) and profits
(as the form value takes in a capitalist society) cannot be made;
surplus value and prices being of different orders. But before
spelling out the implications of this distinction between form and
'value, let me briefly put the transformation procedure in a firmer
context.
Prices of production depart from values, and there is no
possibility of prices equalling values, unless under very exceptional
circumstances. Marx's understanding of value in other words
requires the solution of the transformation problem. Indeed, as
I have already shown, the possibility of incongruity between price
and value was pointed out by Marx in Volume I of Capital. The
transformation procedure then represents the relation between the
individual capital and the class as a whole. The aggregate of
society's capitals are in reality innumerable fragments made up of
individual capitals, and yet the movement of capitals forms an
homogeneous whole. In the last section, I showed the mechanism
for the average rate of profit governing lithe seemingly independent
motions of capital", to use Rosa Luxemburg's words. In demonstrating
the dual mode of formation of the average profit rate I hope that I
have provided a sound basis for grasping an understanding of the
regulative mechanism, but there is now a need to place this mechanism
in the context of the transformation procedure.
The transformation from value to price is necessary to show
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that capitals comprise a single class, together exploiting the
working class. Hilferding,for instance, (using Marx's notation,
which was explained earlier) argues that the subordination of labour
to capital is shown by the freedom and equality of capitalists.
"The capitalists are free and equal; their equality is displayed in
the price of production = k + p, where p is proportional to k.
The dependent position of the labour is shown by his appearance as
one of the constituents of k, side by side with machinery,
lubricating 9il and dumb beats; this is all he is worth to
capitalists as soon as he has left the market and has taken his
place in the factory to create surplus value".(66)
It haS already suggested however, that it is illegitimate to
see competition as the bridge from values to prices. There is not
one world in which values operate and another in which prices
operate. Competition cannot be introduced from outside the system,
since it is inherent in the nature of capital as I argued earlier.
The solution lies in seeing that prices of production do not
involve a revision of the law of value, but rather constitute the
law of value at a level nearer to reality. I do not apologise for
quoting Salama at length, since he expresses this point so well.
"La concurrence ne peut done constituer la cle de passage des
valeurs aux prix des production. L'analyse de la valeur se situe
au niveau du capital en g£~eral (Livre I), celIe des prix de
~production au niveau des capitaux nombreux (Livre III) ou joue la
concurrence. Mais pour expliquer cette concurrence encore faut il
connaltre au pr~alable les lois internes du capital definies au
Livre I. II n'existe done pas un monde ou jouerait la valeur et
/
un autre ou joueraient les prix de production, Ie pont etant
constitue par la concurrence. L'analyse de la valeur est done un
nrelable theorioue necessaire pour comprendre les prix de production
et de la l'evolution des prix de marche. Elle constitue done un
niveau d'abstraction necessaire pour saisir par la suite l'unite de
cette diversite apparente des phenomenes. Les prix de production
ne constituent que l'application de la loi de la valeur au niveau,
plus proche du reel, des capitaux nombreux en concurrence".(67)
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The regulative mechanism which operates to bring many capitals
into relation with each other is not the relation of a dependent to
an independent variable, price being the dependent, and socially
necessary labour time being the independent variable. The law of
surplus value is the process by which abstract labour is
objectified, and not the relation between value and price. The
inner character of the form of value regulates its representation
at the level of reality. Universal social labour is thus an
emerging result, a result which cannot be determined independently
of the price form, since the price form provides the signals for
the actors. The law of value thus asserts itself for individual
capitals as a coercive law of competition. Equalit,y of profit
levels indicates a social sanction concerned with the general level
of productivity in the whole economy. Nevertheless, as I have
indicated already, the law of value is not simply the relation
between value and price, and marxism is for~~atelymoving away
from dogmatic and determinist interpretations of value.
Earlier, the different forms that value takes were followed:
the price-form of value, value in the form of capital, involving
the law of surplus value. I then showed Marx arguing the price-
form of surplus value as profit appearing as an excess of the
selling price of a commodity beyond its cost price. This price-
form of surplus value as profit is the basic form of the
capitalistic principle of the distribution of the surplus product.
The price of production (cost price plus average profit) as a
concrete form of value can be measured directly in money terms.
However, it also represents the concrete form of the regulation of
price by the substance of value, as the embodiment of labour time.
I also argued that surplus value is the origin of profits, in that
other determinants of profit act either due to their effect on
surplus value, or within limits established by surplus value. If
all sectors had the same organic composition of capital, prices of
course would be directly proportional to values and the upper and
lower bounds on profits would coincide. In the real world,
organic compositions are not the same in all sectors, and this
determines the actual profits made, but the total amount of surplus
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labour performed still defines the limits of what can be converted
into profits in each sector.
The actual mechanism of regulation then, is brought about
through competition, the law of surplus value expressing itself
through the tendency towards the average profit rate. This
regulation is indeed approximate; competition is a striving to
divide the surplus value available. The 'striving to divide'
however does not take the form of a pool of surplus value which is
first available to the whole capitalist class, and is then divided
between individual capitals. As I have described it the process
of competition is inevitably guided both by the 'underlying'
substance of value and by the 'neo-classical calculus' of the money
rate of profit, and the popular image of a kind of melting-pot of
surplus value from which each capital then takes a share is a
misleading one. The laws immanent for the capitalist system as a
whole assert themselves as coercive laws of competition for the
individual capital.
A useful way of concluding this section on the transformation
procedure is to consider the relationships between Volume I and
Volume III of Capital. These have been seen from a number of
perspectives, many of which I feel to be complementary. Thus
Morishima is emphatic that the two volumes are not in contra-
diction, but that there is rather a development of the model in
Volume III. This is frequently put in terms of the different
levels of abstraction that Marx is concerned with. Rubin sees
Volume I as primarily concerned with the relations between
capitalists and workers, while Volume III looks more concretely at
the relations between particular groups of industrial capitals.
Banaji puts this in another way: the former volume looks at the
laws of motion of capitalism at the level of the enterprise, while
the latter examines these laws at the level of the social totality
of enterprises.(68) Diane Elson criticises Rodolsky's characteri-
sation (Which I have made considerable use of) of Volume I as
concerned with 'capital in general' and Volume III with 'many
capitals', on the grounds that it is confusing to imply that Marx
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abstracts from competition in Volume I. She argues that Volume I
actually abstracts from the consideration of social relations that
imply that prices cannot directly represent magnitudes of values.
For my part, I would prefer to emphasise Rosdolsky's distinction,
advocating that the nature of 'capital in general' must be under-
stood first of all, before the relations between 'many capitals'
can be understood. Competition, as I've argued, is not thereby
abstracted from, since competition is seen as something inherent in
the nature of capital, but in starting with the emphasis on 'capital
in general', the importance that value takes becomes clear.
Prices of production then are seen as a form of value nearer
to reality. The regulatory process is indeed an approximate one,
the equalization of profit rates being but a tendency, but which can
nevertheless be seen as operating within limits set by total surplus
value.
E. Conclusions
This chapter has placed considerable emphasis on elucidating
the apparently contradictory nature of competition in relation to the
labour theory of value. Summarising on the arguments used to solve
these contradictions, it was pointed out that the concept of
'capital in general' contains the idea of competition, which in turn
embraces the existence of 'many capitals'_ From 'capital in
general' the law of surplus value can be understood, which however
appears to be contradicted in the real world of 'many capitals'.
This contradiction can nevertheless be resolved if prices of
production are seen as the form that value takes. when commodities
exchange as products of capital. The law of value as realised
through the process of competition then provides the regulative
mechanism whereby the immanent nature of capital becomes apparent,
with the tendency to form an average profit rate as the regulative
principle.
Marx was criticised at certain points for his lack of clarity
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in expounding this regulatory process. Thus I have tried to
emphasise the dialectical nature of competition as both movement
towards an average rate of profit (in terms of competition between
capitals, at the level of competition between spheres); and
movement away from that average, with capit~ls seeking normal
surplus profits within a sphere, albeit on an inevitably temporary
basis. Marx talks rather abruptly on the 'formation of the
average profit rate'; in view of the approximate nature of this
process, I would prefer to emphasise it as a tendency to form an
average profit rate.
In line, then, with the conclusion drawn in Chapter 1 that the
law of value cannot be seen as rigidly deterministic, this chapter
has indicated that the law of value finds expression in a tendency
to form an average profit rate. What status can be afforded to a
tendency? It is certainly very difficult to provide empirical
proof of a tendency to form an average profit rate. I do not
however propose to enter into a full discussion on this issue until
possible barriers to the tendency have been considered, which they
will be in ensuing chapters. It is however undeniable that the law
of value, even under the competitive stage of capitalism as
considered by Marx has a certain elasticity. The first point I
would like to make in defence of the law is that it makes no
pretence to be anything but a broad and general law. A general law
cannot, in its natQre provide tight and particulacised statements.
Let me contrast the law of value with the laws of supply and demand;
the latter make detailed predictions of price movements possible,
but this does not invalidate the status of a more general law
covering the wider aspects of economic phenomena.
Value theory prOVides then, a conceptual rather than an
empirical framework. As has been argued during the course of this
and the previous chapters, the labour theory of value does not
provide a rigidly determined independent variable on the basis of
which prices can be derived. A second important point which
follows is that the law of value therefore leaves space for
political action. Thus if one is arguing for prices being rigidly
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determined by the socially necessary labour embodied in a commodity,
class struggle and political action must be external to economic
processes. The approach taken here, in contrast, sees labour as
the subject of production, and not simply its object. The
individual is firmly present in terms of their labour contribution,
what Marx calls the 'life activity'. The possibility of a
mechanistic view of the automatic production of surplus labour
giving rise to surplus value is thus muted. The substance of value
is human self-activity, and we have an economic view of people which
also encompasses their political and personal aspects.
Samir Amin seems to be making a similar point in "The Law of
Value and Historical Materialism" when he sets himself the task of
overcoming the appearance of a divide in Marx's work between his
economic and his political writings. In the former 'it would appear
that Marx is setting forth a series of economic laws explaining the
way that capitalism functions, treating these laws as objective
and articulating all these laws around a single 'backbone' - the law
of value", whilst the political writings seem to be about clashes
between social classes organised around political aims.(69) Amin
thus opposes both the idea that class struggle is powerless to change
economic laws and the idea that class struggle can obtain anything;
instead he is concerned to examine how economic laws and class
struggle are interlinked. "My own thesis asserts that class
struggle does not reveal the 'necessary economic equilibrium', but
determines one possible equilibrium among others".(70) Whilst AHlin
is sensitive to the importance of integrating political and economic
categories, he does not centre that integration in an analysis of
the forms of value, but rather introduces the 'space' for the
political element in the interrelation between the law of value and
the class struggle. "In short, the class struggle onerates on an
economic base and shanes the way this base is transformed within the
framework of the immanent laws of the canitalist mode".(71) In
contrast, I have argued that this integration takes place through the
forms that value takes, the law of value being the expression of the
form in relation to 'many capitals' •
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Despite the fact that I have argued that the value theory of
labour allows 'space' for the political component, competition
cannot of course be equated with freedom. The law of value
subjects individuals to the rule of their relations of production.
As Rosdolsky puts it: "Human beings, having been liberated from
earlier limitations are subject to a new fetter under capitalism,
namely the reified rule of their relations of production, which
have grown up over them, the blind power of competition and chance.
In one respect they have become freer, but in another they have
become less free.(72) Nevertheless, this subjection is not
absolute~
In conclusion however, let us look to the future forms of
capitalism; to the future beyond the competitive stage of
capitalism that Marx himself analysed. As a result of the
consideration of the role of competition in Marx's theory of value
I draw an initial conclusion that the law of surplus value is
unlikely to become invalid through a change in the nature of
competition with the development of the monopoly stage, since
competition is not a driving force external to the system, but
rather one which is inherent in it. I have shown that the law of
surplus value is a general law which governs the distribution of
surplus value between capitals through the tendency to form an
average profit rate. However I have not yet examined the cases
Marx put forward of 'capitals not submitting' to the average rate
of profit, nor the other pointers which Marx provides towards the
development of a monopoly stage of capitalism. To what extent
might such developments modify these initial conclusions based on
the analysis of a competitive capitalism?
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Chapter 3
A CRITIQUE OF MARX'S VIEWS OF THE
CHANGING NATURE OF COMPETITION
A. Introduction
This chapter will complete bringing together what Marx had to
say about competition by pinpointing the transitional elements in
Marx's thought, and examining the seeds of change noted by Marx
which might be seen as pointing towards the monopoly stage of
capitalism, as the concept was developed by later writers. Putting
it another way, the interface between competition and monopoly as
portrayed by Marx will here be the focus of attention.
Three aspects of this interface will be identified. The first
can be seen as the descriptive aspect - Marx's well known, if rather
brief references to the process of concentration and centralisation
of capital. The second relates to Marx's examination of the sub-
divisions within the capitalist class (What have been called the
fractions of capital) between commercial, industrial and banking
capital and the development of the credit system. The third
analytical aspect, and what I shall be dealing with herelare the
cases of 'extra' surplus value which Marx examines. These cases
contrast with the 'normal' surplus profits identified in the last
chapter, where the tendency to form an average profit rate was seen
as a function of both movement towards and away from that average
with the latter as the incentive for particular capitals (reinforced
by competition) to gain extra surplus value within the sector.
Competition was thus seen at one level operating within the sector
to ensure that the commodity had the same market value for all
producers regardless of the method of production used, which meant
'surplus' or 'extra' profits for those who produced the commodity
with 'above average' production methods. These 'extra' profits
were nevertheless inevitably temporary (earned only until other
producers in the sector adopted similarly advanced methods), giving
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the picture of a relatively straightforward tendency for the
establishment of an average profit rate, this average profit rate
being the basis for the interaction between capitals - both the
starting point for competition and its result. It was also
mentioned in the last chapter that competition takes place at a
second level, that between sectors, and it is this second level of
competition that will be more closely examined in this chapter.
Marx talks here of the possibility of a series of special cases of
'exclusions' from the average profit rate taking place at the
intersectoral level.
The chapter will conclude by pointing to a dichotomy between
Marx's treatment of the descriptive and the analytical aspects of
the changing nature of competition, as well as identifying a number
of inadequacies in what Marx had to say. How far, then, did Marx
anticipate further developments in the competitive process?
B. Concentration and Centralisation of Capital
Marx saw these two processes as inevitably taking place along-
side capitalist accumulation. Talking of primitive accumulation in
the chapter of Volume I entitled "The General Law of Capitalist
Accumulation", Marx shows that not only is a certain degree of
accumulation of capital a precondition for the capitalist mode of
production, but also that this mode of production itself causes an
accelerated accumulation of capital. This growth of social capital
must be effected through the growth of individual capitals
(paralleling the fact mentioned in the previous chapter that capital
must exist in the form of many capitals). Marx calls this
'concentration' of capital; it goes along with accumulation. As
he says in the "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts": "The formation
of many capital investments is only possible as a result of multi-
lateral accumulation, since capital comes into being only by
accumulation; and multilateral accumulation necessarily turns into
unilateral accumulation".(1) Concentration is limited on the one
hand by the rate of increase of social wealth and on the other by
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repulsion between individuaL capitals where "the increase of each
functioning capitalist is thwarted by the formation of new and the
subdivision of old capitals".(2) In other words, if accumulation
is proceeding rapidly the possibility of particular capitals
expanding is correspondingly greater, while acting counter to this
is the fact that a greater rate of accumulation stimulates growth
in the number of particular capitals, thus restricting concentration
of existing capitals. (We shall see that this double tendency
exists also in the case of the formation of barriers to entry by
monopoly capital and their supersession in ensuing chapters.)
Repulsion between capitals is countered by their attraction.
Centralisation "is concentration of capitals already formed,
destruction of their individual independence, expropriation of
capitalist by capitalist, transformation of many small into few
large capitals".(3) Marx says that he cannot here develop the
laws of the centralisation of capital (these are of course taken
up in later chapters of this thesis), but he briefly indicated that
the "battle of competition" is based, via the productiveness of
labour, on the scale of production. In other words, centralisation
comes about through the action of the immanent laws of capitalist
production itself. "One capitalist always kills many".(4) It
can only be concluded that in the very battle of competition,
competition is destroying itself. The contradictory manifestation
of competition is something that Marx does not develop, but it will
be seen as a problem which marxist writers on the monopoly stage of
capitalism must perforce confront. Concentration is inevitable
"and it is precisely through competition that the way is cleared
for this natural destination of capital".(S) This expropriation
takes place on an enormous scale in which "both success and failure
lead now simultaneously to a centralisation of capital".(6)
It is precisely in this process of concentration and centrali-
sation that Marx anticipates the demise of capitalism, and I here
cite one of the purple passages of Volume I 'in extenso':
"Along with the constantly diminishing numbers of the magnates of
capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of
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transformation into large scale units grows the mass of
misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with
this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always
increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organised by the
very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself.
The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production,
which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it.
Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of
labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with
their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder.
The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators
are expropriatedfl . (7) It can be seen from this passage that Marx
visualises the process of concentration and centralisation as
leading to the demise of capitalism, rather than as giving rise
to a new phase of the existing mode of production.
There are further hints of the possible mode of this transition
in Volume III when Marx is concerned to analyse the credit system
in Part 5. In Volume I he has already remarked on the credit system
as the specific mechanism for the centralisation of capital, so that
the laws of centralisation of capital depend on the development of
the credit system. As the credit system develops 'fictitious'
capital is formed, based on 'capitalising' any money income on the
basis of the rate of interest.(8) The existence of fictitious
capital means that all connection with the actual process of self-
expansion of capital is lost, opening the way for rapid depreciation
in times of crisis, and thus contributing to the process of
centralisation. (9) But the credit system also implies "the latent
abolition of capitalist property".(10) In the joint stock
company, enterprises assume the form of social enterprises,
involving "the abolition of private property within the boundaries
of capitalist production itselflf.(11) With hindsight, this sort of
analysis has many affinities with the ideas of the managerial revo-
lution as initially propounded by Berle and Means in the 1930's:
ideas that the separation of ownership and control in the large
enterprise lead to some kind of supersession of capitalism. This
approach will be criticised in later chapters, but meanwhile it
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seems justified to see Marx as being rather naive at this juncture.
The credit system as Marx presents it, conforms to a dual
nature: it centralises social wealth, but at the same time consti-
tu.tes the transition to a new mode of production. "There is no
doubt that the credit system will serve as a powerful lever in the
transition from the capitalist mode of production to the production
by means of associated labour".(12) This view of the transition to
socialism is a somewhat mechanistic one, which makes little allowance
for capitalism's ability to be flexible, and to mould social and
economic change to its own continuing existence, although it must be
allowed that Marx is proffering a few comments here rather than
providing a considered line of argument. Once more we see Marx
anticipating a new mode of production rather than a new stage
within the existing mode.
Summarising then, Marx was obviously aware of the process of
concentration and centralisation of capital, seeing it as signifi-
cant for future evolution. Yet he does not provide a systematic
development of the theme. Rather, certain pointers on the nature
of the then-current development of capitalism are given, with the
generalised implication that this will hasten the arrival of the new
mode of production, socialism. It should perhaps be noted that only
a few years later, Engels, as the editor of Volume III, saw fit to
intervene in Marx's description of the joint stock company, inter-
jecting the subsequent development of cartels, and the fact that
monopoly can replace competition in an entire line of industry.(13)
Marx himself points to the fact that large industry and large
agriculture reinforce each other to promote extension of their
large-scale nature.(14) This change in the nature of competition
is of central concern to marxist writers from the beginning of the
following century.
c. The fractions of cauital
Up till now, the capitalist class has been presented as
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consisting of an undifferentiated group of 'many capitals'. Since
the changing nature of competition and the law of value with the
development of the monopoly stage of capitalism are considered in
later chapters, it will be helpful to be aware of the fact that Marx
distinguished different sections within the capitalist class. The
previous chapter followed the intricacies of profit as a mystified
form of surplus value, but profit itself can, in Marx's terminology,
take on the different forms of rate of interest, profit of
enterprise and rent. These different forms of profit are associated
on the one hand with different fractions (this seems the best term to
use) within the capitalist class, notably industrial, banking and
commercial capital, and on the other with the landowning class. It
is also interesting to see that Marx contrasts the nature of the
determination of the rate of interest with that of the average profit
rate, since this highlights the approximate nature of the latter.
As I mentioned at the beginning of my exegesis of Volume III,
the existence of different subdivisions within the category of
profit further mystifies the nature of surplus value. The three
classes of capital, merchant's capital, interest-bearing or banking
capital and industrial capital differ in the form of their
circulation. It will be recalled that Marx saw capital as taking
the circulation far~ M - C - M', which in Volume II he specifies
more precisely as M - C<~ ... p ••• C' - M' , where C is the
means of production including labour-power, the production process
P intervening before the commodity capital C' incorporating surplus
labour can finally be sold with an increment M' added to the
original money capital ventured.
The circulation of merchant's capital takes the form of
M - C - M' where the same commodity changes place twice, merchant's
capital being necessary due to the specific form of capitalist
production which presupposes the circulation of commodities. The
exclusive function of merchant's capital is to convert commodity
capital into money capital, and thus commercial capital forms an
independent fraction of capital. As such it plays a determining
role in the formation of the average rate of profit, for although
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merchant's capital does not take part in the production of the
surplus value which is converted to an average rate of profit, costs
of circulation are an essential part of the total process of
reproduction.(15) Marx deals with merchant's capital in Part 4 of
Volume III, to which the interested reader is referred for further
details.
Part 5 deals with the second division of capital, interest
bearing capital. This takes the form MA- ~- C - M' B- M'A where
money capital changes hands from A (the owner) to B (the borrower)
the latter transforming it into productive capital and returning
the realised capital with an increment to A. The outlay of money
as capital and its reflux as realised capital are duplicated due to
the transfer between borrower and owner. Capital here becomes a
commodity as capital, in contrast with the movement of both
merchant and industrial capital.
Let us here pause to examine the nature of the rate of interest,
for Marx contrasts the determination of this with the formation of
the average rate of profit, so that the nature of the latter is
further illuminated. The clash between financial and industrial
capital is purely empirical, as compared with the two opposing
elements, labour and capital. Thus there is no general law by
which to determine the limits of the mean rate of interest (as total
surplus determines the limits of the average rate of profit)
"because it is merely a question of dividing the gross profit between
two possessors of capital under different titles"(16), yet the rate
of interest appears as a "uniform, definite and tangible magnitude"
in a very different manner from the rate of profit. Marx in fact
characterises the average rate of profit as a "vanishing shape of
mist compared to the definite rate of interest"(17), saying further
that "The average rate of profit does not appear as a directly
existing fact, but merely as a final result of the compensation
of opposite fluctuations to be determined by analysis".(1S)
Incidentally, I do not feel that this undoubtedly very brief
characterisation of the contrasting nature of the determination of
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the rate of interest and of the average profit rate contradicts
Lawrence :p:arris' s article "On Interest, Credit and Capital".( 19)
Harris here concerned to show that Marx did consider the rate of
interest to be subject to determinate analysable laws - I am not
denying this, but simply sayi~g that there is not a general law
governing the rate \of interest, and Harris indeed agrees that the
rate of interest has an indeterminate status within value theory.
The conclusion to be drawn is that when a general law is being
applied (the law of value deriving from the value theory of labour)
the result ~s a breadth in the statements that can be made. When
on the other hand a general law is inapplicable, and the market
criteria of supply and demand are used instead, considerable
precision is reached~ I am not arguing against the usefulness of
the latter, but rather saying that general laws also have their
place. It is general laws that are my prime concern in this
thesis.
Despite this, the money market has a ve~J special character, for
capital exists here in the form of independent value money. This
means that the social ch?racter of capital is here fully expressed,
the competition between individual spheres ceasing. "The
character worn by industrial capital only in its movement and
competition between individual spheres, the character of a common
canital of a class comes into evidence here in full force by the
demand and supply of capital".(20) Capital in general has appeared
up to now only as an abstraction, but capital in general as distinct
from the particular real capita~ has itself a real existence, the
capital accumulating in banks.(21) We are now able to move full
circle from capital in general to particular capitals and back again.
The social character of capital as expressed in the average rate of
profit can in fact only be promoted and fully realised by the
complete development of the credit and banking system, for the
credit system allows for the free movement of capital between
spheres of production.(22)
What of the third class of capitalist, the industrial capitalist?
The functioning capitalist, as a non-owner of capital, sees interest
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as the mere fruit of owning capital whilst perceiving the remainder
of gross profit, what Marx calls the profit of enterprise, as the
frui t of his own activity. The two parts of gross profit become
ossified and individualised with respect to one another, and this is
so even if the employer of capital is actually working with his own
capital. Interest bearing capital represents capital as ownership,
whilst profit of enterprise represents capital as function, but the
latter is dependent on the former, for profit of enterprise relies
on the existence of interest as an independent category. The
opposition of capital to the wage labourer is obliterated in
interest, and at the same time the functioning capitalist is seen as
working: the process of exploitation now appears as a simple labour
process! "It is the interest which represents the social form
of capital, but it does so in a neutral and indifferent way. It is
the profit of enterprise which represents the economic function of
capital, but it does so in a way which takes no cognisance of the
definite capitalist character of this function".(23) The fetishism
which we first observed in relation to the exchange of commodities
reaches in interest bearing capital its highest stage, for
"Instead of the actual transformation of money into capital, only
an empty form meets us here". We find money generating money, and
this form of self expanding value shows no scars of its origin.
"The social relation is perfected into the relation of a thing, of
money, to itself".(24) Just as the competition between many
capitals masked and obliterated the class struggle between
capitalists and workers, so too does the existence of different
fractions of capital obscure the nature of exploitation and the
source of surplus value.
What is of particular interest in Marx's analysis of the
fractions of capital is the foreshadowing of the institutional
chmlges in the forms of those fractions which the theorists of
imperialism pinpoint as one of the characteristics of the monopoly
stage of capitalism. Since Marx argues that competition between
the fractions of capital (industrial and banking) is not subject to
the general law of value, this raises the question of how far the
merging of these fractions under the monopoly stage brings up new
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issues in terms of greater determinateness in the distribution of
surplus value.
D. The Cases of 'extra surnlus profits'
The introduction to this chapter has already provided a brief
explanation for the role that these cases play in Marx's analysis.
The framework within which he places the cases of extra surplus
profit are those of capitals not submitting to the process of profit
equalization, so that Ita surplus profit may... arise, when certain
spheres of production are in a position to evade the conversion of
the values of their commodities into prices of production, and thus
a reduction of their profits to the average profit".(25) The bulk
of Marx's ~~alysis of these special cases of extra surplus value
falls into Part 6 of Volume III, 'The Transformation of Surplus
Profit into Ground Rent'. The questions that I want to keep in
mind as I trace what Marx has to say are three in number. Does the
existence of such special cases alter the nature of competition?
Does it disturb the economic analysis of the formation of market
values? What kind of barriers lead to capitals not submitting to
the average profit rate, or being 'excluded' from the formation of
the average profit rate? Marx made descriptive observations of the
growth of large-scale enterprise as has already been seen. It is
important for the analysis of the changing nature of competition and
the corresponding operation of the law of value, to see what
analytical comments Marx made that might be of relevance to the
growth of large scale enterprise. As I expound on the six cases of
extra surplus profits, it will become apparent that Marx concerns
himself almost exclusively with one type of monopoly - that of the
monopoly ownership of land. Conclusions on the relevance of this
approach will be drawn at the end.
(a) Differential rent
This category is of course one that was introduced into
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political economy by David Ricardo. Marx introduces differential
rent by considering the case of a manufacturer who is able to make
use of natural water power instead of steam for motive power. In
more general terms, by harnessing any relative natural superiority
in fertility or power, the farmer (capitalist or otherwise) or
manufacturer can gain a surplus profit which does not differ from
any other surplus profit. "This surplus profit then, is likewise
equal to the difference between the individual price of production
of those favoured producers and the general social price of
production regulating the market in this entire sphere".(26)
Because of private ownership in land, the surplus profit can be
transformed into ground rent, but private ownership is not the cause
of the creation of this surplus profit. "The property in land is
here merely the cause of the transfer of a portion of the price of
the product, which arises without any active participation of the
landlord in production and resolves itself into surplus profit".(27)
This rent is what Marx calls a 'differential' rent since it does not
enter as a determining factor into the average price.of production
of commodities, but is rather based on this average. lilt always
arises from the difference between the individual price of
production of the individual capital having command over monopoly
of natural power and the general price of production of the total
capital invested in that particular sphere".(28) This surplus
product, is limited on the one hand by the difference between the
capitalist's individual cost price and the general one and on the
other by the magnitude of the general price of production, into
which the average rate of profit enters as a regulator. The
differential rent is determined on the one side by goods being sold
at their general market price "the price brought about by the
equalization of individual prices through competition",(29) and on
the other by the greater individual productivity of this
capitalist's labourers. This rent therefore plays no part in the
formation of the prices of agricultural or mining products. Thus
the only way in which the existence of differential rent can be
considered to modify the law of value as expounded in Chapter 2, is
that surplus profits are here of a more durable and lasting
character. The change that takes place relates not to the
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production of extra profit, but to its distribution. Ownership of
land_leads to surplus profit taking the form of differential rent,
payable to the owner of that land. This relative natural
superiority can however be broken down, and Marx gives the example
of coal becoming cheaper so that the relative advantage of water
power decreases. Thus developments in power technology have long
left behind eighteenth century disputes over who owns the wind~(30)
Massey and Catalano underline this approach when they argue that
differential rent need not be the form taken by the process of
equalizing profit rates when ownership relations change.(31)
(b) Absolute rent
Marx developed the concept of rent used by Ricardo to show
that an absolute rent was payable even on land of the worst quality,
on which there was no relative advantage. A crucial question thus
becomes, does this rent enter into the price of products as an
element independent of their value?(32) Marx made the assumption
that the organic composition of capital was lower in agriculture and
in the extractive industry than the average. (Whilst Marx was
probably justified in such an assumption owing to the relative
backwardness of agriculture in his day, that assumption is not valid
today, and the implications of this will be considered below.)
Such a capital will, in employing more liVing labour, produce more
surplus value than the social average capital. "The value of its
products stands, therefore, above their price of production plus
the average profit, and the average profit is lower than the
profit produced in these commodities".(33) Now normally, as I have
already pointed out, surplus profits are only tolerated within a
sphere of production, so that the conversion of values into prices
of production via the average rate or profit in the economy as a
whole isn't affected. But this assumes free movement of capital
between sectors and that "no barrier, or at least only a temporary
and accidental barrier, interferes with the competition of the
capitals, for instance, in some spheres of production where
the produced surplus value is larger than the average profit".(34)
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There may however be conditions under which the general equalization
of surplus value into an average profit is wholly or partly
prevented. "Private property in land ••• is the barrier wl'lich
does not permit any new investment of capital on hitherto un-
cultivated or unrented land ••• without demanding a rent, although
the land may belong to a class which does not produce any
differential rent".(35) This rent is formed from the excess of
the value of the commodities produced by agricultural capital over
their price of production, or a part of it. Absolute rent is thus
due to the fact that all or part of the surplus value is withdrawn
from the process of equalization to the average profit rate. It
depends on market conditions to what extent the surplus value
created in agriculture is converted into rent, or enters into the
general equalization to an average profit rate. Marx considers
it "a matter of course that this tax has certain limits",(36)
namely additional investments on old leaseholds, competition of the
products of the soil of foreign countries, competition amongst
landlords and the wants and solvency of consumers. Marx could also
have included prices of substitutes, but perhaps this important
factor could be included under wants.
Marx sees absolute rent creating a monopoly price for the
products of the soil. This, it seems to me, is not a helpful
terminology to adopt. This monopoly price is a special case since
normally a monopoly price arises because the price of a product
exceeds its value. (This latter case is considered below.) Marx
sees the monopoly price of agricultural or mining products as due to
the fact that their higher value is not levelled to prices of
production. "If the value of commodities is higher than their price
of production, then the price of production is k + p, the value
k + p + d, so that p + d represents the surplus value contained in it.
The difference between the value and the price of production is,
therefore, equal to d, the excess of the surplus value created by
this capital over the surplus value assigned to it by the average
rate of profit".(37) The monopoly price here consists in the fact
that either price is equal to value (containing an amount d above the
average profit rate), or that price is lower than the price of
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production (thus containing a propv~ion of d). The reason for this
monopoly price is the monopoly in private ownership of land. The
source of absolute rent as a monopoly price is that it is completely
created and realised in the branch. Marx is therefore using the
term 'monopoly price' for a phenomenon which is the result of
monopoly in ownership of land. Private ownership of land is
incidental to capitalism, and to use 'monopoly price' in this
context, it seems to me, diverts attention away from possible
criticisms of capitalism towards an attack on landed property. A
parallel can be drawn here with the fact that equally confusingly,
mainstream economists often refer to the surplus profits obtained by
monopolists as monopoly rent. Whilst it is important to draw
attention to similarities between the monopoly ownership of land and
the monopoly ownership of capital, it seems clearer to retain the
term rent for use in association with the former only, and monopoly
with the latter.
In this discussion of absolute rent, I have restricted myself to
an almost straight exposition of what Marx had to say. Essentially,
as I shall be arguing in the conclusion to this chapter I see Marx's
concern with the analysis of the effects of land ownership on the
law of value as both anachronistic and of little relevance to
monopoly within the capitalist class. Whilst it is true that under
certain historical circumstances landowners as capitalists may become
a fraction of capital (in the same way that for example merchant
or industrial capital are fractions) landowners are essentially a
separate class, whose existence is in no sense fundamental to
capitalism. What is very noticeable about Marx's analysis of
absolute rent is that it once more relies on the idea of a pool of
surplus value available to the whole capitalist class, a kind of
melting pot of surplus value, only on this occasion there is a dam
which sets one part of the pool apart. What would be useful would
be if Marx were to discuss barriers between sectors of capital which
were not simply a function of the ownership of land.
128
(c) Monopoly rent
But what of the case where the average composition of
capital in agriculture or the extractive industries is above that of
the social average capital? "If the average composition of the
agricultural capital were the same, or higher than that of social
average capital, then absolute rent, in the sense in which we use
that term, would disappear".(38) The case of a higher than
average organic composition of capital has hardly been considered
by Marx. Nevertheless, we find Marx saying, "the rent would
create a monopoly price, if grain were sold not merely above its
price of production, but also above its value, owing to the barrier
erected by the private ownership of land against the investment of
capital upon uncultivated soil without the payment of rent".(39)
Marx cannot here be talking of absolute rent (since in that case
price is either equal to or below value), he is rather referring
to what he very briefly calls elsewhere, a "monopoly rent". "Even
monopoly rent, to the extent that it is not a deduction from wages,
and does not constitute a special category, must be indirectly
always a part of surplus value. If it is not a part of the surplus
value which is measured by the average profit (as in the case of
absolute rent) it is at least a part of the surplus value of other
commodities, that is, of commodities which are exchanged for this
commodity which has a surplus price".(40) Monopoly rent must
thus be comprised of a transfer of surplus value produced in
branches with an organic composition of capital below the social
average, paralleling the normal profit in any sector with an organic
composition of capital above the average. The difference between
value and monopoly price is thus made up of two parts: the first
is the difference between value and price of production which will
be a part of the whole of normal profit, the second is the
difference between the price of production and the monopoly market
price. Both constitute a transfer of values produced in branches
with an organic composition of capital below the social average.
Like absolute rent, monopoly rent provides a basis for a
'monopoly price'. Thus once more, monopoly price is being
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discussed as a relation of distribution between two classes, the
capitalist class and the landowning class. The monopoly price in
both these cases is determined by the rent payable to the landowning
class, although in one case it is thanks to a lower than average
organic composition of capital, whilst in the other it is a higher
than average one. Eut what of monopoly prices themselves,
monopoly prices that are not determined by the existence of rent?
(d) Monopoly price
"When we speak of a monopoly price" says Marx, "we mean
in a general way a price which is determined only by the eagerness
of the purchasers to buy and by their solvency, independently of
the price which is determined by the general price of production
and by the value of the products".(41) Marx raises the question
of a monopoly price in the context of a rent resting on a monopoly
price, rather than the opposite case which I have been considering
up to now. He deals with it very briefly for "its analysis belongs
in the theory of competition, where the actual movement of market
prices is considered".(42) (This is Marx's third level of
. competition, that of market prices, which I have up till now
ignored, on the grounds that this level of competition is precisely
the level at which it is considered by orthodox economists, so that
marxists have here nothing specific to offer.) Thus Marx gives
only one example of this type of monopoly price, "a vineyard
producing wine of a very extraordinary quality, a wine which can be
produced only in a relatively small quantity, carries a monopoly
price. The winegrower would realise a considerable surplus profit
from this monopoly price, the excess of which over the value of the
product would be wholly determined by the wealth and fine appetites
of the rich wine drinkers lt.(43) This example seems to be of an
exceptional and decidedly obscure character, calling for some
extensive criticism.
Firstly, the example is once more tied to the case of
landownership; a vineyard rather than an industrial case is what
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we are presented with. The causal level for the monopoly price
is that of the market interaction of supply and demand, so that what
is being considered is market prices, rather than market values.
Marx's interest in the case is however based on the possibility of
a rent (for the landowner) being derivable from this monopoly price.
Secondly, this example of a monopoly price bears no relation to
the descriptive analysis that Marx makes of the growth of large
scale enterprise. His example of a monopoly product is of a luxury
commodity, such that the demand factors influencing market prices
are of a highly subjective character. What of the provision of
railway services for example, surely of far more economic signifi-
cance? Although private ownership of land is again an element,
there is also here a potential barrier to participation by all
members of the capitalist class in terms of the size of capital
required. In such an example (of contemporary relevance to Marx)
the issue of competition is not here simply tied to the level of
market prices, as Marx implies it always will be in the case of a
monopoly price, but becomes a matter of barriers within the
capitalist class, which will operate at the level of market values.
Why does Marx not relate his ideas on monopoly price to his own
assessment of the importance of large scale enterprise? Marx
limits himself to an outline of what I would like to name 'subjective
monopoly price', whereas what I will argue that of greater signifi-
cance is the 'monopoly transformation' taking place between sections
of the capitalist class.
(e) Profit upon alienation
The final category of extra surplus profit which Marx
proposes is that of 'profit upon alienation'. As we shall see in
Chapter 5, certain marxist writers (44) draw comparisons between and
even attempt to equate, monopoly surplus profits with profit upon
alienation. For Marx, profit upon alienation is made by the
merchant within the process of circulation. This was possible
because trade had not yet established equalized individual values of
commodities. "It is not supposed to be an exchange of equivalents.
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The conception of value is included in it only to the extent that
the individual commodities all have a value and are to that extent
money. In quality, they are all expressions of social labour but
they are not values of equal magnitudes".(45) It is profit made
exclusively in the sphere of circulation. In other words, a
profit upon alienation can only be obtained at a relatively un-
developed stage of world commodity exchange, and the very activity
of the merchant in fact successively reduces the possibility of
deriving such a profit since he thereby establishes the equivalence
of commodities. It is of little relevance to developed capitalism.
E. Conclusions: lasting surnlus profits
Diagram 3.1 provides a summary of Marx's views o£ competition
and its changing nature as spelled out in this and the previous
chapters. The labour theory of value shows competition as inherent
in the nature of capital at the abstract level of 'capital in
general'. Nearer to the real world, the law of surplus value
regulates the interaction between 'many capitals'. This is
achieved through the process of competition establishing an average
rate of profit as the regulative principle for distributing surplus
value. Competition acts at two levels for Marx: within a sphere
of production and between spheres (1) & (2). In both cases the
tendency to form an average profit rate is the outcome of both a
movement towards that average and a movement away from it as
capitals try to put themselves in a special position. Within
sectors the tendency to differentiate takes the form of 'normal
surplus profits' (due to technological advantage), whilst between
sectors Marx largely sees it as taking the form of rent due to the
barrier of landed property. Marx also describes competition taking
place at the level of market prices, but since so much work has been
done within the orthodox paradigm in relation to this level of
compeTItion, I have ignored it in this thesis.
The transformation procedure links 'many capitals' to the
formation of prices of production within spheres of production in
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a process which brings 'many capitals' nearer to the real world.
'Many capitals' can also be grouped into 'fractions' (3):
merchant capital enters into the formation of the average profit
rate, but banking and industrial capital dist2'\~bute surplus value
between them in the form of interest and profit of enterprise
respectively. Banking capital then provides a link with Marx's
original analytical category as 'capital in general' in the real
world. Marx does not relate his description of concentration and
centralisation of capital (4) to the rest of his analysis of
competition and the distribution of surplus value.
In this chapter I have been relatively brief in the exposition
of what Marx had to say with regard to texclusions' from the average
rate of profit, because I see his remarks on the matter as of
limited relevance to my own concern with the changing nature of
competition and the application of the law of value. Had I been
concerned with land ownership, a more detailed and critical
presentation would have been necessary, and there has in fact been a
resurgence of interest in Ma-~'s analysis of rent in recent years.
Marx can indeed be excused his lack of concern with monopoly within
the capitalist class on the grounds that when he died, the growth of
large-scale enterprise was at an embryonic stage. Thus Marx was
unable to provide an analysis of the form that the working class state
would take as a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' until the events
of the Paris Commune of 1870 provided evidence for that form.(46)
Similarly it could be argued that Marx could do little more than
point to the tendency towards concentration and centralisation of
capital (as described in section B) at the time when he was drafting
"Capital".
I would thus argue that what Marx had to say on the possibility
of the development of a monopoly stage of capitalism, as exemplified
in his consideration of the phenomena of large scale enterprise and
monopoly, needs substantial development, and I would now like to
summarise the criticisms I have to make of what is said in "Das
Kapital".
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The first relates to the dichotomy that seems to exist between
the description of the growth of large scale enterprise in terms of
concentration and centralisation, and the analysis of exclusions
from the tendency to form an average profit rate. The latter, as
was seen in section TI, relates almost exclusively to land ownership.
Thus although Marx mentions the possibility of barriers between
capitals, he proYides no analysis of the effects on the average rate
of profit of anything besides the monopoly barriers of land owner-
ship. As I have already emphasised Marx's references to subjective
monopoly price are obscure. Yet the analysis of concentration and
centralisation implies the growth of monopoly. I feel that Marx
devotes much attention to the issue of rent, something that was
SUbstantially of historical interest even in his day, at the
expense of a phenomenon that he himself recognises as being of
contemporary significance. A second and related criticism is that
Marx in his descriptive passages implies a contradictory nature for
competition that competition creates the seeds of its own demise
in the growth of large scale enterprise; yet that he does not
develop this idea. As already stated the possibility of competition
creating monopoly is missing from Marx's exclusions from the tendency
towards an average profit rate. Thus an alteration in the nature
of competition is described, while its effect on market values is
not analysed.
It has been seen however that Marx saw concentration and
centralisation of capital as leading to the demise of capitalism.
Although Marx was criticised for the naivity of this implication
earlier, the fact that he sees the growth of large scale enterprise
leading to socialism may explahn this lack of interest in the
possibility that it might indicate a new stage of capitalism. I
have already suggested that had Marx had this latter perspective,
he might have been able to link the development of the credit system
and the consequent institutional changes in the fractions of
capital with industrial monopolisation, as the theorists of
imperialism did at the beginning of the twentieth century. As it
was, Marx again associated the development of the credit system
with the new mode of production, socialism.
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naving made these general points of criticism, let me now
turn to a more detailed consideration of the significance of the
'exclusions' from the formation of the average profit rate for an
analysis of competition. A crucial question: when Marx talks of
, exclusion', does he mean lasting excLus.ion? Normal surplus
profits (obtainable within a sector), despite being a constant
feature of capitalism, are not permanent, since the competition
inherent in the nature of capital involves a continual process of
innovation which both supersedes normal surplus profits and re-
establishes them. It has similarly been seen that profit upon
alienation is also of temporary duration, although in contrast
there is no tendency for such profits to be re-established. Are
absolute rent and monopoly rent ( when surplus profit is a function
of the lack of equalisation of profit rates between sectors, Marx's
second level of competition) permanent in contrast to normal surplus
profits? If permanent, then competition has ceased to operate.
Yet it is surely going to be difficult to answer this question on the
basis of nDas Kapital", for as has been seen, Marx's analysis deals
only with land as a barrier to the formation of an average rate .of
profit. True, he mentions the possibility of other barriers, but
does not analyse them. iHhat Marx provides us with is an analysis
of the source of the income of the landowning class, (a relation of
distribution between classes) whilst what is of interest here is
whether, on the basis of barriers between capitals, one can
distinguish a further division within the capitalist class (this
could provisionally be called the division between 'monopoly' and
'non-monopoly' or 'competitive' capitals), adding to Marx's own
distinctions between banking, industrial and merchant capital.
In Chapter 2 I tried to show that for Marx the average rate of
profit is something which competition urges individual capitals
towards and indeed beyond. What then is the significance of
'exclusion from the formation of the average profit rate' when
continually recurring, although temporary exclusions in the form
of normal surplus profits are the very mode of formation of that
average? Thus Mandel correctly points out in his chapter of
"Late Capitalism" entitled 'The Three Main Sources of Surplus
Profit' that the capitalist search for profits is in fact a search
for surplus profits, "If the accumulation of capital is said to
depend on the realisation of surplus value, then ••• in the
context of 'many capitals' - i.e. of capitalist competition -
the latter must ultimately be a problem of the quest for sUI~lus
profits".(47)
As I have said, there is the difference that normal surplus
profits are created within the sector, and in this respect it is
perhaps unjustified to talk of 'exclusion' from the formation of
the average profit, for such capitals in fact obtain the average
profit and additionally enjoy their temporary surplus profit.
Absolute rent and monopoly rent are a function of the lack of
competition at an inter-sectorial level, thanks to private ownership
of land. To determine whether this can be a permanent lack, the
nature of the barriers between capitals under the monopoly stage
must be examined. If such barriers can be overcome, is Marx
correct to speak of 'exclusions' from the formation of the average
profit rate at all?
In a well known passage at the end of Volume III Marx no more
than asserts that the law of value still applies when monopolies
exist. Although the only barriers to the formation of an average
rate of profit to which he specifically refers, are the monopolies
in ownership of land, it is here that the possibility of other
barriers is mentioned. "Finally if the equalisation of the
surplus value into the average profit meets with any obstacles in
the various spheres of production in the shape of artificial or
natural monopolies, particularly of monopoly of land, so that a
monopoly price would be possible, which would rise above the price
of production and above the value of the commodities affected by
such a monopoly, still the limits imposed by the value of the
commodities would not be abolished thereby. The monopoly price of
certain commodities would merely transfer a portion of the profit
of the other riVducers of commodities to the commodity with a
monopoly price".(48) It is particularly the possibility of
'artificial' barriers to the equalisation of profit rates that
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must be considered under the monopoly stage of capitalism, asking
whether Marx was justified in asserting that such barriers do not
affect the law of value. As we have seen, Marx locates the problem
of monopoly at the level of market prices, but it seems to me that
monopoly rather needs examination at the level of prices and
production, in terms of the 'lasting surplus profits' that Marx
sees when land-ownership is a barrier. Monopoly at the second
level of competition, the level of the sector, would then become a
question of a 'monopoly transformation' (along the lines of the
transformation of values into prices of production).
In conclusion, what is probably crucial is that Marx simply
did not consider the possibility of a new stage of capitalism,
despite the fact that he had himself divided early capitalism into
the stages- of co-operation, manufacturing and machinofacture. Yet
it was probably too early in the historical development of the
monopoly stage for Marx to provide more than the pointers identified
in this chapter. Succeeding chapter-s will examine marxist writers
after Marx in an attempt to clarify whether they make use of these
pointers, or whether they develop new approaches to the issue of
competition and monopoly which are in line with Marx's own analysis
of competition and the law of surplus value.
Ibid p. 521.
Ibid p. 516.
Ibid p. 713.
Ibid see pp. 518-519.
Ibid see p. 946.
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Chapter 4
THE CHANGING NATURE OF COMPETITION: MARXIST
WRITERS AFTER MARX AND UP TO 1930
A. Aims
The basic theme of this chapter can be summarised in the
question: how far does the monopoly stage of capitalism raise new
issues for the operation of the law of surplus value, as the nature
of competition changes? In what way, in others words, do the
regulatory processes of capitalism change? One problem, as we shall
see, is that the marxist writers of the period are at least as
interested, if not more interested, in the operation of the law of
value under socialism as in its operation under capitalism. This
chapter will seek to demonstrate a certain lack of critical
continuity within the Marxist tradition. One of the conclusions
I reached in summarising Marx's contribution to the debate on
competition was that there is a dichotomy within Marx between his
description of the tendencies to form large-scale enterprises and
his analysis of exclusions from the tendency to form an average
profit rate. I will here be arguing for a disjuncture between Marx
and Lenin, which is, in a sense, itself a continuation of the
dichotomy described in Marx's writings. Lenin bas~\ his analysis
of 'imperialism' on the descriptive side of Ma~~s work, and I shall
be arguing that it is Hilferding alone who provides a synthesis of
the two aspects identifiable in Marx.
The arguments presented in this chapter are structured on a
thematic basis, developing those themes pinpointed in the last two
chapters as being of relevance in examining the nature of competition
and the functioning of the law of surplus value as regulatory
processes under capitalism. These themes are: the continuing
process of concentration and centralisation of capital (adding the
novel feature of combination between sectors); the ways in which
the tendency to form an average profit rate have changed and thirdly
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the merging of the fractions of capital. I shall also be dealing
with an additional theme that Marx did not raise in any detail in
relation to the process of capitalist regulation: the role of the
state. Inevitably, however, there is a need to start with what
the imperialist writers had to say about 'imperialism' as a stage
of capitalism.
In general terms, this chapter will be laying the groundwork
for chapters 5 and 6 which spell out the current state of the debate
on the relationship between competition and the law of surplus value
under contemporary capitalism. The present chapter is thus in a
sense a transitional one, which will attempt to highlight some of
the inconsistencies within the 'imperialist' tradition, and between
the theorists of imperialism and Harx himself. The conclusions to
the chapter will point towards a possible synthesis between Marx
and the 'imperialists'.
Two questions should be kept in mind throughout the chapter:
with the development of the monopoly stage how does the nature of
competition change and, correspondingly, how does the mode of
operation of the law of surplus value change?
B. 'Imperialism' as a stage of cauitalism
"It is the most ardent wish of the author that this book should
soon be transformed from a weapon against imperialism into an
historic document relegated to the archives".(1) Thus wrote
Nicolai Bukharin in the 1917 Preface to "Imperialism and World
Economy". This quotation encapsulates an important truth about
those who first wrote about 'imperialism' as a stage of capitalism,
for it underlines the fact that these authors were concerned with
the immediate political issues surrounding the first world war and
its aftermath. There is an air of precipitation and urgency, so
that Lenin, for instance subtitles his pamphlet on 'Imperialism'
Ita popular outline", and emphasises in the preface the pressing
circumstances under which it was written in the middle of the war.
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Earlier, I pointed out that Marx made reference to the growth of
large scale enterprise leading directly to the establishment of
socialism. True, the writers being considered in this chapter
interpose a new stage of capitalism which is seen as a consequence
of the growth of concentration and centralisation. Yet Lenin dubs
this the 'highest' stage of capitalism, the stage at which
capitalism is 'rotten-ripe', so that socialism is again seen as
immanent and on the immediate horizon. Rosa Luxemburg presents the
mechanism in different terms, with capitalism unable to realise its
surplus as it absorbs the non-capitalist areas of the world, but
again the implication is that capitalism has a very limited
life-span.
Now of course, in the event, capitalism has proved remarkably
resilient, despite the Russian and the Chinese revolutions. Perhaps
it is unjust to expect these writers to be able to forsee this
resilience. Perhaps too, we can excuse them on the grounds that
their concern was with an immediate event of enormous political,
economic and social importance. Nevertheless, it seems to me that
there is a thread of opportunism amongst the analysts of 'imperialism',
and that concern with the political opportunities opened up by the
first world war lead to a certain blindness as to the possible long-
run outcome for capitalism.
There is no doubt that the role of war and militarism occupies
an important place for the writers of this period. "Peace is the
interval between wars" says Lenin, and the inevitability of inter-
imperialist rivalry and war is of course one of his five
characteristic features of the imperialist stage. For Bukharin's
analysis too, war has an important role, perhaps particularly in
his "Economics of the Transformation Period", with the 'militari-
zation' of the state pervading economic and political mechanisms,
while for Rosa Luxemburg, militarism constitutes a demand for
surplus. Naturally the war lead to a focus on the connexions
between capitalism and militarism, and indeed I am far from denying
that there is such a connexion. Nevertheless it seems to me that
this strong emphasis can be seen as an illustration of the concern
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of these writers with immediate political issues; an understandable
concern, but one which should alert the post-second world war
generation of marxists to possible errors of analysis.
In my discussion of periodisation in Chapter 1,1 emphasised
that the identification of stages within capitalism depends on the
perspective of the writer and the purposes that writer has in mind.
The political concerns of the theorists of imperialism would appear
to bear this out. Unfortunately the imperialist school does not
actually discuss any theory of periodisation. Rather, they claim
to be describing and analysing a new stage of capitalism, and the
basis for this new stage is asserted as being the five well known
features put forward by Lenin. These features are: the
concentration of production and monopolies leading to combination
between sectors, a parallel process for banks, the growth of links
between industry and banks in the form of finance capital, the
export of capital, and the division and redivision of the world
amongst the capitalist associations and the great powers. The
features are so well known that it is not necessary to discuss them
at this juncture, although two features, finance capital and the
export of capital have been subject to criticism. "Imperialism"
says Lenin "is the monopoly stage of capitalism". I would like
to argue that there are implications in the writings of this
school that imperialism is not a stage of capitalism for there is
no attempt to delineate a distinction between a stage and a mode
of production.
Backing for such an argument comes firstly from the fact that
Lenin makes no explicit reference to Marx's analysis of capitalism
in his "Imperialism". Thus Lenin shows no concern to develop the
concepts which ~~rx himself used. True, Lenin introduces the
concept of super-profits, "obtained over and above the profits
which capitalists squeeze out of the workers of their 'own'
country",(2) but this is an isolated reference, and part of the
preface. Thus Lenin does not raise the question as to how the
law of value operates under this new stage, so that the issue of
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capitalist regulation and the tendency to form an average profit
rate is not brought up. This lack of interest in placing himself
in the context of Marx's thoughts contrasts strongly, it seems to
me, with Lenin's political writings, where he is always careful to
clear the ground by elaborating cn the correct points that
precursors make, and clarifying their mistakes. In 'Imperialism'
Lenin simply makes use of the statistics and information provided
by bourgeois commentators, largely without critical comment.
Bukharin, as we shall see below, shown himself prepared to make
more links with Marx's arguments, but makes a variety of statements
which seem to imply that the nature of capitalist regulation had
changed substantially. For instance, the growth of finance capital
means that the "capitalist 'national economy' has moved from an
irrational system to a rational organization, from a subject-less
economy to an economically active subject". This from the
"Economics of the Transformation Period".(3) Or again, from
''Imperialism and World Economy": "Thus various spheres of the
concentration and. organization process stimulate each other,
creating a very strong tendency towards transforming the entire
national economy into one gigantic combined enterprise under the
tutelage of the financial kings and the capitalist state, an
enterprise which monopolises the national market and forms the
prerequisite for organized production on a higher non-capitalist
basis".(4) Is it clear from these sorts of statements that the
monopoly stage in indeed a stage of capitalism? I think not.
Rudolf Hilferding is an exception to this first argument, for
"Finance Capital" is clearly an attempt to develop and build upon the
concepts that Marx uses. Thus Hilferding does not duck the issue of
capitalist regulation and directly confronts whether the law of value
is applicable under the new stage of capitalism; "Si les unions a
charactere de monopole suppriment la concurrence, elles suppriment
par i~ meme Ie seul moyen grace auquel peut se manifester une loi
objective des, prix. Le prix cesse d'etre une grandeur objectivement
determinee, il devient une operation arithmetique de ceux qui Ie
d6terminent volontairement et consciemment, au lieu d'une resultat
145
une condition, d'un objectif un subjectif, d'un n~cessaire
indtpendant de la volontt et de la conscience des participants
un arbitraire et un fortUit. La verification de l'enseignment
marxien de la concentration, a savoir l'union a charact~re de
monopole, parait ainsi aller a l'encontre de la th{orie illarxienne
de la valeur".(5)
I argued in the first chapter that for Marx competition is
something inherent in the nature of capital, as inevitably comprising
many capitals. Hilferding is alone amongst the 'Imperialist' school
in clearly confronting the implications that the movement from
competition to monopoly might have for a marxist analysis of
capitalism. If Lenin is arguing for a new stage of capitalism
there is a need to demonstrate the similarities and differences with
~~e previous 'competitive' stage, yet Lenin does not even refer to
Marx's economic writings in 'Imperialism'.
The second set of arguments concern the fact that Lenin himself
portrays the monopoly stage of capitalism as something unique. It
is true that one of the tasks Lenin sets himself in "Imperialism"
is to argue against the idea of monopoly giving rise to a single
giant super-trust as put forward by Kautsky. I have already
pointed out that Bukharin seems to make some statements which imply
this possibility, though Bukharin is actually careful to qualify
these ,implications. Hilferding, incidentally, is another advocate
of 'ultra-imperialism'. It is clear that any idea of capitalism
forming into one giant combined enterprise contradicts Marx's
conception of capital as many capitals in competition, and Lenin
certainly opposes this. Yet Lenin himself makes many statements
that the monopoly stage of capitalism is something altogether
different from competitive capitalism.
Consider, for example, the following: "Capitalism in its
imperialist stage leads directly to the most comprehensive
socialization of production, it so to speak, drags the capitalists,
against their will and consciousness, into some sort of new social
order, a transitional one from complete free competition to complete
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socialization". (6) What dces Lenin mean by 'transitional' here?
Are we to see 'imperialism' as capitalist or as socialist in nature,
or is it something in between? The problem with the last
characterisation is that the 'transition' has now persisted for more
than half a century. Lenin does go on to say that despite
production being socialised under 'imperialism', appropriation
remains private, so that in this respect a 'free enterprise'
capitalist economy is retained. An important theme for Lenin
throughout "Imperialism" is that the anarchy of competition is
overcome at this stage, that capitalists who were formerly scattered
and out of touch with each other "are transformed into a single
collective capitalist". A modern critic, Margaret Wirth, takes
issue with Lenin here, arguing that Lenin makes two errors, firstly
in conceiving monopoly as the opposite of free competition, secondly
in defining monopoly as a relation of domination so that the
operation of the law of value is partially suspended.(?) I feel
that Ms Wirth overstates her case, for Lenin did observe that
competition cannot be entirely overcome by monopoly: "Certainly
monopoly under capitalism can never completely, and for a long
period of time, eliminate competition in the world market".(a)
Nevertheless, Lenin is a long way from fully discussing the theore-
tical implications of the changing relations between monopoly and
competition, and shows little realisation of the contradictions
between what he is saying in "Imperialism" and what Marx says in
"Das Kapital" •
The third point I want to make ties in with what has just been
said on the transitional nature of the monopoly stage. Imperialism
for Lenin is the "highest stage" of capitalism: it is "moribund
capitalism tl , it is "rotten ripell, and Section a of his pamphlet is
entitled 'Parisitism and Decay of Capitalism'. Perhaps this
emphasis on the death-throes of capitalism can be put down to the
urgent mood in which Lenin wrote, which was mentioned earlier.
However, such an emphasis can be seen as mistaken, providing a very
rigid interpretation of the laws of capitalist development.
Panzieri and Wirth both criticise Lenin here, and with
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justification. Panzieri argues that both the 'imperialist' and the
modern revisionist strands of thought are reading Das Kapital as an
interpretation of competitive capitalism, valid only for that form
of capitalism. "The further 'orthodox' development of Marxist
theory re-asserted this perspective by denying the capitalist system
any other 'full' form of development outside that assured by the
competitive model, and by defining regulated monopolistic-oligo-
polistic capitalism as capitalism's last and 'putrescent' stage.
Modern revisionism ••• end up by loosing sight of the system's
continuity in its passage from one historical leap to the next, for
it too has anchored its expression of the law of value in the same
interpretation" .(9) This criticism of Lenin as failing to allow
capitalism the possibility of further development is surely valid.
Margaret Wirth makes the further point that Lenin is inhibiting
political action in calling upon capitalism's 'objective senility',
and what is actually necessary is to investigate the concrete
conditions for the overthrow of capitalism.
The final point I want to put in arguing that there is a
certain implication that the imperialist stage of capitalism is
actually something altogether new, again relates primarily to Lenin.
I refer to Lenin as an initiator of the idea of the 'wicked
monopolist': "A monopoly, once it is formed and controls thousands
of millions, inevitably penetrates into every sphere of public life,
regardless of the form of government and all other 'details'''.(lO)
As Lenin sees it, finance capital levies tribute upon the whole of
society for the benefit of monopolies. Much of the tone of Lenin's
pamphlet is an emotive appeal against the 'baddy monopolists' of
this 'moribund' form of capitalism. Whilst it is true that
"Imperialism It was intended for propaganda-purposes, Lenin, it seems
to me, is here presenting an oversimplified picture. He is
appealing to emotional hatreds for the big, the powerful and the
impersonal, whilst failing to draw attention to the subtleties of
the interactions within the capitalist class. Despite rightly
criticising super-imperialism, Lenin himself does much to create an
image of a 'super-boss', a 'super capitalist'.
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So, despite the fact that 'imperialist' theoreticians declare
that they are dealing with a new stage of capitalism, there is much
in their writings (and particularly in Lenin) that implies something
altogether new. Much of the problem arises, as I have already
suggested, from a failure amongst the imperialist writers to
discuss what a 'stage' of capitalism might mean in broader
theoretical terms.
But let me now take the imperialist writers at their face value.
They are writing about a new stage of capitalism: in what way is
this new stage characterised? I would argue that the characteri-
sation is very largely in descriptive, rather than analytical terms.
Here is one respect in which Lenin does develop points that Marx
puts forward, for he builds on Marx's essentially descriptive
presentation of the process of concentration and centralisation
of capital as his starting point for the characteristics of
imperialism. The other four characteristics that have already been
mentioned, and which will be considered further in the course of
this chapter, are also essentially descriptive. Now I am not
denying that a descriptive framework serves a useful function.
There has in fact been a fairly substantial body of empirical work
done on the basis of the five characteristics put forward by Lenin,
including material by Varga and Hendlesohn, Anna Rochester, Victor
Perlo and Sam Aaronovitch. ( 11) But what I shall be arguing
further is that Lenin~s typology does not provide an economic
analysis of the monopoly stage of capitalism.
In ending this section on the idea of a new stage of capitalism,
I would like to criticise the term 'imperialism' as an inappropriate
one. Firstly it places insufficient emphasis on the development out
of Marx's own analysis, linking up with my argument that the change
between the two stages of capitalism are changes of degree.
Secondly, the term is, or has become, too hysterical in tone, there
is too much of the armageddon about it. For these reasons, and
for others which will become clearer in the course of the chapter,
I would prefer to use the term the 'monopoly stage of capitalism'.
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C. Concentration and Combination
It is from the concen~ration of production into large units and
the formation of monopolies that Lenin starts to describe and
delineate the new stage of capitalism. As was shown in the last
chapter7 this was a feature which Marx also pointed out 7 but Lenin7
rather than looking directly to the possibility of socialism7 sees
monopoly as characteristic of a new (albeit transitional) stage of
capitalism. "This transformation of competition into monopoly"
he says7 "is one of the most important ••• phenomena of modern
capitalist economy".(13) However 7 in addition to concentration
and centralisation within a particular branch of industry7 there is
also combination7 with different branches of industry grouped "into
a single enterprise.
This distinction between concentration and centralisation on
the one hand (Lenin incidentally does not make play of the
differences between these as did Marx) and combination on the other
is paralleled by the two levels of competition that I showed Marx as
describing in Das Kapital. Centralisation within the branch
affects the form that competition takes between industries producing
the same product. Combination between branches (as for example the
combinations between the anthracite coal industry and the railroads
in the USA at the turn of the century) alters the competitive process
between branches. As I pointed out in the previous section, Lenin
is rather vague in his presentation of how these changes in the
nature of competition affect the capitalist system. He sees
monopolies as quite different to the old free competition although
Il"the general framework of formally recognised competition remains".
(13) The new stage is thus characterised as 'transitional', a
label which has already been seen to be unsatisfactory. Throughout
"Imperialism" the anarchy of capitalist competition is a strong
theme. Monopoly develops only in certain branches of industry so
that it increases the disparity between different spheres of the
national economy. The resulting 'law of uneven development' shows
that the process of concentration and combination cannot eliminate
the anarchy of competition, but rather raises it onto a new plane.
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Such an analysis of the changing nature of competition remains at
a highly general level and fails to come to grips with the
importance of the dual nature of competition as present in Marx.
Competition does not merely represent 'struggle' or 'anarchy'
within the capitalist' class, it also represents the unity of that
class.
The changing nature of competition as resulting from the
novel process of combination is something that receives far more
attention from Bukharin. In Chapter 11 of "Imperialism and
World Economy" he discusses the changes in the methods of compe-
tition which evolve as concentration increases, whilst in the
"Economics of the Transformation Period" he distinguishes three
forms of competition: horizontal competition between analogous
enterprises, vertical competition between heterogeneous enter-
prises and combined or compound competition between these
capitalist units encompassing different branches of production.
I propose to discuss this typology further in section E, but mean-
time it can be pointed out that the first two correspond to Marx's
inter- and intra-industry competition, while the last is a new
concept.
Concentration of banks occurs alongside industrial concen-
tration, but takes on a special significance because banks are the
'universal boo~eepers' (MarX) of the whole capitalist class.
"Scattered capitalists" Lenin points out "are transformed into a
single collective capitalist".(14) The ensuing combination between
large banking capital and large industrial capital is of course at
the core of the more controversial concept of finance capital,
which will be dealt with in a separate section below.
Hilferding too, is much concerned with the growth of large
scale enterprise whether banking or industrial. Unlike Lenin,
however, Hilferding is concerned to develop and analysis of this
process based on the tendency to form an average profit rate. Such
an analysis follows logically from Marx's treatment of levels of
competition and the mechanism for the formation of the average
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profit rate, although Marx himself did not extend this to his
consideration of concentration and centralisation. Since
Hilferding does achieve this link his consideration of concentration
and combination will be held over to the next section. I consider
it very important that Hilferding provides a mechanism explaining
concentration and centralisation, in a way that neither Marx nor
Lenin do.
Combination is of course a new feature of capitalism at this
stage. Hilferding provides a typology for classifying the unions
between capitalist enterprises which it may be helpful to repeat
here. The distinction between homogeneous unions (in other words
.centralisation of capitals producing the same product) and
combined unions (combinations across sectors between capital
producing different products) rests on the technical character of
the union. A distinction can alternatively be made between
partial unions and monopoly unions based on their differing
positions in the market and depending on whether they control
prices or prices control them. Finally there is the difference
between the forms of organisation involved in the combination:
Hilferding makes the distinction here between a community of
interests and fusion of the constituent enterprises.(15) Such a
typology typifies the contrasting interpretations of the signifi-
cance of the growth of large scale enterprise: that the shift
should be looked at in technological terms, that it requires a new
look at price theory or that the internal functioning of the unit
of business enterprise needs examining. What is actually
required is a unity of interpretationl These three types of
approach are further considered in the next two chapters on the
modern debate.
To conclude this section then, an important question which has
been lying behind the discussion of centralisation and combination
is, what effect do these tendencies have on the process of
capitalist regulation? In what ways are the forms of competition
affected? In what ways does the tendency to form an average
profit rate get altered? These questions will be the concern
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of the next three sections.
D. The Formation of the Average Profit Rate
It was seen in section B that the writings of the imperialist
school imply that the nature of capitalist regulation changes with
the new stage. Marx saw the formation of the average profit rate
by means of the process of competition as the mechanism for expression
of the law of value. In what ways does the growth of centralisation
and combination affect the formation of the average profit rate?
Preobrazhensky in a section of his "New Economics" entitled "The Law
of Value and Monopoly Capitalism' says: "'Restriction of freedom of
competition leads also to restriction of the working of the law of
value, in that the latter encounters a number of obstacles to its
manifestation and to some extent is replaced by that form of
organization of production and distribution to which capitalism can
in general attain while still remaining capitalism".(16)
Preobrazhensky thus argues for a degeneration of the law of value
under monopoly capitalism since t1equalizing of the rate of profit •••
is rendered almost impossible tl and free competition is substantially
replaced by a planned state capitalism, even on a world level.(17)
Despite Preobrazhensky's eloquence, it remains important to pose the
question: are competition and monopoly mutually exclusive?
Preobrazhensky argues that they are, and that the development of
monopolist tendencies in capitalism suppresses free competition,
undermines the formation of an average profit rate and distorts the
law of value. It has already been suggested that the imperialist
writers are not much concerned with analysis of the law of value
under capitalism, and Preobrazhensky is an exception here. Bukharin
doesn't directly discuss the formation of the average profit rate,
but he does talk of the suppression of the anarchy of production with
the growth of finance capital in the context of the war economy
providing the preconditions for a socialist revolution. He feels
that finance capital has changed the capitalist national economy from
an irrational system into a rational organisation; into an
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economically active subject. There is much in this analysis that
implies the possibility of a single "super-trust", although Bukharin
is far from suggesting that this means the elimination of competition,
since he is emphatic that the changing forms of competition must be
considered. "Centralization of capital consumes competition but on
the other hand reproduces it on an extended base. Centralization
destroys the anarchy of small units of production, but it thereafter
aggravates the anarchic relationships between the large sectors or
production".(18) As will be further elaborated on in the next
section, Bukharin in contrast to Preobrazhensky thus seems to see
monopolistic tendencies and competition subsisting side by side,
albeit with competition changing its form. Briefly, and rather
cryptically, Bukharin discusses the effect that this has on lithe
categories of profit and of distribution of surplus value" in the
third chapter of the "Economics of the Transformation Period".
"The mathematical limit ••• is given by the transformation of the
entire 'national economy' into an absolutely closed combined trust,
where all excess 'enterprises' have ceased to be enterprises and
have transformed themselves into mere individual workshops, into
branches of this trust ••• where the entire economy has become an
absolutely unified enterprise of corresponding groups of world
bourgeoisie".(19) Bukharin does not refer to the effect on the
formation of the average profit rate, but he sketches out the idea
of a unified 'state capitalist dividend' which seem to bear a
certain resemblance to the average rate of profit. This concept
is a function of Bukharin's analysis of state power as inevitably
unifying the contradictory organisations of imperialist capitalism.
I shall argue in section F below that Bukharin holds to an over-
simplified view of the role of the state, although it must be remem-
bered that he is specifically dealing with the state in the context
of a world war. His conclusions for the distribution of surplus
value run as follows: "Capitalist relations of production transform
themselves also in this way to state capitalist ones, and different
kinds of capitalist profit equalize each other, and are transformed
into a peculiar 'dividend', which is paid out by a unified,
capitalist collective enterprise, a unified stock company, a trust,
as represented by the imperialist state".(20) This concept of a
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'state dividend' could be seen as some sort of objectified average
profit rate. Opposing Preobrazhensky's contrast between monopoly
and competition then, Bukharin also reaches different conclusions
on the distribution of profits within an economy. What both
authors lack is any detailed discussion of the mechanism for
centralisation and combination and a clear linking of these
monopolistic tendencies with the process of formation of the average
profit rate.
This is where Hilferding has a major contribution to make.
In the third part of "Finance Capital" entitled 'Finance Capital
and the Limits of Free Competition' he formulates a dynamic of the
combination process which starts from one of the aspects of the
formation of the average profit rate emphasised by Marx: the
capitalist only succeeds when his profit is above that of the
averate rate of profit, yet the objective result of seeking higher
profi ts is establisl:>.ment of a common rate of profit. "Mais cet
effort sUbjecti~e en vue du profit Le plus eleve possible a pour
resultat objective la tendance a l'etablissement du meme taux de
profit moyen pour tous les capitaux".(21)
Hilferding however goes further than Marx and argues that this
fight to obtain extra profits means that the organic composition of
capital becomes higher and higher. Marx looked at the implications
of this process for the economy as a whole in terms of the falling
tendency of the rate of profit, but Hilferding analyses its effect
on many individual capitals. The growth in the importance of fixed
capital makes it harder to withdraw capital once it has been
invested and economic barriers to the movement of capital appear.
Hilferding sees this as the start of a process tending to lead to
inequality in the general rate of profit, with two sectors likely
to have below average rates of profit. Overproduction in the
highly capitalised sectors already mentioned is likely to reduce the
profit rate there below the average, more especially with barriers
to the exit of capital. The highly competitive sector is also
likely to have below average profit rates.
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A second aspect of the formation of the average profite rate
emphasised by Marx then comes in to play: the existence of
differences in profit rates provokes competition which then eliminates
those differences. Marx postulated the free movement of capital
between branches as the means to this end; Hilferding argues that
in the new circumstances when spheres of production may have lower
profit rates due to being particularly highly capitalised or
particularly competitive, combination between spheres is the vehicle
for achieving equality. "Ainsi nous voyons comment se forme,aux
deux p$les du developpement capitaliste et pour des raisons tout a
fai t differentes, une tendance ~ La baisse du taux AIL profit
" '"au-dessous de la moyenne. Cette tendance provoque a son tour, la
Oll Le capital est su!fisamment fort, une tendance contraire.
Celle-ci' aboutit finalement a. la supression de la concurrence et,
par la, au maintien de l'in~galite de taux de profit, jusqu'a ce que,
en fin de compte, cette inegalite elle-m@me soi abolie par la
supression de la separation des spheres de productionl1.(22)
Thus at the level of combination between spheres of production,
Hilferding sees a tendency to form an average profit rate in
operation once again. It is a tendency largely put into effect he
argues, by finance capital, so that the issue will need further
discussion in the next section. What is noticeable at this
juncture is that Hilferding has presented a dynamic for the growth
of concentration and centralisation based on a consideration of the
competitive process and the formation of the average profit rate as
put forward by Marx. He has however been able to combine this
issue with the idea of barriers within the capitalist class, while
Marx, as we saw, considered barriers only with respect to the owner-
ship of land. Hilferding even provides an explanation for Marx's
indifference here, for ownership of capital (and the concommittant
barriers within the capitalist class) do not affect the production
process, Marx's central concern: liLa mobilisation du capital
n'affecte en rien, bien entendu, Ie processus de production. Elle
ne concerne que la propriete, ne cr{e que la forme de transfert de la
propriete fonctionnant d'une fa~on capitaliste, Ie transfert de
capital en tant que capital, somme d'argent produisant du profit.
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Comme il n'affecte pas la production, ce transfert n'est en fait que
transfert du titre de propriete sur Le profit rt .(23)
Hilferding however, goes on to consider barriers within the
capitalist class more extensively in what seems to me a different
context. In Chapter 11, which has been the object of discussion
up till now, Hilferding has been looking at the growth of large-
scale enterprise. Later in part 3 he discusses the growth of mono-
polies, cartels and trusts. Although Hilferding himself does not
draw a clear distinction here, it seems to me that he is dealing
with two distinct phenomena. Large scale enterprise tends to have
profit rates below the average; monopolies, trusts and cartels have
profit rates above average. This is because the barriers in each
case are different: in the former there is a barrier to the exit
of capital, whilst in the latter there is a barrier to entry.
Elimination of competition within the sphere makes barriers to entry
possible: rt Une combinaison dans la m:me branche d'industrie se
forme dans Ie but d'elever par l'elimination de la concurrence, Ie
taux de profit dans cette sphere au-dessus de son niveau inferieur
a la moyenne".(24)
It is through their ability to fix prices that monopolies or
cartels gain above average prices, but if one industry is not
carteI[sed whilst another is, it will be difficult for capital to
move despite disparities in profit rates. However, if the non-
cartellised industry undertakes a programme of combination, it too
can obtain a higher profit rate. "C'est ainsi que les cartels
developpent leur force de propaganda". Cartellisation in one area
of the economy provokes the same process in other areas. Hilferding
gives as an example cartellisation in manufacturing provoking
cartellisation in the extractive industries. "Les limitations
imposea; ~ la liberte de movement du capital pour les raisons
economiques et des rapports de proprie'te ••• sont la condition
de la suppression de La concurrence sur Le marche entre les
acheteurs. L'egalisation des taux de profit ne peut done se faire
que par une participation au tame: de profit eleve par suite de la
cartellisation ou la combinaison".(25) The extra profits of the
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cartel are thus simply the appropriation of the profits of other
branches of industry, and ultimately the profits of capitalists in
the non-cartellised industries who are apparently still independent,
actually becomes a simple overseeing salary, as effective
employees of tIle cartel. (Por Lenin this is the so-called 'law of
uneven development', a law of disparity between sectors which seems
a cruder version of the possibility of monopoly and competitive
sectors to subsist side by side.) Competition within this
competitive sector leads to a tendency for centralisation there too.
Hilferding argues that ultimately a general cartel will be formed,
but this I feel contradicts what he has to say about the role of
finance capital, which will be examined in the next section.
Hilferding is not content to leave the issue of monopoly price
where Marx left it, but argues that with the growth of monopoly
there is no objective law of prices, dependent as monopoly prices
are on demand. The threat of consumers restricting purchases, and
low profitability in related non-cartellised industries are two
factors setting limits on the prices charged by monopolies.
We thus find that in developing features to be found in Marx's
analysis, Hilferding raises issues which today are still at the
centre of the stage when competition and monopoly are being dis-
cussed. The first of these is the possibility that two average
rates of profit may be formed (perhaps better expressed as a
hierarchy of profit rates): one in the monopolised sectors of the
economy with a higher average rate of profit, one in the competitive
sectors with a lower average rate of profit. Interestingly,
Hilferding also suggests that sectors with high organic compositions
of capital may make below average profits, due to barriers to the
exit of capital. This is at variance with those views which
equate high organic composition of capital with large scale enter-
prise and with monopoly: Hilferding, it seems to me is
distinguishing between large scale enterprise and monopoly. In
the case of large scale enterprise he argues for combination leading
to a re-establishment of the average rate of profit. In the next
section I shall consider whether there is a similar tendency
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operating in the case of monopoly.
The second issue raised by Hilferding is that of monopoly
price, together with some discussion of barriers within the
capitalist class. Hilferding is able to clearly explain how the
surplus profits of the monopolist is obtained at the expense of
competitive capitals. Although Hilferding himself sees monopoly
profits as potentially in conflict with the marxian labour theory
of value, are surplus profits in fact a new form of value resulting
from the development of the monopoly stage of capitalism? How far
are these surplus profits lasting surplus profits? These
questions will receive further consideration in the next section.
From this examination of the formation of the average rate of
profit, then, I would conclude that competition and monopoly are not
mutually exclusive terms, (as Preobrazhensky seems to argue) but
that each becomes the other in the dynamic process of capital
accumulation. What requires attention is the natu.~ of that
competition: we have already shown Marx's competition within
sectors extended to Hilferding's competition between sectors by
combination. The complementarity of competition and monopoly will
be further considered in the next two chapters. Meanwhile, let us
examine the effect of combination between the fractions of capital
on the competitive process.
E. Finance Canital and the Levels of Competition
I have already outlined how Marx described the process of
concentration and centralisation taking place in his day, at the same
time pointing to repulsion between capitals. The last section
showed Hilferding as able to link the process of combination between
sectors (something that had not yet occurred in Marx's day) to the
formation of the average rate of profit through a two-fold mechanism
of a tendency for differentiation of profits, and a tendency for
their equalisation. Marx had seen such a two-fold mechanism at
work within a particular sector (the formation and transcending
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of normal surplus profits), but not between sectors.
It was further seen that Marx distinguished between three
independent fractions of capital: merchant, industrial and money
or banking capital. Dealing with competition between these three
fractions of capital, Marx showed how the existence of different
fractions obscured the nature of exploitation and the source of
surplus value, with no general law to determine the distribution
of total surplus value between the fractions. In his emphasis on
the role of credit in the transition of socialism, Marx saw banking
capital as a particularly important fraction of capital. The
theorists of imperialism (Lenin, Bukharin and Hilferding) develop
the idea of a process which leads to the merging of these different
fractions of capital.
For the imperialists concentration of banks took place along-
side concentration \i\ industry, and was a second very important
feature of the new stage of capitalism (the growth of monopolies
being the first). It has already been seen that Lenin saw the
concentration of banks as of special significance, but Hilferding
provides an historical basis for this in linking it to the develop-
ment of the credit system. When credit develops to a certain point
argues Hilferding, its use by the capitalist enterprise becomes
essential on two counts: it increases the rate of profit since the
enterprise can mobilise larger quantities of productive capital and
can sell its products at a lower price without diminishing profits.
This process in turn reacts on the banks and forces them to become
giant units. (Similarly, Hilferding saw cartellisation in one
sector of industry provoking cartellisation in related sectors.)
Like Lenin, Hilferding argues that this leads to a significant new
role for the banks in their relationship with industry. Formerly,
as intermediaries for payments, the banks were only interested in
current solvency. In providing capital credit, they have an
interest in overseeing the process of production itself, since loans
are long term. The catch phrase for the imperialist writers is
that banks now take on a ltsocial role lt• In this way too,
industrial and banking concentration mutually reinforce each
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other.(26) This fusion of industrial and finance capital contrasts
with Marx's presentation of a capitalist class which differentiates
itself into separate fractions. At both periods, however, the
theoreticians are concerned to derive their analysis from the
then-eurrent state of development of the credit system.
There is thus a merging of industrial and banking capital,
which is known by the theorists of imperialism as finance capital.
Can such a merging of the fractions of capital be seen simply as an
extension of the process of combination betw~en sectors, or does it
A
raise new issues for the process of competitbn? The concept of
finance capital has in fact proved a controversial aspects of the
theory of imperialism, and the controversy will need to be seen
in relation to the particular problematic of this thesis.
The controversy has centred around whether, under the
imperialist stage of capitalism, banking capital dominates industrial
capital or vice versa. Hilferding first raised the problem,
arguing vigorously for the former when he says, "Finance capital
is capital controlled by banks and employed by industrialists",(27)
Lenin, although he for instance cites Marx on banks as the
"universal bookkeepers of the capitalist class", is careful to talk
of the "merging" or "coalescence" of the banks with industry
together with the rise of monopolies as being the content of the
concept of finance capital. (28) "Fusing" is another term that has
been used. Hilferding himself is more cautious in places, for
instance when he suggests a trinitarian analogy for the relationship
between different fractions of capital, with finance capital as the
highest form of capital. "Car le capital industriel est Dieu le
P~re, qui a lib~re le capital commercial et bancaire comme Dieu Ie
Fils, et le capital-argent est le Saint-Esprit. Ils sont trois,
mais pourtant un seul dans le capital financier".(29)
Sweezy is an eminent Marxist who is highly critical of
HiIferding, and says "The dominance of bank capital is a passing
phase of capitalist development which roughly coincides with the
transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism".(30) Giving
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as evidence for his opposition the growth of self-financing in
industry, Sweezy sees the danger of this stand as so great, tnat he
would rather substitute the term 'monopoly capital' since "it is
doubtful whether the term 'finance capital' can be divested of the
connotation of banker dominance which Hilferding gave it".(31)
The problem with Sweezy's postulated term is that it excludes any
idea of coalescence between banks and industry. Further, it would
appear from the writings of V. PerLa and 3.M. Chevalier on the U.S.
economy (which will be examined in more detail in the following
chapters)that the importance of self-financing for industry has
likewise been a passing phase~ Both authors saw the dense network
of interconnections between banks and industries, and both would
argue that banking capital dominates industrial capital, while
Graham Thompson argues in relation to the present day UK situation
that even where self-financing by firms is important, the views of
banking capital must be taken into account.(32)
The controversy over the nature of finance capital amongst
marxists centres then on whether industrial or banking capital is
dominant in the combination. It should be obvious from the
discussion thus far that much depends on the historical and
institutional situation in which a particular theoretician is
writing. Notoriously, when Hilferding was writing, (and indeed to
this day), German banking capital fulfilled a dominant role with
respect to industry. The imperialist writers who insisted that
banking capital 'dominated' evinced a certain lack of subtlety.
What is crucial is that they commented on the links between
industrial and banking capital.
What is of importance at this stage is that, in addition, both
sides in this controversy can be seen to agree on the effect of
finance capital on competition, with the single exception of
Hilferding. For with Hilferding the dominance of banking capital
over industrial capital leads to the possibility (already hinted at
in the last section) of a single general cartel being formed. The
dialectic which was noted in his analysis of the process of
concentration and the formation of the average rate of profit thus
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disappears at this stage of his analysis. Sweezy based his
criticism of Hilferding on the latter's insistence on the dominance
of banking capital, but he missed the theoretical significance of
Hilferding's brand of 'ultra-imperialism'. This proposition of
the possibility of a single general cartel must involve the
complete suppression of competition between capitalists.
Does the merger of industrial and banking capital imply such
suppression? I would argue that competition between capitals
continues to function regardless of whether industrial or banking
capital is dominant within the concrescence. The fact that this
competition takes a different form to the competition between a
multitude of small enterprises is what blinds some marxists to the
continued functioning of the process of competition. No more
than concentration or- centralisation of capital can eliminate the
concurrent repulsion between capitals, can the combination process
or the merger between banking and industrial capital eliminate the
internal struggles between sectors and fractions of capital
respectively.
As I have already argued at several points in this chapter, the
difficulty with the 'imperialist' writers is that they do not clearly
confront what they mean by the terms they use: what is a
'competitive' as opposed to a 'monopoly' stage of capitalism, and
what changes in the nature of competition are implicit here; is a
distinction being made between 'competitive' enterprises and
'monopolies', or is it 'large-scale' enterprises and their behaviour
that are at issue?
Bukharin, in his "Economics of the Transformation Period" of
1920, provides a useful framework which distinguishes three forms of
competition based on the changes from concentration and centralisation
to combination across branches then extending through the role of
finance capital between who13 sectors of the economy. Bukharin' s
first form of competition he names as 'horizontal' competition
between analogous enterprises where anarchy in competition does not
rest on social division of labour. For example, separate tailor
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enterprises all produce a similar product. Secondly, there is
vertical competition between heterogeneous enterprises whose separate
existence expresses the fact of social division of labour. The
owner of a tailor shop is related to the clothier because he buys
cloth from him, and the simultaneous existence of a tailoring and
a cloth-making enterprise constitutes the expression of the social
division of labour. Lastly, there is combined or compounded
competition between these capitalist units encompassing different
branches of production which therefore transform social division
of labour into technological division.
Let me expand upon the forces which underlie the changes in the
nature of competition spelled out by Bukharin. These can perhaps
best be understood in terms of the idea of uneven and combined
development. Marx saw that within each industry competition
destroys itself, but that monopoly does too. It has been seen that
combination now takes place both between industries and between
fractions of capital. What are the dynamics of this process? The
dynamic cannot be one of a consistent development of a single centre
of monopolistic power. This is because the very factors that make
for growth of one centre of economic power, also make for the
dispertion of this power and for the building up of alternative
centres of power. It can thus be concluded that with respect to
competition, the controversy over whether industrial or banking
capital is dominant in finance capitalism is irrelevant. (Indeed
the fact that they alternate in domination within the concrescence
can itself be seen as a result of competitive changes.) Whether
industries dominate banks within the conscrescence or vice versa,
each concrescence (or finance capitalist group) will itself be
involved in a perpetual battle for dominance within the firm, the
industry, the bank or the group. The social-private contradiction
becomes internal to the financial group. This is not to say that
truces are not declared, that agreements are not reached to divide
the influence of the dominant finance capitalist groups in many
individual cases, but essentially such truces are temporary, and as
the balance of economic forces changes, competition and rivalry
re-establish themselves. Changes in the relative position of the
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dominant groups can come about in two ways. In the first place the
underlying changes are features of the uneven development of
economic life and here we can give examples such as the substitution
of cars and aircraft for railways and the increasing economic weight
of oil, aluminium and chemicals: this is Bukharin's combined or
compounded competition. But changes also encompass the results
of rivalry within a specific industry, (horizontal competition).
What then are the differences between the capitalism that Marx
analysed and the capitalism that the imperialists analysed? The
first element in any answer to this question is that the differences
between the two stages are of degree only. Both are stages of
capitalism with an invariant core of production relations that
characterise capitalism. This means, for instance, that there is
not a transition to the monopoly stage of capitalism in the same way
that there was a transition from feudalism to competitive capitalism.
Despite the socialisation of production which the latest stage of
capitalism promotes, exploitation continues to be the mode for the
accumulation of capital.
Thus I would argue that monopoly does not take over from
competition at the later stage of capitalism, but rather that
competition takes an additional form. Marx saw competition taking
place at two levels: competition between producers (within an
industry, and leading to the formation of market values although
with the possibility of temporary surplus profits) and competition
between capitals (between sectors, and leading to the formation of
a general profit rate, from which there might be 'exclusions').
Arising from the imperialist analysis, competition takes place at
three levels, the two spelt out by Marx, and additionally,
compounded competition between combined enterprises. At any of
these three levels, barriers to competition will provoke competition
at the higher level. Thus a monopoly within an industry (shall we
say, coal extraction) will lead to lasting surplus profits based on
barriers to entry, but such a monopoly is threatened by both
vertical and by compounded competition, where in the former, shall
we say the railways as major carriers of coal might threaten to
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take over the industry, or where the oil industry as an alternative
form of energy might also threaten take over.
A second difference is in terms of the behaviour of fractions
of capital. In the last chapter I showed that Marx saw banking
capital as 'capital in general' having a real existence. The
imperialists point to the existence of 'finance capital' as a unity
of the three fractions of capital postulated by Marx, industrial
capital, commercial capital and banking capital. Hilferding calls
banking capital the 'holy spirit' so that capital in general,
originally an abstraction, finds a means of asserting its
characteristics in the world through the concrescence formed as
finance capital. Hilferding's analysis of the formation of the
average profit rate restricted itself to the relations between
sectors of the economy. Hilferding then went off at a tangent (as
I argued) seeing monopoly leading to the possibility of ultra-
imperialism. But there is also the possibility of compounded
competition between the units of finance capital, and at this level
finance capitals (such as the Rockefeller group in the USA), if they
earn above the general rate of profit will provoke competition from
other finance capitalist groups (say Morgan or Mellon). Compounded
competition and the modern debate over finance capital will again
be persued in the following chapters.
The third difference, (and it will be noticed that this
difference is a facet of the other two) is the receeding role that
the market plays under the new stage and the corresponding growth of
internal planning within the vertical or horizontal combination or
the financial group. Lenin saw this rather crudely as the anarchy
of capitalist production raised onto new planes. The imperialists
did not really put forward any 'theory of the firm', any theory of
the internal functioning of the larger unit to contain the social/
private contradiction that in Marx's day had been substantially
handled by the market. Whilst relations of competition are
external, the giant corporation interiorises these processes. In
the next chapters we shall look at how far this issue has been
tackled by marxists since the 1930's~
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The final difference is that there is what I would see as a new
form of surplus value under the monopoly stage of capitalism, the
extra surplus profits accruing to the monopolist. True, Marx him-
self saw the possibility of extra surplus profits in those cases
where capital did not submit to the average rate of profit, but
Marx saw these cases in terms of exceptions to the rule and largely
related to landed property. Under the monopoly stage of capitalism,
extra surplus profits can consistently accrue to the monopolies which
form themselves within sectors. This is not, however, to argue that
these surplus profits will be lasting, for in the very process of
forming barriers to entry allowing the monopolist to make extra
surplus profits, there is creation of the conditions for overcoming
those barriers. Combination between sectors is one of the
important mechanisms for overcoming such barriers, rendering extra
surplus profits temporary. Despite the more or less temporary
nature of these extra surplus profits, they are such a pervasive
feature of the monopoly stage of capitalism, that I think it is
justified to see them as a new form taken by surplus value. One
can thus picture a 'monopoly transformation' of surplus value into
'extra surplus profits' as superimposed on to the transformation of
values into prices of production as it exists under the competitive
stage of capitalism. This concept of a 'monopoly transformation'
will merit further discussion in the following chapters.
F. The State and the Competitive Process
No more than Marx do the imperialist writers deal comprehensively
with the question of the state under capitalism, for Lenin's "State
and Revolution- is of course concerned with the role of the state in
the transition to socialism. The capitalist state, then, is dealt
with by the imperialist writers in a peripheral fashion; it is
dealt with largely in the context of other questions where it is of
relevance, rather than as a subject in its own right. For example,
the state is examined in relation to the process of internationali-
sation, as well as in relation to the tendency to form an average
profit rate. Similarly, Marx had, by implication, a good deal to
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say about the nature of the state when he discussed the length of
the working day. It is not my intention in this section to look
at the imperialist writers' analysis of the state as such, but
rather in its ~elation to competition and the law of value. I am
thus not aiming at any comprehensive coverage~(33) Nevertheless,
even this limited aim is made more difficult because the imperialist
writers didn't provide any overall analysis of the capitalist state,
any more than of periodisation.
It is an examination of the policies that the state ~rsues
under the 'imperialist' stage of capitalism that seems the primary
focus of Hilferding, Lenin, Bukharin and Luxemburg. In the first
place they all point to the fact that it is in the interests of
cartels that tariffs should be introduced. This, the imperialist
writers argue, explains the demise of free trade as state policy, and
its replacement by the principle of protectionism. Such a policy
allows the cartels to evade competition between goods on the world
market. Thus state action contributes to altering the forms of
competition in the world market, whereby competition in the goods
market is replaced by competition to export capital.
The second aspect of state policy concerns colonisation. This
of course is one of Lenin's five features of the new stage of
capitalism. In section IV of Imperialism he sees the world as
divided up into spheres of influence by the capital exporting
countries, although it is finance capital which actually divides the
world. "The capital-exporting countries have divided the world
among themselves in the figurative sense of the term. But finance
capital has led to the actual division of the world".(34) The
state participates in the centralisation of capital, and its conquest
policies derive from competition between these capitals in sales
markets, in raw material markets and in spheres for capital invest-
ment. Imperialism is the policy of finance capital, argue these
writers, a policy of conquest. Implicit in such a policy is of
course militarisation, the demand for armaments from the imperialist
state being something emphasised by Rosa Luxemburg, while Bukharin
looks at the militarisation of capitalist forms of organisation.
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Competition, then, expressed itself under imperialism in a new form,
the conquest policies of the imperialist nations. Finance capital,
argues Lenin, derives the greatest profit from a form of subjection
which involves the loss of the political independence of the
subjected countries.(35)
Lenin has (rightly) been criticised here on a number of counts.
What mechanism is it that makes the state prepared to act on behalf
of its national capitals? The expenses of colonisation are, after
all, very substantial. What is it that distinguishes the
colonisation of the end of the nineteenth century from earlier
(pre-industrial capitalist) waves of colonisation? And, at an
empirical level, did export of capital actually precede colonisation,
as Lenin's argument would imply, and was capital actually primarily
exported to colonies, or to other areas of the world?
These writers thus provide a picture of monopoly capital
and the state acting very much in harness. The question of why
the state should have the interests of monopoly capital at heart, is
not clearly raised, and even the methods of putting these interests
into effect is left fairly sketchy. Thus Hilferding in the 5th
part of his "Finance Capital", 'La FoUtique Economique du Capital
Financier' sees cartellisation as unifying economic power and
thereby increasing its political efficacy. Lenin and Bukharin add
that the state itself participates in the centralisation process.
Hilferding continues his argument in terms of other classes in
society being more prepared to support finance capital. Small
enterprise is dependent on large enterprise and thus interested in
the latter's expansion. The struggle for concentration thus takes
place within the capitalist sector itself as a struggle between the
giant enterprises and small and medium capital. Importantly,
however, this struggle is not an anticapitalist one. "Mais cette
lutte n'a en generale aucun charactere anticapitaliste: au contraire
elles Lsmall and medium capitals] ne voient leur salut que dans
un dtveloppement plus rapide du capitalisme dont elles sont elles-
~
memes Le produi t et qui elargisse leur champ d' activi t e", (36)
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This picture of the concentration of political power in the
hands of finance capital is also put forward by Bukharin.
Competition between individual capitalists becomes by stages the
competition of state capitalist trusts in the world market. The
state thus becomes more than ever an executive committee of the
ruling classes. Parliament no longer serves as the arena for the
struggle amongst various factions of the ruling groups, for
finance capital has consolidated it into one solid reactionary
mass. "'Democratic' and 'liberal' sentiments are replaced by open
monarchist tendencies in modern imperialism, which is always in
need of state dictatorshiplf . ( 37)
The state is thus seen as a monolithic entity, closely bound
up with the interests to finance capital, with minimal fractional
struggle. This unity is further emphasised by working class
opportunism, as a feature of the class struggle under the monopoly
stage which Lenin, Bukharin and Hilferding all point to. This
opportunism is based on the possibility of the imperialist nations
buying off working class opposition with increased wages, as a
sharing out of imperialist super-profits. Whilst it is true that
this opportunism is seen as temporary, the general picture
presented is that of class and fractional struggle within the
imperialist nations being replaced by imperialist national rival-
ries, rivalries between states on a territorial basis.
Whilst I have shown the imperialist writers concerned with the
interrelation between the role of the state and the changing nature
of competition, Preobrazhensky alone deals directly with the state
and the law of value. As Wf= have already seen, Preobrazhensky
sees monopoly capitalism as partially abolishing the law of value,
where the law of value is the spontaneous regulation of the
production process in commodity society. The world war and state
intervention further emphasises this process: "Free competition
was abolished, and the law of value in many respects was almost
completely replaced by the planning principle of state capitalism".
(38) The ending of the war by no means fundamentally reversed this
process; and Preobrazhensky is largely concerned to point out that
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such an economic system is objectively ripe for socialist planned
production.
Again then we trace the implication that the state and the
capitalist economy becomes a single monolithic entity. Again
there is the urgency and immediacy of the transition to socialism
which we observed in Lenin. However Preobrazhensky is not so
concerned as, say Bukharin, to analyse the changing nature of
competition with the growth of the monopoly stage of capitalism.
Earlier sections of this chapter have examined the changing nature
of competition in some detail, arguing that new forms of competition
have become evident, but that competition has certainly not been
'abolished'. It is thus a rather sweeping generalisation to see
the law of value as partially abolished with the monopoly stage of
capitalism, as indeed I have already argued earlier.
In conclusion then, the imperialist writers do not deal very
systematically with the relationship between the state, the changing
nature of competition and the law of value, concerned as they are
with immediate state policies. When more modern theories of the
state are considered in Chapter 6, I shall want to focus more clearly
on whether the state has the interest of monopoly capital at heart,
and whether the state is indeed the monolithic entity that the
imperialist writers seem to imply, an implication that is made
fairly explicit in the modern theory of state monopoly capitalism
for instance.
There are three noticeable absentees from the admittedly
peripheral discussions of the role of the state by these writers.
Two of these can probably be explained by a justifiable lack of
historical foresight. Firstly there is no discussion of the
extension of the social role of the state, and this obviously becomes
important with the establishment of the welfare state. Secondly
there was no realisation that colonisation woul~be replaced following
the second world war by 'neo-imperialism'. (Since this thesis is
concerned only with developed capitalist formations this issue is
only included for the sake of completeness.) Finally, and perhaps
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particularly importantly for the unexpected staying-power of
capitalism, the imperialist writers do not deal with the role of
ideology in the capitalist state.
G. Conclusions
The imperialist writers were not centrally concerned with the
issue of this thesis: the relations between the monopoly stage of
capitalism, the changing nature of competition and the implications
for the law of value. The urgency of the historical situation in
which they were largely writing, the first world war, meant that
the transition to socialism was foremost in their mind. Amongst
other reasons, this lead to an implication in their writings that
the monopoly stage of capitalism (or 'imperialism' as it was
generally called) was something other than a new stage: as Lenin
put it, it was "putrescentU or "dying' capitalism. It have argued
that the monopoly stage of capitalism must be seen as essentially
capitalist; that although a new phase of capitalism requires a
fresh theoretical effort, there is a theoretical continuity
between monopoly capitalism and competitive capitalism.
In Chapter 3 a dichotomy was identified in Marx's economic
writings between his descriptive considerations of the growth of
large-scale enterprise and his analytical consideration of
'exclusions' from the formation of the average profit rate. This
chapter has pointed out that Lenin seems to continue this dichotomy,
in the sense that the analysis he presents in "Imperialism" bases
itself almost wholly on the descriptive aspects of Marx's work,
whilst the analytical aspects are substantially ignored. I
pointed out then, that the imperialist writers do not systematically
relate their analysis to that of Marx. Hilferding is an exception
here: not merely does he explicitly relate his analysis to Marx's
economics in "Das Kapital", but he also achieves some synthesis
between the descriptive and the analytical aspects of Marx's work
in the links he makes between the growth of large-scale enterprise
and the formation of the average profit rate. With this exception
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then, there is a certain lack of critical continuity of ideas within
the marxist tradition, particularly in terms of a disjuncture
between :!"larx and Lenin. In the following chapters it will be seen
that the descriptive tradition established by Lenin is continued by
later marxist writers. How far have modern ma~st writers also
been able to return to and develop Marx's analytical ideas? The
conclusions here will point towards a possible synthesis between
Marx and the imperialists.
What of such a possible synthesis then,at this stage of the analysis?
I am trying to emphasise that Marx wasn't simply analysing one stage
of capitalism, the competitive stage, but that the laws he adumbrated,
and in particular the law of surplus value, apply to the new stage
also, although in a modified form. The first aspect of this
continuity is that competition remains a feature of the monopoly
stage of capitalism, albeit in a changed form. Competition now
takes place at three levels, horizontal, vertical and combined
competition, rather than simply within and between sectors as under
competitive capitalism. Whilst barriers to entry of capital
(monopolies) and barriers to exit of capital (large-scale enterprise)
can temporarily, or even for longer periods, prevent competition
between sectors; combined competition, and the possibility of
shifting concrescences of finance capital correspondingly tend to
overcome those barriers in their search for extra surplus profits.
The second aspect of the continuity is the development which
the law of value itself undergoes under the monopoly stage of
capitalism. In Chapter 2 I portrayed the law of value as a general
law governing the distribution of surplus value between capitals
through the tendency to form an average profit rate. The
'elasticity' of the operation of the law was emphasised, where
normal surplus profits within a sector, and the tendency for those
surplus profits to be overcome, are part of the process forming the
tendency towards an average profit rate. On the other hand,
Chapter 3 showed Marx presenting competition between fractionsof
capital (industrial, commercial and banking capital) as not subject
to this general law at the competitive stage of capitalism: there
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is an 'indeterminacy' (in the sense of no governing general law) in
the distribution of surplus value between the fractions of capital.
I have argued in this chapter that the development of the credit
system and the possibility of combinations between sectors and
between fractions of capital provides a mechanism for the tendency
to form an average rate of profit to re-establish itself at the
level of the fractions of capital under the monopoly stage of
capitalism.
There is thus a link between the changing form of competition
and the development of the law of value, which deserves spelling
out in some detail. It was shown in Chapter 1 that under the
competitive stage of capitalism, competition operated at ~o levels
to enforce the law of value. It operated within a sector ensuring
that the commodity had the same market value for all producers
regardless of the method of production used, which meant surplus
profits for those who produced the commodity with an above average
production method. Within the sector there is horizontal
competition between enterprises producing the same commodity, and
seeking to gain surplus profits•. Competition also operated between
sectors, equalising profit levels through the difference between
prices of production and values. At this level there is vertical
competition between enterprises producing different commodities and
expressing the social division of labour. It appears that under
competitive capitalism the law of value gives a determinate, if
elastic, method for calculation of the division of the social labour
of society. This is, however, to forget that running parallel to
the operation of competition within and between sectors of production
is the division of the capitalist class into three fractions,
industrial, merchant and banking capital, together with the
existence of the landowning class. In his theory of rent, Marx
provides an analysis of the mechanism whereby the landlord is able
to extract surplus value from the capitalist, enforcing the law of
value on the latter, if he is in a position to enjoy surplus profit.
It is also known that merchant capital partakes of the average rate
of profit, according to the mass of capital invested by the merchant.
Eut Marx points out that there is no general law to determine the
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division of gross profit between banking and industrial capital,
since the competition between these is an intra-elass competition
and thus the determinants of the limits of the mean rate of interest
are purely empirical, in contrast with the competition which takes
place between labour and capital. It would thus seem that under
competitive capitalism there is in fact a level of indeterminancy
(which has not generally been observed) in the law of value at the
level of the division of the capitalist class into industrial and
banking fractions. However, insofar as the credit system develops
hand in hand with the development of capitalism this indeterminancy
is overcome. In the money market, the character worn by industrial
capital only in its movement between spheres, the character of a
common capital of a class comes into full evidence. 'Capital in
general' has an existence in the real world as finance capital.
In comparison with the above situation, what are the levels of
operation of competition and the law of value under the monopoly
stage of capitalism? Within each sector of production competition
will still enforce a common market value. The only point of
difference here will be that insofar as sectors become characterised
by one or a few large producers with a proportion of small producers
remaining, the large (or monopoly producer)will probably have the
most efficient production methods and will therefore obtain surplus
profits. As was seen with respect to vertical competition, sec~ors
characterised by monopoly can escape submitting to the average profit
rate, involving transfer of surplus value from other sectors, what
I called the 'monopoly transfer'. At the intersectorial level there
is thus the introduction of a certain indeterminancy into the law of
value which results in an uneven development between spheres through
the tendency to create and overcome monopoly barriers. This is not
to say that uneven development between spheres does not exist under
competitive capitalism (Marx is emphatic that the average profit rate
exists only as a tendency), but that t~is uneven development takes on
a more structured form under the monopoly stage, comprising two
different types of capital, monopoly and non-monopoly capital.
Having seen how the operation of the law of value tends to
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result in uneven development between monopoly and non-monopoly
sectors, albeit with the boundaries between these two capitals as
moveable and variable, we can now go on to point out the existence
of compounded competition under the monopoly stage of capitalism.
This is ~ form of competition characteristic of the new stage,
involving a tendency for combination to take place between spheres
of production eliminating the differences in profit rate which have
been established by the monopoly sectors as described by Hilferding.
There are thus two levels at which competition functions to
ensure that the indeterminancy in the operation of the law of
(surplUS) value which was observed at the sectoral level under the
monopoly stage of capitalism ~s but a temporary indeterminancy.
On the one hand vertical competition tends to break down any eXisting
division of competitive and monopoly capitals, creating monopolies
from the former and opening the latter to competition. And on the
other hand, compounded competition overrides the sectoral divisions
of capital and encompasses different branches of production, re-
establishing an average rate of profit.
One further change is brought about under the monopoly stage of
capitalism in the process of competition, which is that the division
of capital into three fractions no longer runs parallel to the
competition within and between spheres (horizontal and vertical)
as under the competitive stage. The three fractions of capital
now join at the level of combined competition. Banking capital,
industrial capital and merchants' capital coalesce or fuse to form
a series of concrescences. The existence of such concrescences
means that at the level of compounded competition, the indeter-
minancy of the division between interest and profit of enterprise
has been eliminated, becoming rather the gross profit of the
concrescence, the unit of finance capital. The fuller development
of the credit system under the monopoly stage of capitalism has
brought the character of a common capital of the capitalist class
into full evidence.
However, the formation of concrescences from the different
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fractions of capital does not mean that these concrescences are
fixed, for the merging of capitals has nothing friendly or co-
operative about it. Competition under the monopoly stage of
capitalism in fact continues to take place at the two levels at
which it took place under competi~ive capitalism, namely horizontal
and vertical competition. The form of the latter has changed due
to the existence of monopoly sectors, but this in turn has led to
the development of a third level of competition, combined competition.
The indeterminancy of the 'monopoly transfer' is limited by the
operation-of a modified vertical competition and of compounded
competition. Insofar as competition takes place simultaneously
at three levels under the monopoly stage of capitalism, the law of
surplus value, too, is operating at three levels, and it is thus that
the modifications in the operation of the law of value under the
monopoly stage of capitalism must be seen. Those who would see
this as a less predictable form of operation must recall that a
major indeterminancy under the competitive stage tends to be
eliminated under the monopoly one, namely the indeterminancy of the
division of gross profit between industrial and banking capital.
I have finally suggested in this chapter that the monopoly stage
of capitalism sees the development of a new form of surplus value:
extra surplus profits, which might be linked to the idea of a
'monopoly transformation'.
It will be the task of the next chapters to see how far the
possible synthesis between Marx and the imperialists pointed to
above provides a basis for assessing the achievements of modern
Marxists in analysing the changing nature of competition under the
monopoly stage of capitalism.
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Chapter 5
THE MODERN DEBATE ON THE ROLE OF
COMPETITION: SETTING TEE SCENE
A. The 1930's to the 1950's
The main focus of these last two chapters will be on the
themes within the current literature which are of concern to this
thesis, themes which will be used as a basis for my own interpre-
tations and suggestions on the changing nature of competition and
its implications for the operation of the law of surplus value.
Given that I am putting myself forward as a historian of marxist
economic thought, I will however start with a brief overview of
certain of the salient aspects within the marxist tradition between
approximately 1925 (following the theories of imperialism examined
in the last chapter) and the rearousal of interest in marxist
thought at the end of the 1950's. This period corresponds of
course to Stalin's accession to power in the USSR.
In Chapter 1, I suggested a series of contrasting features in
the orthodox and marxist approach to competition and monopoly which
are a result of their differing paradigms. What aspects of the
marxist paradigm are most apparent in the writers of the Stalinist
epoch? Three are of particular importance: these writers
emphasise the institutional framework, they include a dynamic
approach to competition and monopoly, and they are well aware of the
historical dimension. A major unifying feature of the period is the
continuing (if spasmodic) development of the analysis sketched out in
Lenin's Itlmperialismlf • The writers I propose to consider do not
relate their presentation to Marx, but rather to what in the last
chapter I characterised as Lenin's descriptive development of Marx.
There is thus in this period a continuation of the tendency initiated
by Lenin to consider simply one aspect of Marx's contribution to the
debate on competition. The writers of this period do not build on
Marx's analysis of the tendency to form an average profit rate;
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they develop the descriptive framework he initiated in his remarks
on the concentration and centralisation of capital. One finds then,
a number of empirical works which develop the descriptive categories
used by Lenin, the most important of which are Anna Rochester's
"Rulers of America" (1936), Varga and Mendlesohn's "New Data for
Lenin's Imperialism" (1940) and Victor Perlo's "Empire of High
Finance" (1957).
To what extent then do these works reassert the disjuncture
between Marx and Lenin which I identified in the last chapter?
Victor Perlo for instance saw Anna Rochester's book (sponsored
incidentally by the Labour Research Association) as the outstanding
theoretical work of the 1930's, whilst I would argue that it is
rather an empirical work developing empirical categories. In the
forward Rochester herself is more modest than Perlo would claim,
and estimates her contribution as an empirical one: "The present
book is based on the economic and political teachings of Marx as
developed for the imperialist era by Lenin. It attempts to show
the broad outlines of capitalist structure in the US and illustrates
for this country the basic argument presented by·Lenin in his
'Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism'''.(1) In examining
the contents, it is indeed found that~Rulers of Americ~/is concerned
to illustrate the usefulness of Lenin's descriptive categories in
relation to the United States. Thus Parts 1 and 3, entitled
'The Rulers and their Domain' and 'Capitalism in Crisis' respecti-
vely, deal with the broader background, whilst Part 2, 'Control in
Selected Industries' provides details of the grip of the principal
financial groups on nine industries. The concluding chapter of
this section 'Monopoly and Competition' argues that the studies of
industries have illustrated the uneven development of monopoly in
the various sections of capitalist society, and further that "They
show that even the most highly developed monopoly does not - and
cannot - eliminate competition".(2) The relations between and
within financial groups is represented as confused, and Rochester
concludes that "The financial overlords are unable to co-ordinate
the activities of the separate corporate organisms which they have
createdll.(3) In summary, Rochester confines her study within the
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framework of Lenin's empirical categories, whilst nevertheless
enriching them by her specific consideration of the United States
economy up to the 1930's~
The same can be said of Varga and Mendelsohn's study,
pUblished four years later, where the explicit aim is to update the
empirical material provided by Lenin. Comments are provided in a
format parallel to Lenin's text. They provide additional relevant
data, for example including Japan in their tables, and citing cases
of compulsory cartellisation, especially in Germany; government
holdin~in joint stock companies; or lists of new colonial
conquests and of the territoral redivisions under the Versailles
Treaty and of the former Ottoman Empire. Even more than with
Rochester's study, the framework of the empirical categories of
"Imperialism" is closely adhered to.
Turning to Victor Perlo's post-war work, this is concerned with
the 'spider web' of financial institutions in the U.S. economy, in
which he follows the changing fortunes of the eight major 'interest
groups' there, (Mellon, du Pont, Rockefeller, Cleveland, Chicago,
Morgan, Boston and Kuhn-Loeb). Perlo argues, "Some writers have
presented this too simply, as virtually a single integrated unit •••
Others - the apologists - use the complexity of relationships to
obscure their existence. The real truth is that a definite
financial structure does exist, but not as a single unit. The
economy is clustered around several major empires and a number of
minor duchies. The boundaries are shifting, and indistinct, with
many border-provinces under divided rule".(4) Again Perlo is making
a particular case study of Lenin's concept of finance capital in the
United States. Sam Aaronovitch took a similar look at finance
capitalism in Britain in two books "Monopoly" (1955) and "The
Ruling Class" (1961).
That these works had a solid empirical contribution to make to
the marxist tradition cannot be denied. Lenin intended his
"Imperialism" as an outline, and Rochester, Varga and Mendelsohn and
Perlo did much to fill in the detail. In particular, they did much
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to provide empirical evidence for the concept of finance capital.
But whilst not wishing to belittle the contribution that they did
make, there can be no doubt that all these studies rest firmly on the
categories put forward in Lenin's pamphlet. There is here no
continuation of the theoretical synthesis between Marx and the
'imperialists' which I argued in the last chapter had been
initiated by Hilferding.
It is of course generally accepted that the period being dealt
wi th here was marked by a hiatus in marxist theory, a hiatus
that can to a large extent be put down to the rise of fascism' in
Germany, and of Stalinism in the USSR, the two countries which had
up to the 1920's been the centres of creative marxist thought. This
lack of theoretical development can be identified with an extension
of over-simplified versions of Marxism-Leninism.(S) Perhaps it
provides a partial explanation for the close adherence to Lenin's
conceptual categories which I have identified in the writers con-
sidered above. It also leads on to a second feature of this period
in marxist economic thought which I would like to identify. For as
well as developing aspects of the marxist approach to competition
and monopoly, this period also shows marxists influenced by the
orthodox paradigm and its consideration of competition and monopoly.
Around the turn of the century an extensive descriptive
literature had grown up concerned with the prevalence of trusts,
poo~/ cartels, and other monopolistic forms of capitalism which has
had a considerable influence on theory in both the marxist and the
orthodox schools of thought. Although there were a number of 'muck-
rakers', there were also many serious chroniclers of this growth of
monopoly elements. In the U.S.A. John Moody, Richard T. Ely,
J.W. Jenks and Eliot Jones are examples of pre-first world war
writers, whilst in Britain we find H.W. Macrosty and Herman Levy.(6)
These extensive and carefully descriptive studies were crystallised
in the work of J.A. Hobson who devoted six chapters of his revised
edition of "The Evolution of Modern Capitalism" to the problem of
size and combinations in modern business.(7) Hobson was of course
one of the writers whose figures Lenin made use of in Imperialism,
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and one does indeed find that it was the marxist tradition which first
took this literature into account, basing its theories of imperialism
on the empirical accounts provided by bourgeois chroniclers, as we
saw in the last chapter.(8)
It is true that these writers often took varied theoretical
stands towards the phenomena they were describing(9), but there can
be no doubt that this descriptive literature demonstrated a need for
change in the accepted wisdom of Neoclassical theory, hypothesising
as it did, a perfectly competitive situation. As late as 1936
A.R. Burns wrote: "Elements of monopoly have always been interwoven
with competition, but the monopoly elements have increased in
importance. They can no longer be regarded as occasional and
relatively unimportant aberrations from competition. They are such
an organic part of the industrial system that is it useless to hope
that they can be removed by law and the industrial system thus
brought into conformity with the ideal of perfect competition".(10)
But during the 1930's orthodox theory did at last respond to the
substantial descriptive literature on the growth of monopoly structures.
True, it was a response that took place after an interval of some 30
years, an interval that did much to discredit the discipline of
economics, yet it took place at a time when theoretical marxism was in
disarray. The response of bourgeois theory (at the risk of sub-
stantial oversimplification) can be classified as two·fold: the first
has often been called the 'managerial reVOlution', while the second
involved changes in the theory of the firm. (Orthodox theories on
monopoly are considered in more detail in Appendix A.)
According to managerial writers, whose views were pioneered by
Berle and Means in "The Modern Corporation and Private Property"
(published in 1933) the separation of ownership and control
"challenges the fundamental economic principle of individual
iI"..i tiative in industrial enterprise" since "the explosion of the
atom of property destroys the basis of the old assumption that the
quest for profits will spur the owner of industrial property to its
effective use".(11) The separation of ownership and control has
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also allowed of the growth of huge corporations, whose domination,
say EerIe and Means, challenges many of the basic assumptions of
economic thought. "Ownership of wealth without appreciable
control and control of wealth without appreciable ownership appear
to be the logical outcome of corporate development".(12)
Whilst the 'managerial revolution' challenged the internal
coherence of orthodox economic theory the 'price revolution'
challenged the adequacy of its fundamental assumptions. Neo-
classical theory had limited its analysis of the market to pure
competition and pure monopoly as two fundamental types. The
initiators of the price revolution, Pierro Sraffa, Joan Robinson and
E.H. Chamberlin, attempted to bring equilibrium theory more into
line with the reality of the economic world. It is widely accepted
that the achievement of their contributions was that they introduced
an empirically relevant set of assumptions into price theory and
the theory of the firm.
Given the lack of development of marxist thought after 1925,
and the recrudescence of orthodox economics in the 1930's (the
period Shackle calls the "Years of High Theory"), the likelihood of
mainstream economics influencing the marxist analysis appears prima
facie high. I would suggest that the influence of orthodox
economics can be identified in two aspects of the marxist analysis,
one theoretical and the other political.
The first involves a certain tendency to fuse the marxist theory
of a monopoly stage of capitalism with mainstream theories of non-
competitive (other than perfectly competitive) markets. In other
words, the distinction made by orthodox economists between competi-
tive, oligopolistic and monopolistic markets has tended to be
confused with the marxist concept of monopoly, a concept which, as
will be further argued in this chapter, is by no means to be
identified with purely market phenomena. As I showed in Chapters
2 and 3, for Marx monopoly is not opposed to competition, but is
rather seen as an extension of the competitive process. The fact
that the orthodox and marxist paradigms provide analyses at quite
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different levels seems not to have been always clearly realised by
marxists. As will be demonstrated in section E below, certain
marxists in the current tradition (and particularly those, like
,
Ronald Meek, intellectually reared in a Stalinist context) place
considerable emphasis on monopoly pricing and the role of the
market as an element in a marxist theory of competition and monopoly.
Such a concern is more appropriate for an orthodox paradigm, and
indeed the achievements of orthodoxy in developing the theory of
market price is unlikely to be matched by marxists. Of even more
fundamental importance for this thesis is that marxists may also
have allowed themselves to be misled into the view that the
existence of monopoly structures can change the fundamental nature
of competition. This chapter will continue to argue the case
against such a view. Were it the case that monopoly and competition
are fundamentally opposed, marxists would indeed be obliged to
seriously pose themselves the question of whether the law of value
remains valid under monopoly capitalism.
The ideological influence of mainstream economics can, I feel,
also be identified in certain marxist political approaches to the
question of monopoly. British Communist Party emphasis on the role
of monopolies (conceived of as 'bad') contains a certain implication
that the political struggle is one to be waged against monopolies
(by means of the anti-monopoly alliance) rather than against capita-
lism as such. How far does this involve an acceptance of the
liberal idea that monopolies need control, but that once this control
is achieved, further political action is unnecessary? Have the
years of defeat for the CPGB meant a corresponding absorption of the
bourgeois policy prescription: control monopolies and then really
the economic system provided by capitalism is reasonable!
The quarter century then between 1930 and 1955 was a period
which saw little development of marxist theories of competition and
monopoly, although there was useful descriptive work based on
Lenin's categories in "Imperialism". It was also a period in which
there was a marked recrudescence of orthodox theorising, which had
some influence on the largely languishing marxist school. However,
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since the end of the Stalinist hiatus, there has been a substantial
rearousal of interest in theoretical and empirical marxism. The
next section will spell out the themes in the contemporary
literature as they relate to competition and the law of surplus
value.
B. Themes in the current literature
The rebirth of the interest in marxism from the end of the
1950's involved coming to terms with the fact that socialism had
only been established in a part of the world. Lenin's
"Imperialism" had been written in the midst of the first world war,
and it was not surprising that his analysis should have been
coloured by the ideas of an immanent demise of capitalism. In the
aftermath of the Russian Revolution marxists turned their attention
to the economics of the transition period and of socialism.
Contemporary marxism has returned to the analysis of the capitalist
mode of production, and within this the theme of competition and
the regulation processes of capitalism have been of continuing
importance. There has also been a concern to reclaim the roots
of marxism by a return to the writings of Marx himself.
Contemporary marxism shows a richness and diversity of approach
to the theme of competition and its implications which is not very
easy to follow. A major concern of this chapter and Chapter 6 will
be to attempt a classification of these different approaches, using
this as means of identifying and clarifying the themes and issues
that I see as most significant and important. How far have modern
marxists been able to return to and develop Marx's analytical ideas
on competition and the regulation of capitalism? Here I will want
to continue the task I set myself in the last chapter of identifying
continuity and disjuncture with Marx, and with the theorists of
imperialism. For example how useful are Bukharin's three types of
competition, and has Hilferding's synthesis been made use of in the
contemporary literature? Do we have any new departures? Some
notable new themes in the contemporary literature are a concern
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with monopoly pricing and with the internal functioning of the
large firm. Because of the range of issues covered, this chapter
will deal with those that set the scene for the contemporary debate.
Chapter 6 will examine the themes that, as I see it, indicate
fruitful new possibilities for a theory of competition within the
marxist paradigm.
Capitalist regulation, then, has become an important issue for
contemporary marxist political economists. For James Clifton,
theories of competition are the basis for systematising the
fundamental forces at work in a capitalist economy.(13) How does
one characterise the adjustment mechanism of capitalism? For
Aglietta too, competition is very important: he sees competition
as a process of unification of the whole capitalist class insofar
as all capitals are constrained to adjust themselves to the general
profit rate.(14) The changing forms of regulation are what concern
Alain Lipietz and he distinguishes two types of regulation, monopoly
and competitive regulation.(15) Section D of this chapter will
focus on the views of the changing nature of competition and
monopoly. This will in turn raise the question of whether the law
of surplus value has been modified or distorted under the monopoly
stage of capitalism, and whether the changes are such that the
labour theory of value is no longer applicable, or remains a useful
tool.
It is now time to provide a preliminary classification of the
themes in the current literature. I want to spell out here how
each theme relates to the concern of this thesis, and to provide a
brief outline of what each theme involves. It is important to
realise that none of the themes can really be considered in
isolation, but that there are links between all of them. (For
example the issue of monopoly pricing inevitably ties up with the
forms of corporate organisation.) Authors do however differ in
the emphasis they place on each theme. Thus Meek has quite a lot
to say about monopoly pricing, and scarcely mentions finance
capital, whilst Chevalier places most emphasis on corporate organi-
sation and finance capital. Readers will also notice that there
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is little unity of opinion on each of the themes I have identified.
Diagram 5.1 provides a classification of themes and shows some of
the diversity of opinion within each.
The issue of periodisation is in a sense fundamental to all the
rest. What is the modern view of the monopoly phase of capitalism
(what Lenin called 'imperialism') and of how it differs from the
capitalism analysed by Marx? The remaining themes involve the mode
of regulation of capitalism (how has competition changed?), the
process of exchange and the market (involving monopoly pricing),
the distribution of surplus (especially in relation to the formation
of a general profit rate), the institutional structure (including
corporate organisation, finance capital and the role of the state)
and what might be called the unity of production and exchange.
First of all, the issue of periodisation. It is commonplace
to assert the validity of the view that capitalism has reached a
new stage. The very titles in the recent literature confirms this:
"Monopoly Capitalism and Marx's Economic Doctrines" (Evanitsky,
1960), "On the Monopoly Theory of Monopoly Capitalism" (Becker,
1971), "Marx and the Laws of Competitive and Monopoly Capitalism"
(Szymanski, 1973), "Towards a Critique of the Theory of State
Monopoly Capitalism" (Wirth, 1977). Is it legitimate to transfer
Marx's concepts and analyses from 19th century capitalism to 20th
century capitalism? Two divergent opinions can be identified here:
those arguing that the changes between the competitive and the
monopoly stages are changes of degree only, and those who see some
sort of fundamental discontinuity. Particularly among the latter
it is argued that Marx's model applies only to competitive
capitalism, and on this basis pleas are periodically made (as I
showed in the Introduction) for significant contributions to be made
to the theory of monopoly capitalism. One view then says that
"Capital" can only be read as an interpretation of competitive
capitalism, an interpretation ·..,hich is not valid for the new form
of capitalism. Discussion of the issue of periodisation must
obviously set the scene for the other issues in the contemporary
debate.
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DIAGRAM 5.1 OUTLINE OF CONTEMPORARY MARXIST VIEWS ON THE CHANGING
NATURE OF COMPETITION
1.
or
2.
or
3.
Periodisation
Competitive capitalism to monopoly capitalism (See Chapter 5 Section C)
(i) A change of degree?
(ii) A fundamental discontinuity?
Regulation
Competition and monopoly (See Chapter 5 Section D)
(i) Is monopoly a mode of appearance of competition?
(ii) Does it lead to a change in the mode of regulation of
capitalism?
What are the forms of compdition?
Sphere of Circulation
How important are markets and prices? (See Chapter 5 Section E)
(i) Monopoly pricing is important
(ii) There is now a monopoly price system
(iii) Markets and prices are relatively unimportant
4. The Institutional Structure
A. Corporate Organisation (See Chapter 6 Section A)
Its implications for internal organisation, ,
motivations, growth, strategies of competition.
B. Finance Capital (See Chapter 6 Section B)
Its meaning and significance
A result of accumulation
C. The State (See Chapter 6 Section D)
(i) 'De-commodifies' the law of surplus value
(ii) Market based constraints remain
5. The Distribution of Surplus
Profits and where they go (See Chapter 6 Section C)
(i) Is there st~ll a tendency to equalization of profit rates?
or (ii) A tendency to their differentiation?
6. The Unity of Production and Circulation
Concluding assessment of the regulative process (See Chapter 6 Section E)
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I have already given some indication of the importance of
regulation as an issue. How has the competitive process changed
since Marx? Does the growth of monopolies and large scale
enterprise exclude competition, or are monopolies temporary barriers
to horizontal or vertical competition which are unable to abolish
combined competition between the units of finance capital?
Margaret Wirth for instance sees monopoly as a mode of appearance
of competition (16), whilst others would see a disjuncture between
the two. Can one distinguish monopoly and non-monopoly capitals
in a similar way to the distinction between the monopoly and the
competitive stages of capitalism? Marxists frequently contrast.
the anarchy of the 'external' regulative process between the units
of competitive capitalism and the planning process involved
inside the corporate units of monopoly capitalism.
It is easy to see how this theme links in with ideas of the
importance of the role of the market and the sphere of exchange.
For marxists, market relations are but a special kind of social
relation, but many modern marxists have placed considerable
emphasis on them. Meek and Sweezy feel that it is important to be
able to calculate monopoly price within a labour theory of value
framework. AS. I have already argued, such a focus shows evidence of
the influence of the orthodox paradigm on marxism. Others feel that
it doesn't really matter if this can't be done. For instance,
Fitch and Oppenheimer argue for the irrelevance of pricing when giant
firms have effectively abolished markets.(17) A third line of
approach sees the significance of a monopoly price system, within
which the realisation of surplus value is of crucial importance.
Baran and Sweezy's Monopoly Capital is the major example of this
line of argument.
In contrast with those who focus on market relations is the
emphasis on the distribution of surplus. Is there still a tendency
towards a general rate of profit as Marx would argue, or is a
hierarchy of profit rates the rule nowadays, dependent on how
monopolised the sector is? Aglietta for example suggests a
permanent uneven distribution of profits under monopoly capitalism.
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An advantage of a consideration of the system at the level of profits
is that the existence of profits demonstrates the presence of non-
price as well as price competition. Any tendency to equalisation
or non-euqlisation of profit rates also ties in with the form that
competition takes: Marx considered competition between firms and
between industries, whilst Eukharin introduced the idea of
compounded competition between financial groups (the units of
finance capital). How does the existence of finance capital alter
the distribution of surplus (and hence profits) between the
different fractions of capital?
The next theme in the literature focuses on the institutional
structures of modern capitalism; finance capital on the one hand
and corporate organisation on the other together with the role of
the state. I have already hinted that a consideration of finance
capital is associated with the formation or otherwise of a general
profit rate and the changing nature of competition. 1/.hat is the
contemporary meaning and significance of finance capital? Does it
in fact give rise to capital mobility to the extent that capital in
general has a real existence in finance capital in a similar manner
~o Marx's suggestion that banking capital showed signs of providing
capital in general with a foothold in the real world? Corporate
organisation was not something that was dealt with either by Marx
or Lenin. Has large scale enterprise altered the motives under-
lying the capitalist system? To what extent has it lead to a change
in strategies of competition; does competition for instance become
a process of securing the most favourable terms of growth, rather
than trade? How far have forms of organisation changed and lead
to changes in production strategies or changes in the distribution
of profit within the enterprise? Turning to the state, there are a
variety of possible ways of classifying the types of state inter-
vention, including intervention in the competition between capitals.
Some have argued for a 'state sector' to be considered in addition
to the monopoly and the non-monopoly sectors. Does the state
'de-commodify' the law of value, or do market based constraints
on the action of the state persist?
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The final section of my classification I refer to as unity of
the production and circulation process. This will incorporate my
conclusions at the end of the next chapter, on the issues in the
current debate which are of most significance to the changing
nature of competition and the law of value. It will include an
assessment of the role of accumulation, and will summarise on the
significance of finance capital.
B. Stages in capitalism
There are many terms in use in both the marxist and the orthodox
traditions that would seem to indicate a widespread feeling that
capitalism has changed its nature: capitalism is qualified as
Advanced, Late, Post-Industrial, Mixed, Public Enterprise,
Managerial, State Monopoly or Imperialist Capitalism. Within
orthodoxy, it is those in the institutionalist tradition (such as
Galbraith or Schonfield) who are most concerned with the change in
the nature of capitalism, but neo-classical theo~J also sees
capitalism as becoming less competitive over time with the
development of oligopolistic markets.
There is a strong theme in the marxist tradition that monopoly
capitalism is something quite different from competitive capitalism.
That capitalism has entered a new phase since the nineteenth century
is however frequently seen as a matter for dogmatic assertion in the
marxist literature, rather than as a proposition that might need
arguing for. Without intending a judgement on the rest of their
work, let me give two examples.
The introductory sentence to Fitch and Oppenheimer's important
article "Who Rules the Corporation?" reads: "The inability of
various 'Marxist' parties and sects to develop beyond trade
unionist policies has been reflected in their failure to move beyond
Marx's competitive model of capitalism and to analyze and understand
large-scale corporate capitalism".(19) Yet the article itself
takes for granted that there are two stages of capitalism without
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making comparisons. Similarly, Bar-an and Sweezy's well known
book "Monopoly Capital" fails to provide more than a brief overview
of the contrast between 'competitive' and 'monopoly' capitalism in
their introductory chapter. "There is one important factor which
can be identified and isolated and hence (at least in principle)
remedied: the Marxian analysis of capitalism still rests in the
final analysis on the assumption of a competitive economy".(20)
Yet the remedy they propose is limited to the characterisation of
monopoly capitalism as a capitalism in which "competitive market
relations" have been replaced. '~e must recognise that competition,
which was the predominant form of market relations in nineteenth
century :Britain, has ceased to occupy that position, not only in
:Britain, but everywhere else in the capitalist world".(21)
(This view of competition is one that will be further considered
below in section D.) That there may be some continuity between
competitive and market relations is ignored, and that monopoly
capitalism may involve other features besides market relations
is not entered into.
I attempted to show in the last chapter that Lenin implies a
lack of continuity between competitive and monopoly capitalism.
There is also a strong current in the contemporary literature which
sees Marx's model of capitalism as historically specific.
Szymanski's view is typical: "The point of this paper is that Marx
accurately described the economic laws of competitive capitalism •••
Thus, many of his economic laws were historically specific to the
competitive form of capitalism and do not apply once meaningful
competition ceases to exist. The analysis of monopoly capitalism
in good part must proceed from the premise of monopoly rather than
competition, a premise absent from Marx's own analysis".(22) It is
true that in reading Szymanski's article we again find that there is
little analysis of the "cessation of meaningful competition": there
is an extensive exposition of Marx's 'competitive' laws with a series
of assertions for the laws of monopoly capitalism interspersed. As
I indicated in the Introduction~Paul Sweezy provides a forceful
example of those who call for significant contributions to be made
to the theory of monopoly capitalism on the grounds that Marx's model
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applies only to competitive capitalism. It The traditional
Marxists have their economic theory from Capital which they
consider equally applicable to the capitalism of today as it was to
the capitalism of the mid-19th century. On another level, the
traditionalists of course embrace Lenin's theory of imperialism
with its emphasis on monopoly and state action, but there is no
effort to integrate this with the economics Marx expounded in the 3
volumes of Capital. And when it comes to the features which most
strikingly differentiate the capitalism of Marx's day from that of
our own, the traditionalists usually do not get much beyond
commonplace description".(23) It is indeed one of the aims of this
thesis to attempt just such an integration between the different
strands of thought within the Marxist tradition, and it has already
been argued that the dichotomy to which Sweezy refers here can
actually be identified in Lenin himself.
I would now like to consider two examples of arguments in the
current literature which see a disjuncture between competitive and
monopoly capitalism. The first type sees monopoly capitalism as an
irrational movement towards disequilibrium. Such a view can perhaps
be traced back to Lenin's characterisation of imperialism as decaying
and putrescent capitalism. Many theorists of the monopoly stage of
capitalism begin by postulating a model of competitive capitalism as
a more or less rational order. Capitalism is then attacked on the
basis of its historical movement towards disequilibrium with the
centralisation of capital and the development of the monopoly stage.
Monopoly capitalism is thus characterised as being 'irrational'.
True, competitive capitali sm was exemplified by the anarchy of the
market, and relations between firms were subject to the discipline
of the market and its irrational concomitants, but under the
monopoly stage planning at the level of the firm simply leads to
systematic incoherence at a higher level, in the relations between
sectors, as seen for example in the law of uneven development.
This method of postulating some sort of ideal forerunner to the
monopoly stage has already been criticised by Lenin, and it is also
visible for example in Handel's "Marxist EconomicTheory", and
indeed in many Eurocommunist versions of state monopoly capitalism.
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As James Becker puts it: "The strategy in its entirety is
strikingly familiar. We see that it depends at its one extremity
upon a definition of competitive equilibrium, and at the other upon
a specification of causes and consequences ••• of the drift away
from equilibrium". (24) The strategy is of course familiar from
the orthodox economists, who choose their postulates in relation
to models of pure or perfect competition, so that theories of
imperfect competition then throw credit back on competitive theory.
We have here an example of marxist analysis being influenced by the
orthodox paradigm, and a criticism of the theory of perfect
competition was given in Chapter 1.
A well known example of a second argument for some sort of
fundamental discontinuity is contained in Baran and Sweezy's
"Monopoly Capital". Interpreting monopoly capitalism as a
monopoly price system they argue that the classicial marxian law of
the tendency of the rate of profit to fall must be replaced by the
law of rising surplus, so that the crucial problem for capitalism
becomes one of absorbing surplus. Somewhat earlier, Gillman too
argued for the importance of methods of realising surplus value
under the monopoly stage, albeit in a context more closely related
to Marx's theoretical concepts than Baran and Sweezy. Gillman
thus argues that profit and surplus value are no longer equal for
the manufacturing capitalist, since so much of surplus value dis-
appears in administrative expenses internal to the corporation which
are unproductive of surplus value. ."Taking the economy as a whole,
these growing 'unproductive' expenditures eat into the surplus value
produced and tend to effect a decline in the rate of net surplus
value realized, and so of the net profit realized".(25) Stanfield,
in a study of the economic surplus in the US economy 1929-1970,
starts from the basic hypothesis proposed by Baran and Sweezy, but
concludes: "Baran and Sweezy fail to travel far enough. They
continue to analyse the class situation primarily in terms of
classical Marxism's Moneybags and the subsistence-living proletariat.
Hence they fail to entertain the possible scenario of power-wielding
technocrats and overfed ',olOrkers. This latter scenario is at the
heart of the most recent radical social analysis steeped in the
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heritage of the young Marx".(26) In Stanfield we see a clear
meeting point for marxist theories of the monopoly stage of
capitalism and the more orthodox analysis of the growth of a
technostructure.
I shall be returning to a consideration of the monopoly stage
of capitalism as a monopoly price system in section E below. As I
attempted to show in the first chapter, the marxist paradigm has not
traditionally placed much emphasis on pricing and the role of the
market. Orthodox theory, on the other hand,'has achieved considera-
ble successes in this sphere. This is because, as I have already
argued, marxist and orthodox paradigms are operating at different
levels of analysis. In section E I shall be arguing that
marxists are not well employed dealing with the issue of prices and
that the marxist paradigm is of considerably more relevance when
dealing with issues which are not covered by the orthodox approach.
This is not to suggest that Baran and Sweezy have an equivalent
approach to orthodoxy: the realisation of surplus value has always
been of concern to marxists. Nevertheless, there are several
aspects of their approach which are alien to the mazxf.st paradigm,
including their emphasis on pricing.
Let me now turn to the alternative view of the change from
competitive to monopoly capitalism; that its crucial characteristic
is one of continuity. Did Marx indeed start from 'free competition I
as the ideal form of capitalism, with competitive capitalism giving
the most accurate expression to the laws of the system? Shaikh
expresses such a view when he says "Marx lays bare the structure
of capitalism on the basis of its 'ideal' form, that of free
competition, precisely because it is~ form that gives the freest
expression to the immanent laws of the system".(27) Preobrazhensky
took a similar stand when he pointed out that commodity production
takes place in the very divergent conditions of a society of
independent producers working for the market; early capitalism with
survivals of craft regulation of production, and interference of the
feudal state in the productive process; classical capitalism in the
period of free competition; and monopoly capitalism and the state
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capitalism of war time economies. But, asks Preobrazhensky
"Would anyone undertake to affirm that under all these four types
of commodity production the law of value was able to operate in the
same way and to display all of its most characteristic features?Il(28)
Indeed certain marxists authenticate the labour theory of value
by planting it within competitive theory.
I would wish to argue, however, that the competitive capitalism
which Marx analyses is not an 'ideal form' of capitalism, but rather
an approximation to the historical circumstances in Britain at the
time Marx was writing. As Uno points out, Marx set out to provide
a pure theory of capitalism. In the process of capitalist
development the economic phenomena representing the abstract
principles of capital appear in concrete and stage characteristic
forms. The transformation from free competition to monopoly is
located at the level of realisation of the laws of capitalism. It
is thus important to demonstrate first of all that capitalism is still
capitalism and that the monopoly stage remains characterised by the
prevalence of the capital relation, and by exploitation taking the
form of surplus value. It is then important to demonstrate what
kind of capitalism we now have, and to assess the changes in the
form of social relations that have taken place. To what extent do
they justify the identification of a monopoly stage and any other
stages?
That capitalism has retained its characterisation as capitalism
can usefully be clarified by considering the theory of what has been
called the 'managerial revolution'. Such a view is arguing that
there is no longer a capitalist class, and thus implies that
capitalism has ceased to exist. According to managerial writers,
whose views were pioneered by Berle and Means in "The Modern
Corporation and Private Property" (published in 1932) the separation
of ownership and control "challenges the fundamental economic
principle of individual initiative in industrial enterprise" since
llthe explosion of the atom of property destroys the basis of the old
assumption that the quest for profits will spur the owner of
industrial property to its effective use".(29) The separation of
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ownership and control has also allowed of the growth of huge
corporations, whose domination, say Berle and Means, challenges many
of the basic assumptions of economic thought. "Ownership of wealth
without appreciable control and control of wealth without ownership
appear to be the logical outcome of corporate development ll.(30)
On the basis of such arguments as these, the authors conclude with
a section entitled 'Reorientation of Enterprise' in which they call
for a fundamental change in economic analysis since its concepts
are no longer applicable, be they the concepts of private property,
of wealth, of private enterprise, of individual initiative and the
profit motiv.e, or of competition. Since the profit motive is no
longer operative, the technocrat can replace the capitalist, leading
Berle and Means to conclude their tome with pious hopes fo~ the
future: "It is conceivable - indeed it seems almost essential if the
corporate system is to survive - that the 'control' of the great
corporation should develop into a purely neutral technocracy,
balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and
assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of
public policy rather than private cupidity".(31)
What is wrong with such a view? Berle and Means use, as it
were, a microscope to examine each of the 200 largest firms in the
United States economy, but neglect the use of a telescope to look at
the 200 firms together. They assume separation of ownership and
control because they do not look at the links between the large
corporations. C. Wright Mill's withering criticism of American
social science as having become so empirical that a mere enumeration
of a plurality of causes is seen as the best scientific method
applies to the inappropriate level at which managerialists have
chosen to analyse the phenomena of the modern corporation. "You
allow your own confused perspective to confuse what you see and, as
an observer as well as an interpreter, you are careful to remain on
the most concrete levels of description you can manage, defining the
real in terms of the existing detail".(32) The managerial schools
thus succeeds in denying the class nature of capitalism because of
the low level of abstraction adopted. For similar reasons they are
wrong to posit the death of the profit motive as Aaronovitch and
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Sawyer have explained: "The fact that control may be centred on
minority holding of equity does not alter the even more over-riding
feature of capitalist firms, namely that they are the legal property
of the equity owners and that, if enough combine to exercise it, the
distribution of equity between shareholders represents a distri~ution
of power over the enterprise. As a consequence firms have been
increasingly converted into arenas of struggle between competing
groups of owners seeking control, whether the rivals appear as
individuals or as other firms. The crucial and strategic role of
ownership is most evident in the merger and takeover movement".(33)
Thus while Berle and Means talk again and again of the fundamental
changes that they perceive to have taken place within the modern
corporation, they fail to see that these developments are in fact
contained within the very idea of capital, as Marx was able to point
out.
A second example is that historically there have been attempts
to deny the capitalist character of fascism, attempts which Neumann
in his study of German National Socialism and G~~in dealing with
German and Italian fascism, strongly refute. Writing in 1942
Neumann said, "There is an increasing tendency to deny the
capitalistic character of National Socialism. It is called a system
of Brown Bolshevism, of state capitalism, of bureaucratic collecti-
vism, of the rule of the managerial bureaucracy. This school of
thought "believes that there are no longer entrepreneurs in Germany
but only managers ••• that the market has been abolished and with
it the laws of the market ••• consequently the law of value is no
longer operative ••• classes,if their existence is admitted, are no
longer the outcome of production ••• The appropriation of •••
labour is a political act, not economic. The new economy is,
therefore, one without economics".(34) Similar theoretical
positions are involved in certain present day analyses of the
economies of the totalitarian Latin American Countries, especially
Brazil. Neumann first points to the ideological attractiveness of
such a point of view. "It is an enticing view for it makes the
difference between National Socialism and democracy appear not only
political and ideological, but also economic, that is, it sees them
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as two economic systems, private capitalism and state capitalism or
capitalism and managerial dictatorship".(35) He then suggests two
ways of refuting such a theory: either theoretically deducing the
impossibility of such a structure or showing in detail the structure
and operation of a fascist economy. Neumann did the latter for the
German economy whilst G<,teJ:rin, in 1936, did it for the German and
Italian economies, being concerned to show that the.fascist economy
is only a sharpened form of the so-called 'guided' capitalist
economy of war time.(36) These authors provide powerful empirical
confirmation of the capitalist nature of fascism.
Having argued against those who assert that capitalism is no
longer, let me now turn to the second task: that of assessing the
changes in the form of social relations that have taken place in
twentieth century capitalism. In Chapter 1, I ident~fied a range
of ways in which the form of social relations has been seen as
changing by various authors. I suggested there that the social
relations emphasised depended on the focus and purpose of the study
made. I t is actually very difficult to avoid circularity in
periodising capitalism; for example Braverman wishes to examine the
changing forms of the working class with the development of the
monopoly stage, so that his periodisation of capitalism is based
on changes in that form of social relation.
My purpose is to examine the changing nature of competition and
analyse how it alters as capitalism develops. My focus for
periodising capitalism could therefore appropriately be the changing
forms taken by accumulation. The institutional form for this was
initially competitive (or non-monopoly ~Qf\~al), then monopoly
capital, finance capital and perhaps with the addition of 'state
capital'. This could also be seen in terms of the increasing
socialisation of production which is for Fine and Harris the hall-
mark of capitalism's development process. The increasing sociali-
sation of production is clearly reflected in the shift to large scale
enterprise, finance capital and the increasing role of the state.
Socialisation of production however is also reflected not only in
the institutional form adopted by capital but also in changing
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forms of the working class, as Eraverman points out. The changing
forms of social relations in fact all parallel each other. Thus
changing forms of accumulation give rise to changing methods both
of appropriating and of controlling surplus value. With. the
development of the credit system, profit of enterprise is
increasingly transposed into interest, and finally takes the form
of taxation by the state. Control correspondingly shifts from
process control (control of particular production units) to the
accounting form (control at the level of the firm) and then to
financial control (control of particular capitals through the agency
of money capital).(37) Such structural transformations are of
course bound to be mediated by class struggle, and thus lead to
changes in its form as well. Correspondingly there will be changes
in the forms of crisis and of the state. Such changes will
frequently lead to institutional reorderings.
The task of the rest of this thesis could be summed up as the
attempt to show just how the realisation of Marx's laws have changed;
and in particular the forms of competition, the process of capitalist
regulation and the forms of surplus value. The headings to the
sections themselves indicate that I shall be developing the details
of the changing forms of social relations pertaining to 'many
capitals'. It is really only after completing this task that one
can provide justification for the periodisation of capitalism into
stages. This is the circularity to which I have just referred.
Yet such circularity should not give cause for surprise. This is
because periodisation into stages is essentially an empirical matter
of how capitalism adapts to the constraints it faces. As I argued
in Chapter 1, theories of new stages in the development of
capitalism have their own historical pre-conditions: they cannot
be derived by pure logic from "Capf tal" •
In anticipation, then, of my conclusions at the end of Chapter 6,
I would suggest that for the purpose of analysing the changing nature
of competition capitalism can be divided into four stages: a
transitional stage in which merchant capital predominates, followed
by the competitive stage analysed by Marx. At the monopoly stage
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industrial capital is supplemented by finance capital and monopoly
capital is the typical form taken by 'many capitals'. (The features
of these two main stages will become apparent during the course of
this and the next chapter~ As will become clear from my
discussion of the role cf the state in Chapter 6, I am hesitant to
use the term 'state monopoly capitalism' for the current stage of
capitalism, and would prefer to call it 'modified monopoly capita-
lism' to reflect my view of the limits on state participation.
Marx's prognosis in the middle of the nineteenth century was of
the immanent demise of the capitalist mode of production, upon whose
ashes socialism would arise. There has been much disagreement over
the 'breakdown controversy'. Was Marx suggesting that the economic
contradictions of capitalism would lead to its downfall (ever
deepening crises of accumulation and the tendency of the rate of
profit to fall) or was there a further precondition for a working
class consciousness of these contradictions with a social and
political 'revolutionary situation'? Whatever the answer to that
question, Marx did not forsee any interim stage between the freely
competitive capitalism that he analysed in his critique of political
economy, and socialism. Contrary to Marx's expectations, capitalism
has survived. Why has it? An important contribution has probably
been made by the ideological strength of capitalism, which both
Marx and Lenin underplayed. But the growth of oligopolies and
large scale enterprise provided a means for the capitalist mode of
production to adapt to its contradictions. Such a view stems from
the distinction made between the internal laws of capitalism and
their mode of realisation. The blind regulatory mechanism of free
competition was no longer sufficient to resolve the contradictions of
accumulation and the tendency of the profit rate to fall, and the
concentration and centralisation of capital (a phenomenon which, as
was seen in Chapter 3, Marx himself pointed to) allowed the accumu-
lation process to continue. As Kosonen says: "Monopolies must be
considered a means for the capitalist mode of production to adapt
to its own contradictions".(38) The developments of twentieth
century capitalism, then, require a fresh examination of Marx's
political and economic prognostications albeit within the framework
204
of the laws he adumbrated. Monopoly (amongst other things) has
provided a survival mechanism for capitalism. The next section
examines the forms that competition takes today, including
'monopoly as a form of competition'.
D. The forms of competition
In the last section I identified a strong current within
marxism that sees the monopoly stage of capitalism as radically
different from its competitive predecessor. I shall now attempt
to argue the case against such a view in rather more detail in
examining contemporary views of competition and monopoly as such.
Whilst Marx himself had relatively little to say about monoply,
what he said about competition implied continuity between the two.
I have similarly argued for continuity between the two concepts in
my examination of the theorists of imperialism despite the
continuation of the process of concentration and centralisation of
economic units resulting in monopolies. Does the state of the
modern debate confirm or deny such a view? To this issue I now
turn.
An interesting feature of the curremt debate is that many
participants have made a conscious effort to retu.-n to Marx. In
doing so they frequently place emphasis on competition as a process
of regulation or mediation within capitalism. Aglietta argues that
a dynamic system must have a logic of internal transformation,sothat
a crucial question becomes,how is the system regulated? For him
the nodal point of the theo~J of capitalist regulation is the
articulation of the laws of capital accumulation and the laws of
competition, involving in the former case a study of the trans-
formations of the wage relation and in the latter a study of the
transformations of inter-eapitalist relations. Aglietta sees the
changes in inter-eapitalist relations and the forms of competition
heavily modified by the concentration and centralisation of
capital.(39) Wirth argues her case via a critique of Lenin as well
as Marx, and similarly sees the importance of competition as a
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regulator. tiThe quantitative forms of appearance of value and
the qualitative preconditions of its reproduction are mediated by
competition, in which it is revealed for the individual capital
whether its production from a quantitative point of view
corresponds equally to qualitative demands for use-values from
society". (40) Lipietz too sees regulation as important, although
he points to the need to reject any idea of regulation as a kind
of consciousness, achieving harmony. "Par re'gulation, nous
designerons la maniere dont l'unite s'impose a travers la lutte
des elements".(41) Competition then is seen by all these authors
as the means for regulating capitalism. As it is for Marx too,
competition is the movement of capitals in their compulsion for
valorisation.
What then is the effect of the continuing growth of centrali-
sation and concentration on competition and the regulative process?
We saw in Chapter 3 that Marx identified such tendencies in the
process of capitalist development and in Chapter 4 that this growth
of monopolies was identified by the theorists of imperialism as a
major characteristic of a new phase of capitalism. Several modern
marxists see the growth of monopolies as altering the system of
regulation. Both Lipietz and Aglietta argue the need to distinguish
new forms of regulation. For Lipietz, centralisation isn't simply
a reflection of accumulation, it plays an active role in the
regulation of accumulation, and it leads to a transformation in the
form of regulation from 'competitive' to 'monopoly'. "Mais
surtout la tendance a la centralisation, dans la measure o~ elle
modifie la charactere du 'travail social que se presente comme somme
de travaux prives', est un moteur de La transformation des formes
m~es de La regulation: du' concurrential' au 'monopoliste'''. (42)
Expressing this in another way, Lipietz sees centralisation as
facili tating the interiorisation of·· the contradiction between social
and private within the internal calculation of the (large-scale)
economic unit. Lipietz nevertheless draws a distinction between
monopoly regulation and the monopoly stage of capitalism for
'monopolisation' doesn't reduce itself simply to centralisation,
but involves class relationships. Thus although the 1930's saw
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"la formation de 'grumeaux'de monopolisme; ••• la mayonnaise ne
prend pas" and it was changes in wage relations which actually
made the mayonnaise take. "Ce qui fera 'prendre La mayonnaise' ,
donnant un cours tout a. fait nouveau 'a. la forme de la regulation,
et en particulier aux movements de la production et des prix, c'est
la mise en oeuvre de formes nouvelles du rapport salarial".(43)
Lipietz' argument then leads on to the law of value and its
relationship with prices and profits, of which I shall have more to
say in the next two sections. Aglietta also sees the centrali-
sation of capital establishing new relations of competition.
"While simple concentration of capital is a quantitative fact
of uneven accumulation in the field of value, and preserves the
autonomy of separate capitals, centralisation is a qualitative
change that refashions the autonomy of capitals and establishes new
relationship of comnetition".(44) He then distinguishes three
types of competition, which, as with Lipietz, tie in closely with
the price system and the formation of a general profit rate. 'Full
competition' he sees as an external link between autonomous capitals,
presumably similar to what has been called atomistic' competition
between small scale enterprises. This contrasts with 'monopolistic
regulation' and with 'stratified oligopoly' where the relations of
competition are summed up under the concept of barriers to entry.
(I shall have more to say about barriers to entry and exit of
capital in a moment.)
Whilst I would not wish to deny that the forms that competition
and regulation take under the monopoly phase of capitalism have
changed, I feel that Lipietz and Aglietta overemphasise the radical
nature of that change. It seems to be more useful to see monopoly
as a new form, a new mode of appearance of competition. Margaret
Wirth shows that the theory of state monopoly capitalism often
incorporates the idea of monopoly as the opposite of free
competition, with monopoly defined as a relation of domination such
that the operation of the law of value is partially superseded. On
the contrary, she argues, competition signifies the form in which
individual capitals affect one another. For Marx competition
between capitals involved both a tendency to receive the general
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rate of profit, and an effort to gain extra surplus value in what-
ever way possible. Wirth points out that the form this effort
takes will change historically. IIMonopoly is one form of this
endeavour; it is a mode of anpearance of competition and cannot
be explair..ed separately from it". (45) I would agree with Wirth
that it is important not to identify capitalism with competitive
capitalism alone. liThe currently existing form of concentration
and centralisation of capital can be explained from the general
categories of analysis of capital".(46)
Becker takes a similar approach to Wirth, but expresses it in
a rather different way. Again the approach relies in part on
examining the formation of the average profit rate, of which more
in the next chapter. He summarises competition as a process which
leads to self-destruction, a characterisation I have already pointed
to in discussing Marx and the theorists of imperialism. Competition
between capitals inevitably drives capitals to seek a monopoly
situation, which in turn is undermined by competition. "Monopoly"
says Becker "is an effect rather than a cause of decadence".(41)
I would argue that in fact neither a theory of competition nor a
theory of monopoly is required, and that the influence of monopoly
over capitalist development is easily exaggerated. Monopolistic
agencies are the creation of competitive exploitation and
IIcompetition rather than monopoly is the prime mover of capitalism".
(48)
As has been mentioned earlier in this thesis, the marxist
paradigm has several advantages to offer in the study of competition
and monopoly. One of these is that a dynamic and developmental
(or historical) method is inherent in marxist political economy.
This means, as will be further emphasised in the section on finance
capital below, that the process of centralisation and concentration
and the growth of large scale enterprise or monopoly is seen as
inherent in the capitalist accumulation process. Monopoly is not
tacked on as a theoretical afterthought. It is nevertheless
important for marxists to ask how monopolies affect the competitive
process. What are the mechanisms for competition producing
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monopoly and vice versa?
Here I think it is useful to return to the idea of 'levels
of competition', a concept present in Marx, but re-emphasised and
developed by Bukharin. Rather than talking of a change in the~
of competition (as do Aglietta and Lipietz), I would emphasise a
shift in the level of competition with the new phase of capitalism.
Competition within an industry is horizontal competition, whilst
competition between industries is vertical. (Borrelly and
Palloix incidentally use the terms competition between producers and
competition between capita~respectively.) Let us look at what the
current debate has to contribute to the latter. Vertical compe-
tition implies movement of capital from one industry to another and
therefore involves exit from and entry to an industry. As Borrelly
points out, there are three possible mechanisms for exit from an
industry: the number of firms goes down and capital is transformed
for another process of production, capital equipment is simply
bought by another firm or finally there is a gradual withdrawal of
capital with profits being invested elsewhere. Exit from one
industry (With the exception of bankruptcy) implies entry elsewhere,
but entry can also derive from 'new' capitals. Entry affects other
firms in the industry in a way that exit does not. Monopoly can be
seen in terms of barriers to entry or exit. In the next chapter I
will be concerned with the issue of monopolies obtaining an extra
surplus profit: here I want to look at how barriers might allow
those profits to be obtained.
Orthodox theory has of course devoted considerable attention
to 'conditions of entry' from J.8. Bain onwards (see Appendix A).
Difficulty of entry is explained by the advantages possessed by
established producers vis a vis potential competitors. Examples
of the advantages which they have are in terms of economies of scale,
product differentiation and advertising, costs of production or
excess capacity. But as Borrelly points out, barriers to entry are
the result of past competitive struggles, and whilst they may be
insurmountable at a particular moment in time, they can at any
moment be brought into question by prospective entrants. No
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barrier is insurmountable. "Mais il faut deja. noter que ces effets
de domination n'existe pas en soi. lIs sont le resultat des
actions, voire des luttes passees et de ce fait peuvent ~ tout
moment etre remis en cause par des actions de ceux qui veulent
entrer Les effets de domination ainsi entendu ne constituent
done un obstacle a l'entree que si le candidat n'a pas la puissance
necessaire pour bouscouler les relations existantes et imposer un
re'seau d I influences qui lui soit favorable". (49) Borrelly then
goes on to show that, using the example of technical progress, there
is a double movement involved in competition as a process, and that
both barriers to entry and the means of overcoming them are an
integral part of the forces confronting each other. It is the
whole movement of competition which must be grasped and not just one
part of it. From such a perspective concentration of capital does
not mean reduction of competition. "Dans cette perspective nous
pouvons montrer part que le progres technique qui constitue un moyen
de depasser des barrieres, est aussi le moyen de les reconstxuire
ou de les renforcer, d'autre part que, integres dans ce double
mouvement de renforcement et de dtpassement des barri~res,
l'accroissement du volume du capital initial necessaire et sa
contrepartie, la concentration, ne signifient pas reduction de la
concurrence".(50)
I have not yet dealt with the third level of competition defined
by Bukharin as compounded competition between the units of finance
capital. For Borrelly diversification brings up further problems
over the idea of entry into an industry. I shall return to this at
the end of this section when I glance briefly at the idea of
competition and monopoly in relation to finance capital. Meanwhile
I want to turn to another way marxists have of contrasting compe-
tition and monopoly. Whilst Borrelly looks at the idea of monopoly
as some form of barrier to competition, others distinguish monopoly
capital from competitive capital. Poulantzas makes such a
distinction, and sees the bounadries between them as moveable and
variable. Non-monopoly capital (a term Poulantzas prefers to
competitive capital) is a hangover from the competitive phase of
capitalism but behaves differently in the monopoly phase. "In
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point of fact, non-monopoly capital is based in the stage of
competitive capita~ism, such as this continues to function in a
formation dominated by monopoly capital. This mode of functioning
is itself transformed as a function of the domination of monopoly
capital".(51) Why is non-monopoly capital not just eliminated?
It is because it is useful for monopoly capital to preserve it.
Thus non-monopoly capital includes sectors of limited profitability,
it can pioneer new sectors of production, it is useful for secondary
lines of production, and monopoly prices can be fixed by reference
to non-monopoly prices, hiding super profits. It is for these
reasons (amongst others) that competitive capital constantly
reproduces itself under the domination of monopoly capital. The
existence of monopolies however does not eliminate competition
argues Poulantzas. "The existence of monopolies with a dominant
market prosition does not abolish competition but merely reproduces
it at a different level".(52) The tendency to monopoly instead
reinvigorates the competitive process. "This contradictory process
of dissociation and concentration in fact characterises the whole
range of relative expropriations that take place in the extended
reproduction of monopoly capitalism, tending towards the amalgamation
of capitals under a single economic ownership, and thus equally marks
the resistance to this process; the merging of capitals has nothing
friendly or co-operative about it".(53) Taking a somewhat different
line of approach from Borrelly, Poulantzas is again arguing that
monopoly does not exclude competition, that the boundaries or
barr~rs between monopoly and non-monopoly capital are moveable and
variable and that what is crucial is the level at which competition
takes place.
One final view of the competition/monopoly distinction sees it as
a contrast between anarchy and planning, and the last section looked
briefly at the idea of the monopoly stage as a movement towards dis-
equilibrium. Again, the level at which competition takes place is
seen as important, although this time it is expressed in terms of its
opposite, planning. Panzieri presents the changing forms of compe-
tition between the phases of capitalism as a progressive extension of
the process of capitali~plar~ing. He argues that competition for
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Marx ensures planning at the level of the factory, with capital
taking command over a planned labour process. "The laws of
capitalist development in the era of competition appear as
capitalist planning in the sphere of production at the level of the
factory. The predominating law of relative surplus value in this
era simultaneously makes individual capital the mainspring of the
development of social capital and forces increasing planning in the
factory".(54) In the process of capitalist development, planning is
extended to higher and higher levels, competition being thus a
process which expresses both solidarity between capitalists and their
differentiation. "In effect the Marxian analysis is intended to
show how capital utilizes planning at increasingly higher levels of
the productive process - from simple co-operation to manufacturing
and to large-scale industry - in order to strengthen and extend its
command over labour power and obtain an even larger access to
it".(55) Competitive capitalism is characterised by anarchy in the
social division of labour between industries, but by planning in
the division of labour at the level of the factory. Under the
monopoly phase, finance capital extends the planning process by
abolishing the market and socialising industrial decision making in
a reactionary fashion. The giant corporation is forced to pursue
a policy of backward and forward integration, and as Fitch and
Oppenheimer put it t1Assured customers must be found; sales and
purchases must be rationalised. Finance capital performs this
f~ction by abolishing the market and 'socialising' industrial
decision naking'.(56) Some see the state intervention as a further
example of planning although I shall argue later that this is a one-
sided view.
The danger, once again, in this approach is that "Capital"
can be read as an interpretation of competitive capitalism, valid
only for that form of capitalism. This will happen if the opposition
between planning in the factory and anarchy in the market is seen as
the general form expressing the law of surplus value. I have
already criticised this approach in Lenin, and Panzieri puts it as
follows: "The further 'orthodox' development of Marxist theory
reasserted this perspective by denying the capitalist system any
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ether 'full' form of development outside that assured by the
competitive model, and by defining regulated monopolistic-oligo-
polistic capitalism as capitalism's last and 'putrescent' stage.
Modern revisionism, on the other hand, ends up by losing sight of
the system's continuity in its passage from one historical leap to
the next, for it too has anchored its expression of the law of
value to the same interpretation".(57) Once more, if competition
is conceptualised as taking place at different levels, the problems
are overcome.
I shall be considering the form that planning within large
scale enterprise takes in the section on corporate organisation in
the next chapter. Meanwhile, let me return to Eorrelly to help
clarify the changes in the nature of competition introduced by
finance capital. We are now moving on to Eukharin' s third level
of competition, that of combined or compounded competition. The
entry to and exit from industries that was examined earlier must be
qualified by the existence of finance capital. Finance capital
links the structure of property of the productive apparatus
(industrial capital) and the structure for financing it (ba~~ing
capital). The resulting complexity no longer allows of talk of
entry into an industry: diversification usually takes its place.
"Cette imbrication est Ie resultat d'un processus historique du
structuration marqui par les characteres concrets du developpement
eConomique et eJle ne se presente pas selon un schema invariable". (58)
The difficulties of measuring diversification are well known.
Financial structures are the means for achieving mobility of capital,
and finance capital allows of transfer of capital from one industry
to another. "II peut alors ne pas s'agir de simples transferts
de profits d'une activite vers l'autre par l'intermediaire des
relations d' echange entre les firmes du groupe ou par des jeux
d'ectriture, mais de restructuration complete des actifs en
fonction des profits escomptes".(59)
As we saw in Chapter 3, Marx suggests that the existence of
banking capital demonstrates that capital in general (as opposed
to particular capitals) has a real existence. There is limited
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capital mobility so long as competition is restricted to the first
two levels, that within industries and between industries. The
corporate units of finance capital provide free capital mobility,
overcoming the limitations of movement for particular capitals.
Capital in general has real existence in the monopoly phase of
capitali sm. As Margaret Wirth puts it "capital has become de
facto an anonymous power which is irreducible to personslt.(60)
Finance capital links the abstract and the real conceptualisation
of capital. These ideas will be further developed below.
Summarising now on what I see as the most fruitful approach to
the debate on competition and monopoly, I would argue that there is
no need to provide separate theories of competition and monopoly.
Monopoly and competition are not mutually exclusive terms, but
rather monopoly is best conceived of as a new form, or mode of
appearance, of competition. Monopoly, then, does not exclude
competition, since the bOundaries between monopoly and non-monopoly
capital are movable and variable. Competition subverts itself, and
can be seen as a p~ocess of self-destruction, but monopolies too are
broken down by competition. The most helpful way of viewing the
changes is to see them as a shift in the levels of competition,
including not only competition within and between industries, but
also competition between the units of finance capital.
What lies behind the characterisation of the relationship between
competition and monopoly is a re-affirmation of Marx's own view of
capital as a social relationship which creates competition. As
Palloix puts it ''Marx se livre a. une demystification de la
concurrence; ce n'est pas la concurrence qui agite les capitaux,
les lance dans une agitation perpltuelle, fonde leur movement, mais
c'est Ie capital comme rapport social, dans son developpement
historique, que cree la concurrence capitaliste, concurrence des
producteurs et concurrence des capitaux, 1. travers Ie sectorali-
sation de la production, a travers Ie mode d'organisation capitaliste
de la production sur la base de la loi de la valeurlt.(61) Palloix
could have added the third level of competition, between units of
finance capital to his competition between producers (horizontal
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competition) and between capitals (vertical competition). We find
then, that the modern debate provides considerable confirmation for
the continuity between competition and monopoly which I initially
argued was present by implication in Marx.
E. The role of the market and prices
For many at the beginning of the revival of marxism from the
end of the 1950's, the relevance of Marx's theoretical framework to
modern capitalism was linked to the determinateness or otherwise of
monopoly prices. It was argued that a lack of determinateness
would indicate that the law of value was not a useful tool for
explaining monopoly prices. The ability of marxism, then to
explain prices was a strong concern.
Ronald Meek in his "Studies in the Labour Theory of Value"
exemplifies such an approach. In a section entitled "The Operation
of the Law of Value under Monopoly Capitalism" he spells out a
conceptual framework within which he suggests that research into
the operation of the law of value in different historical systems
might proceed. This framework is heavily focused on the importance
of price determination. Meek argues that through the labour theory
of value, Marx was concerned to explain actual prices only insofar
as they were equal to 'supply prices' (i.e. the marxian price of
production). "The question of the causes of deviations of actual
prices from su"pply "prices could quite properly be abstracted from"
feels Meek.(62) He then goes on to discuss what he calls
'typical deviations' of prices from values, deviations determined by
the specific set of relations of subordination and co-operation in
production which characterise that stage of commodity production.
Typical deviations may cause (a) the deviation of supply prices
(prices of production) from values and (b) of actual prices
(market prices) from supply prices. Meek then argues that for the
major part of the period of commodity production as a whole (Meek
incidentally seems to hold that simple commodity production had a
real existence prior to capitalist production, rather than seeing
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it as an abstraction), supply prices have been directly or
indirectly determined by Marx's values. (Indirectly, when
differing organic compositions of capital lead to the redistribution
of surplus value between capitalists through the mechanism of the
average profit as we saw in Chapter 2.) Meek suggests that under
the monopoly phase of capitalism the existence of a 'modified
supply price' could be postulated, a supply price which includes
profit not only derived from surplus value, but from certain other
sources. Here Meek points to a 'profit Upon alienation' which he
sees as existing alongside surplus labour as a source of profit,
with monopolies able to exert their power by using 'extra-economic'
methods of obtaining profits. I am far from clear as to what Meek
means by these categories of profit which are not derived from
surplus value. I think it would make more sense if Meek saw
monopoly pricing (his 'modified supply price') in terms of a
redistribution of surplus value between capitals. To conclude,
however, with the outcome of Meek's conceptual framework. He sees
no reason why this should not provide us with the possibility of
determining qualitatively determinate laws of monopoly price, but
in any case goes on to point out that any quantitative indeterminacy
could in fact only affect the deviations from the supply prices, and
not the supply prices themselves. I have argued that for Meek the
determinateness or otherwise of monopoly prices is a crucial issue.
"If we adopt an approach of this type" asks Meek, "are we not in
. effect giving up all hope of obtaining any Quantitatively
determinate laws of price?"(63) In answering his question in the
negative, Meek feels that genuine progress towards the reapplication
of the labour theory of value has been made.
Sweezy follows a similar line to Meek in taking up Hilferding's
assertion (noted in Chapter 4) that with the growth of monopoly there
is no objective law of prices. In "The Theory of Capitalist
Development" Sweezy concurs to a certain extent with Hilferding when
he says ''No reasonably general laws of monopoly price have been
discovered because none exist".(64) Nevertheless Sweezy concludes
that the deviations of monopoly price from competitive price are
not completely arbitrary, since we can determine the kind of
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modification that monopoly brings, for equilibrium output is
generally smaller and equilibrium price higher than under perfect
competition. Taking into account elasticity of demand and degree
of monopoly, "even in relation to the extent of deviation of
monopoly price from competitive price, certain judgements of the
'more or less' type are often possible".(65) Sweezy thus
reaches a similar conclusion to Meek, since both consider that
monopoly prices have a certain determinacy.
Evanitsky provides a third example of a marxist who places
considerable emphasis on the price system. In an article entitled
"Monopoly Capitalism and Marx's Economic Doctrines" he points on the
one hand to the relation of price value in Marx's system and on the
other to divergencies of market prices from prices of production.
He then argues that the divergence of monopoly prices from prices of
production can be seen as a transfer of surplus value from other
sectors of the economy. "Monopoly prices can be shown to diverge
from prices of production in the same way as the latter diverge
from value, that is to say, by a siphoning process whereby surplus-
value is drawn off from the capitals of the competitive sector of the
economy or from the general population in their role of consumers".
(66) Unlike Meek, then, Evanitsky sees monopoly price as a function
of transfers of surplus value. (Surplus value is of course ex-
tracted from the general population via an increase in consumer
prices, which is equivalent to a deduction in wages. If the working
class is unable to pass the price increase on in increased wage
demands, the price of labour power will tend to fall below its value
and increase the rate of exploitation.) Very usefully, I think,
this transfer of surplus value to monopoly capital can be seen as a
'monopoly transformation procedure' over and above the transformation
of values into prices which Marx identified under the competitive
phase of capitalism, although Evanitsky does not draw this analogy
in such precise terms. Evanitsky is however concerned that monopoly
power is likely to permit a far greater redistribution of surplus
value amongst capitalists than that possible on the basis of
divergent organic compositions of capital. This means that only
the limits of the deviation for the monopolised sector as a whole
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are given. t1That is, monopolies can realise higher-than-average
profits only to the limits of the pool of surplus value available
for distribution".(67)
All three writers we have considered so far see the determination
of monopoly prices as an important task for the marxist labour theory
of value. I do indeed agree with Meek, Sweezy and Evanitsky that
there is a problem about deriving a pricing rule for monopoly
products. But whilst they are at pains to demonstrate that there
is a logic to price determination for monopoly capital, I feel that i~
is more fruitful to acknowledge the contradictions of monopoly
prices. As orthodox economists themselves are prepared to admit,
monopoly price is inevitably 'indeterminate' in the sense that
there is no objective pricing rule to be derived from values or from
preferences. It is not more useful to emphasise that indeterminate
monopoly prices are a reflection of the failure of the market system
to express the tendencies towards the growth of large scale enter-
prise? I have already suggested that marxists who emphasise price
determination have done so under the influence of neo-classical
economics and its achievements in the pricing field.
When I examined the labour theor.r of value in Chapter 1 and
the transformation procedure in Chapter 2, I argued that the deter-
mination of prices was not at the heart of what is useful in marxist
theory. Supplementing the argument I made there, Kornai is quick
to point out that price is not the only kind of information linking
economic units. In the model of perfect competition, price is
formed independently of decision makers, so that price is thus
given externally. But in reality, conflict and compromise between
classes, strata and interest groups are th~ rule.(68) There is
in any case considerable ambivalence as to what 'price' actually is.
Price may be actual price, contract price, price offer, price
prognosis~ prescribed price and price may depend on date, and
(particularly with monopoly situations) it may depend on the partner.
The information structure of the price system is far from simple,
and it is unsatisfactory to regard the market as a black box as do
the majority of economists. There is further the recognition that
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competition does not need to be price competition, and that non-
price competition (e.g. advertising) may be of substantial importance.
It is also important to recognise that market relations are actually
a special kind of social relations. Whilst I am not suggesting
that the three authors I've been considering do not consider social
relations in other contexts, it certainly seems that in their
coverage of the way in which Marx's law of value has been affected
by the monopoly phase, they have emphasised the logic and not the
sociology of price formation. It is however probably useful to
point out that, as under competitive capitalism, price competition
(insofar as it is not overshadowed by other factors) can take a
number of different forms: product, raw materials, labour and
money competition. Thus there is competition on the cost side over
raw materials, labour and capital as well as on the selling side.
It therefore seems to be important to acknowledge, as do all
these authors in some measure, that monopoly prices are contra-
dictory. That monopoly prices are to a considerable degree
indeterminate indicates that the monopoly phase of capitalism is
less than successful if judged in terms of the market mechanism.
It is nevertheless useful to point out that monopoly prices are
higher only insofar as there is a transfer of surplus value from
other sectors of the economy. There is thus a "monopoly trans-
formation" process from two possible sources. On the one hand
extra surplus value may be obtained by monopoly capital from the
non-monopoly sector, and on the other the surplus value can be
extracted from the general population. But whilst the "monopoly
transformation" gives the overall limits to monopoly pricing, it is
the outcome of competition between capitals and class struggle which
provides the actual limits. We thus return to the issues raised in
the last section; are there limits on monopoly? I would argue
that there are indeed, and that monopoly as a process of erecting
barriers to competition also calls forth forces which will tend to
overcome such barriers.
There is however a second approach to prices under the monopoly
phase of capitalism, which is to argue for the existence of a
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monopoly price system rather than examining individual monopoly
prices. This is of course the approach of :Baran and Sweezy in
"Monopoly Capital", in which they conclude that the problem of
realisation of surplus (they reject the term surplus value) is the
crucial problem for modern capitalism. As I have already shown,
Bazan and Sweezy are concerned to break what they see as the link
between marxian analysis and competitive capitalism. "We must
recognise that competition, which was the predominant form of market
relations in nineteenth century :Britain, bas ceased to occupy that
position, not only in :Britain but everYWhere else in the capitalist
world" they say, and then go on to argue that the typical economic
unit nowadays has the attributes that were once thought to be
possessed only by monopolies and oligopolies l ' ( 69) . To achieve a
realistic model :Baran and Sweezy argue that they must start with an
analysis of the typical unit of big business, the modern giant
corporation. It is here that the contradictions in their analysis
begin to arise, specifically around the issue of competition. For
having asserted that competition is no longer predominant, :Baran and
Sweezy admit that competition and struggle are an integral part of
the mode of operation of giant companies. Arguing in the context of
management control they say: "This does not mean of course that each
giant corporation operates in isolation, that there are no alliances
and alignments, no agreements and groupings. On the contrary, these
forms of action - like their opposities, competition and struggle
are of the very essence of modern capitalism". Part of the
difficulty which :Baran and Sweezy are experiencing in their
discussion around the concept of competition is that they are
conceptualising competition and monopoly as polar opposites. Were
they to see these as opposite sides of the same coin as I argued in
the last section, the same problem would not arise.
A further difficulty in Bar-an and Sweezy's analysis of competition
is that they tend to identify competition with price competition in
that the bulk of the argument in their crucial Chapter 3 which spells
out how surplus tends to rise is around price competition. They
see the giant corporation as having to take accou.~t of the effects of
its pricing policy on rivals, and therefore having a strong
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incentive to reduce costs as a method of gaining surplus profits.
Notice again that competition between giants is once more implicit
in the argument: in what way is th;s sort of competition radically
different from that of Marx? This is not specified. Ironically,
in their emphasis on the problem of the absorption of surplus,
Baran and Sweezy actually point to waste as an all pervasive feature
of capitalism, a waste which has little basis in a price system.
Thus the sales effort raises the question of what socially
necessary costs are, as Baran and Sweezy themselves are quick to
point out. What then is the meaning of prices? They are also
eloquent in seeing both civilian government and military expenditure
as strictly limited by their compatibility with the pattern of
interests, the structure of power and the ideology of monopoly
capitalism. Such constraints could not be further from the confines
of the price system, and all serve to emphasise its irrelevance.
Baran and Sweezy are thus confused in a number of crucial ways
on the issue of competition and monopoly. I have already attempted
a critique of the view that competition is to be identified with
. price competition, and suggested that especially under the monopoly
phase of capitalism it is important not to overemphasise the role
of price competition in the market for commodities. Much of the
difficulty Baran and Sweezy have in challenging the applicability
of Marx's •competitive' concepts to the monopoly phase of
capitalism arises from the fact that they do not start from a
critique of what Marx himself said on the subject of competition:
in particular that competition and monopoly represent a continuity.
One is led to the conclusion that the radical contrast which Baran
and Sweezy draw between competitive amd monopoly capitalism is
unjustified. Rather than on Marx, they actually draw considerably
on neo-classical monopoly and oligopoly analyses of pricing whilst
their interpretation cf the behaviour of corporations follows the
managerialist tradition initiated by Berle and Means. They are
nevertheless taking an important initiative in orthodox terms in
following through the effects of a monopoly price system. Such a
link between micro and macro theories is something that has only
been attempted by Steindl and Kalecki (see Appendix A). Their
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emphasis on a monopoly price system however does not lead on to any
concern with the formation and growth of the large-scale
enterprises they are analysing.
It is also interesting that while Bar~~ and Sweezy acknowledge
the weight given by Lenin to monopolies, they do not consider the
role of finance capital at all. Robert Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer
make this the basis for their criticisms of Baran and Sweezy's
view of 'management control'. The next chapter will be concerned
to develop an understanding of the role of finance capital. I have
however already pointed to Fitch and Oppenheimer's view that finance
capital abolishes the market by internalising industrial decision
making within the units of finance capital. Orthodox economists
(and indeed the marxist economists we have been looking at in this
section) concentrate on the exchange process between firms
(Whether they be perfectly competitive, oligopolies, monopolies or
giant corporations) and households. Fitch and Oppenheimer suggest
that the value added by sales between corporations is a higher
proportion of GNP than sales to households. They introduce the
concept of 'reciprocity' to explain the behaviour of large
corporations in the context of finance capital. Any conflicts of
interest are resolved through reciprocity which ,involves ignoring
market factors. "The financial institutions cannot allow billion-
dollar corporations to go bankrupt because their product sells for
a few cents more than that of another giant" and this means that
"the market becomes mere ideological grillework masking the engine
of monopoly price making'.(70) Baran and Sweezy do indeed do
something that other marxists have failed to do when they examine
the institutional framework of the business corporation, but they
do not look beyond that to the institutional structure of finance
capital.
In the next chapter the institutional framework receives the
attention it deserves.
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Chapter 6
TEE MODEB.:N DEBATE ON TEE ROLE OF
COMPETITION: NEW DIRECTIONS
A. Cornorate Organisation and the Growth of Monopoly Canital
Several hints have already been made in the previous chapter
that the growth of large scale enterprise (monopoly capital) may
have altered the way in which the individual unit of capital behaves.
Marx referred to the capitalist as "Mr Moneybags", which underlined
a view of capitalist (~terprise as small scale and individually or
personally owned. To many it appears that orthodox work on
corporate organisation provides a far more relevant picture of the
functioning of modern business enterprise than this. I have
already shown that such work was pioneered by Berle and Means in
1932, when they used their demonstration of the separation between
ownership and control in the 200 largest U.S. firms as a basis for
arguing that the traditional view of the 'greedy capitalist' was
dead. The last chapter showed the idea of managerial control
being taken up by Baran and Sweezy. Their somewhat curious mixture
of orthodox managerialism subsisting with the view that the profit
motive remained primary for internal management provided the basis
for arguing for a monopoly price system.
Since Baran and Sweezy wrote 110nopoly Capital, a theory of
'marxist managerialism' has been developed which has re-claimed the
separation of ownership and control as a specifically marxian
inheritance, and criticised the orthodox Berle and Means approach
used by Baran and Sweezy. It is de Vroey who provides the seminal
work here (1), though others such as Bette liheim, Chevalier and
Scott have had a contribution to make. Marxist managerialism
argues that the joint stock company results in 'socialised'
capitalist ownership giving rise to impersonal possession. To
clarify what this means, it is useful to distinguish, as :Bette-\heim
does, between possession, ownership as a relation of production and
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legal ownership. Possession of capital indicates management of
capital: actually putting capital to work in the factory.
Ownership as a relation of production means the power of assignment
and disposition of capital. Legal ownership of capital in the
form of shares doesn~ necessarily entail ownership as a relation of
production.(2) When viewed in the light of these distinctions,
two features of the separation of ownership and control become
apparent. Firstly, it signifies a separation between capital as
property (ownership as a relation of prOduction) and possession
(or management) of functioning capital. This separation indicates
that the capitalist class is delegating the task of making capital
work to specialised managers, a functional differentiation. The
second feature is the split between large and small owners which
rests upon the distinction between ownership as a relation of
production and legal ownership. The dispersal of (legal) stock
ownership actually allows of control by large-scale capital through
purchase of shares.
It is this latter feature which 'marxist managerialists' argue
is ignored by orthodox managerialists in the EerIe and Means
tradition. For the orthodox tradition simply looks at the
separation of ownership and control in the individual company, but
what it is important to observe is how the dispersal of shares allows
of the centralisation of control over several (or even many)
companies in the hands of a few. In particular, marxists argue that
alongside the development from personal to impersonal possession goes
an integration and interdependence between the banking and
industrial sectors of the economy. Finance capital, as the
ultimate expression of this process is examined in a separate section
below. Chevalier makes a study of the 200 largest U.K. firms and
concludes that the marxist perspective provides a superior framework.
"Les travaux de Bez-Le et Means et I' etude de Lazner- avaient isole
les problemes du contr61e de leur contexte economique et des
performances de l'industrie americaine, au risque de donner a la
notion de contrale une valeur purement abstraite. Notre etude est
une premiere etape vers une meilleure connaissance des relations qui
existent entre la structure financiere et la comportement des
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firmes".(3) Chevalier points out how difficult it is to obtain
evidence of ownership of shares in many cases, and talks of what he
calls the "hidden character" of the structure of capital. "On
constate d~s maintenant que la structure du capital revet une
charactere occulte".(4)
It is in fact the separation of ownership and control that
provides the chief mechanism for the growth of large scale enter-
prise through merger activity. Whilst Marx discusses concentration
and centralisation of capital as of equal importance for the growth
in the scale of capital (see Chapter 3), it is widely agreed that
today centralisation (via mergers and takeovers) is of considerably
greater significance. Ceniralisation is the chief process which
leads to the formation of monopoly capital (ownership as a relation
of production) and its separation from non-monopoly capital (legal
ownership). ~~lst concentration is the expansion of ownership
over a process of valorisation, centralisation refashions the
autonomy of capitals, so establishing new relations of competition
(of which more below). Centralisation involves the creation of
new structural forms, in particular the giant corporation (though
ultimately also the financial group which we consider next section).
To look at the internal structure of the giant corporation,
let us return to the first feature of the separation of ownership
and control, the separation between capital as ownership and
possession. It is the study of this process of delegation that
will provide insight into the running of large scale enterprise or
monopoly capital. Mandel points out that the bureaucratisation of
the administration of a company is not equivalent to the bureau-
cratisation of the function of capital. It is simply delegation
to a wide range of managers and so forth. The growing
concentration of power (centralisation and the formation of
monopoly capital) is reflected in the multi-divisional corporation.
(5) In Britain in the 1950's and 1960's the dominant organisational
forms for companies was either unitar'J (the U-form, a single
hierarchical structure organised on a functional basis e.g.
manufacturing, marketing, finance) or the holding company (the H-form,
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an unco-ordinated group of companies under a single financial
entity). Cowling indicates that both these forms tend to become
more inefficient with growth.(6) The M-form, with its multi-
divisional structure, was pioneered in the U.S.A. in the 1920's and
was adopted in the U.K. from the late 1960's onwards. The M-form
is characterised by the decentralisation of production responsibility
and the centralisation of capital allocation decisions. The
general office in a multi-divisional corporation is relatively
efficient at extracting profits from its operating divisions. It
is the general corporate office that manages the firm as a financial
entity. Corporate identity relates to this pool of finance. "The
tendency for the direction of the 'immediate process of production'
to be technically separated from the process of the accumulation of
.capital ••• becomes more widespread in the age of late capitalism",
as Mandel puts it.(7)
It has been argued by marxists that insofar as tne separation of
ownership and management is simply a process of delegation, as
described for the multi-divisional corporation, this does not alter
the dynamics of capitalism at all. Accumulation and the profit
motive remain "Noses and the prophets", just as Marx saw it. Baran
and Sweezy concluded that even corporate management still aimed for
profit maximisation, since the advancement of the manager depends on
advancement of her company. Strength, rate of growth and size of
the company will therefore be the objectives, all of which depend on
profits. "These things become the subjective aims and values of
the business world because they are the objective requirements of
the system".(a)
There are nevertheless two problems with respect to motivation
which arise with the growth of large scale enterprise. The first
is the argument that whilst the M-form may provide the most efficient
mechanism for extracting profits, what about their absorption in the
general office? Cowling gives some gross examples of profligacy
on personal consumption by top executives. \fhilst profits remains
the incentive, they may be used for consumption rather than
accumulation. More serious is the line of argument deriving from
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the stagnationist view of monopoly capitalism which runs through
Steindl, Gillman and Baran and Sweezy and taken up by Cowling.
Here monopoly capital leads to excess capacity, with the implication
that the marxian imperative to the individual capital to accumulate
to survive needs to be qualified. "Since surplus which cannot be
absorbed will not be produced - it follows that the normal state
of the monopoly capitalist economy is stagnation". (9) What profits
can be used for is here seen as affecting the production of profits.
As Cowling points out however, though the motivation of the individual
monopolist may be affected by excess capacity, for capitalism as a
whole, accumulation is still required. I think it may also be
helpful for marxists to be more aware of the conflicting motives at
work within the large corporation. Kornai argues for conflict and
compromise within an institution.(10) People tend to identify
themselves with their taste and role, so that the production
department wants continuous smooth production, the R and D department
wants technical innovation whilst the selling department wants sales.
One would also anticipate a conflict of interests between the general
corporate office and lower levels of management over the distribution
of surplus value. The firm is capable of operating because
compromises emerge among conflicting interests, under the motive of
survival and expansion. Survival and expansion however will be
contingent upon the generation profits, the supervision of which
process is centralised in the general office. De Vroey makes a
useful point in saying that motivations are not individual, but the
personification of social relations. vfhilst many marxists pose the
question 'who rules the corporations?' (this indeed is the very
title of Fitch and Oppenheimer's article), it would be more
appropriate to ask the question 'for which class are they ruled?'.
Marxists do not need to assume maximising behaviour on the part of
individuals, as do orthodox economists; maximising behaviour is
rather a consequence of the capitalist mode of production, and the
process of accumulation which is fundamental to it.
Before leaving the issue of corporate organisation it is
essential to ask how it affects competition. It has already been
suggested in several contexts that the growth of monopoly capital
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means that planning within the individual enterprise supersedes the
market. To use Chandler's terminology, the visible hand of
management has replaced the invisible hand of the market mechanism.
How far does the market survive and to what extent does the whole
process involve the supersession of competition? In a chapter
enti t Led "The Power of the r1arket", Chevalier distinguishes three
types of power relating to large scale enterprises. Firstly there
is "horizontal power" which can take several forms. There may be
direct personal liaison reflecting a community of interests unitir~
big firms. In addition horizontal power may take the form of
maximisation of joint profits, through agreements, price leadership
and price discrimination. Chevalier concludes that horizontal
power appears essentially as a tacit co-operation reflecting the
interpenetration of interests. rtAinsi, Ie pouvoir horizontal
exerce par les grandes firmes americaines paratt se manifester
essentiellement par une co-operation, plus ou moins tacite, entre
les principaux producteurs, co-operation qui reflete parfaitement
l'interpenetration des intere-ts des diff/rents groupes". Such an
analysis suggests a considerable by-passing of the market and links
in with the idea of barriers to competition considered in earlier
sections. Secondly, there is a vertical power, which has more to
do with group structure and commercial transactions than inter-
penetration. Vertical integration takes a part of the market away
from competing firms. Thus Chandler argues that the modern
industrial enterprise is a result of integration of mass production
wi th mass distribution. "The most imposing barrier to entry in
these industries was the organisation the pioneers had built to
market and distribute their newly mass-produced products".(11)
Thirdly, there is conglomerate power, which is the result of
diversification. All in all, Chevalier is suggesting that
corporate power to supersede the market extends well beyond the
boundaries of individual monopoly capitals. Fitch and Oppenheimer's
concept of 'reciprocity' would seem to back up the conclusion that
market and price competition between modern corporations is reduced.
('Reciprocity' is the system of purchases and sales between firms
which parallel networks of fin~~cial control, involving the
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manipulation of these purchases and sales such as to maximise
financial profits.) Conflicts of interest between firms are thus
resolved through reciprocity, and ignoring market factors.
Now, I would indeed agree that concentration, centralisation,
combination and the growth of large scale enterprise means a trend
away from atomistic market forces. "Concentrationfl, as Kornai sees
it flinvolves a trend away from the atomisation of economic
processes".(12) But it is important to realise that the information
flow structure of the modern large firm is a very complex one,
involving non-price as well as price information. The firm will
use market researchers, opinion researchers, system planners,
scientific advisers and will obtain information from inventories,
their financial position, individual market partners, competitors,
and professional institutions getting statistics, be they banks or
government ministries. The information flows provided by the market
are extensively dealt with in the orthodox literature. In particu-
lar, far less attention is paid to the money and credit system as
providing an information flow.
It is actually the free capital mobility which underlies price
competition which ensures that competition does indeed take place.
Is there actually mobility of capital under the competitive phase of
capitalism, as is generally assumed? Clifton points out that the
assumption of free capital mobility under the competitive phase is
historically'quite unjustified for two reasons. Firstly, free
capital mobility cannot be established in the context of exchange
for industrial capital, since finance committed to production
activity is immobilised. It is thus only merchant capital that has
free mobility. Secondly, durable capital goods are not equivalent
to financial capital and cannot be transferred from sector to sector.
As Marx was well aware, it was banks, rather than firms which played
the crucial role in ensuring mobility of capital.
As they have grown (a process facilitated by the separation of
ownership and control as we've already seen) Clifton argues that
the capitalist firm has been able to overcome the limits inherent in
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the nature of fixed capital. The conditions for mobility of
capital are not established in the exchange process, but by the
systematic organisation of production across areas and industries
(the vertical and conglomerate power spoken of by Chevalier),
involving a far wider range of competitive strategies. Diversifi-
cation becomes a crucial component in this new form of competition.
"Diversification is the structural element in the emergence of free
capital mobility for the firm. The range and intensity of competi-
tive strategies is the Dnerational element of free capital
mobility".(13) The growth of monopoly capital is not simply a
process of centralisation, it is also one of diversification
through vertical and combined mergers as Lenin saw, and today some-
times referred to as 'restructuring'. The firm thus becomes a unit
of general production', and achieves the efficient allocation of
capital through an internal flow of funds. As we have already seen,
the general corporate office is the nerve centre of this flow.
To conclude then: competition between large-scale enterprises
has become more abstract, so that it is conducted on an economy-wide
basis. Competition has moved to a third level: competition
between diversified units of capital; what Eukharin called combined
competition. The large firm is more competitive than its small-
scale predecessor in terms of mobility of capital. This does not
mean to say that other types of competition do not subsist, especially
with regard to small-scale capital, and to the competition between
non-monopoly and monopoly capital. The main characteristics of
non-monopoly capital are that it is small scale, that there are a
large number of firms in the same line of business and that there are
barriers to the exit of capital. Monopoly capital on the other hand
is large scale, has barriers to entry (e.g. advertising), deters
potential entry by holding excess capacity, may be formed by agree-
ments between firms, and is often diversified. The separation into
monopoly and non-monopoly capital is made possible by the division
between ownership as a relation of production and legal ownership.
Section C will show how horizontal, vertical and combined competition
act to distribute profits between monopoly and non-monopoly capital.
~That however of the tendency for industrial and banking capital to
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combine together to form finance capital? It is here that marxist
theories of managerialism really come in to their own, positing
as they do, the concept of finance capital.
B. Finance Capital
In the last section we examined the structure of the individual
large corporation as the typical unit of production under the monopoly
phase of capitalism. It was seen that the formation of such
corporations resulted primarily from the centralisation of capitals
through merger and takeover. Such centralisation doesn't only take
place horizontally to include other firms making the same type of
product or vertically to include different stages in the production
process, it also takes place across industries. This is the process
of diversification, or as marxists would tend to call it, combination.
Centralisation actually alters the mode of regulation of capitalism,
the competitive process, and finds ultimate expression in finance
capital. "En somme", says Lipietz, "la centralisation tend ~
faciliter l'interiorisation de la contradiction social/privee dans
Le calcul interne a. 1 'unite de la propriete economique (qui est ici
groupe financier)".(14) It has already been briefly suggested that
the movement from personal to impersonal possession has been
paralleled by an increasing interdependence between the financial and
industrial sectors. There is now a need to consider the coalitions
between large owners, for finance capital is a logical extension of
the process of centralisation.
One of the unexpected features of the modern debate on the
monopoly phase of capitalism is that many in the marxist camp
scarcely mention finance capital at all. It is perhaps not sur-
prising that Baran and Sweezy should ignore finance capital in
"Monopoly Capital", since they rely considerably on the orthodox
theory of managerialism, which does not deal with the coalitions
between management (or owners). Cowling, too, is concerned to
relate orthodox theories of monopoly to a marxist perspective in
"Radical Economics" and doesn I t deal with finance capital. It does
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however seem strange that a specific contribution of Lenin and the
marxist imperialists to the theory of monopoly should not be taken
up amongst important contributors to the contemporary debate. Wirth,
Borrelly and Evanitsky provide more examples of marxists who do not
consider finance capital, even though they aren't concerned to draw
on the orthodox tradition.
Amongst those who do use the concept of finance capital, there
is considerable diversity of opinion over just what its meaning and
significance is. Finance capital is perhaps more often seen as a
fusion, merging or coalescence between industrial, commercial and
banking capital. Others, however, talk of the replacement of an
industrial oligarchy by a financial oligarchy. For some, finance
capital is best expressed in terms of a constellation of interests
which finds concrete expression in a series of 'interest groups'.
Continuing the division of opinion initiated by the theorists of
imperialism, there are also disagreements over which fraction of
capital predominates within finance capital. Posing the question
of who controls the corporations, some would reply that the banks do.
Then there is the contrast between those who see finance capital
giVing rise to a process of 'uneven and combined development' and
those who see it resulting in a group of corporate rich with little
conflict between them.
Let me start at a point where there is considerable agreement,
namely that finance capital represents some kind of inter-relation
between the fractions of capital. Marx identified three fractions
of capital, banking, industrial and merchant capital, which can be
seen as the institutional forms of money, productive and commercial
capital respectively, the latter being the abstract forms of the
three fractions. In Chapter 3 the circulation of the three
fractions of capital was represented in diagrammatic form -
LP
C/
1,,- MP
1
I1:r
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represents the circulation of industrial capital (I), where MI
represents money capital which is then put to work by purchasing
labour power and means of production. Mil represents the increased
money capital obtained at the end of the productive process.
represents the circulation of merchant capital whilst
represents the circulation of banking capital. As Thompson
suggests(15), the formal circuit of finance capital can then be
represented as follows:
1'13 ~ Circuit of
I r :Banking capital/LP'IV I Circuit ofMI- PI I 'rCI" •••• CI - MIMP Y Industrial capitalCircuit ofM -- C -- ~1'C . C J. C Commercial capital
Money capital is lent by banking capital to industrial capital.
Once the circuit of industrial capital is complete, the industrial
capitalist can return the money capital to the banking capitalist
with interest. Industrial capital, however, does not sell the
commodities produced itself, but relies on commercial capital to
realise the money capital in its specialised circuit (MD - Cc - MIC).
This inter-relation between the fractions of capital of course
also existed at the time when Marx was writing. The difference was
that at that time there were no institutional links between the
fractions of capital, and it was the market mechanism that
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established the relationships between the three fractions. As I
emphasised in Chapter 3, it was for this reason that Marx argued that
the distribution of surplus value between profit of enterprise and
interest was indeterminate. With the growth of the monopoly phase
of capitalism, the relationships between the t~xee fractions of
capital have become institutionalised through the process of
centralisation, which has included not simply diversification across
industries, but also combinations between banking, industrial and
commercial capital. It becomes obvious then, that the study of
finance capital must involve a considerable institutional element.
Further, the relationship between the three fractions of capital
within any combination of finance capital will depend on the
division of surplus value between them.
Two opposing arguments on the relationships within the finance
capital combination are to be found: either that it is banking
capital that predominates, or that it is industry that is in control.
For Fitch and Oppenheimer, finance capital is control by banks. In
much of their tb"'ee part article on "Who Rules the Corporations"
they appear to use the terms finance capital and banking capital
interchangeably. The article starts with a challenge to orthodox
managerialists and Bazan and Sweezy, where they argue that management
control is actually equivalent to control by finance capital.
Providing a range of empirical evidence, Fitch and Oppenheimer
conclude that banks have considerable potential for control over the
large industrial companies thanks to ownership of their shares and
to interlocking directorships. Examining the structure of finance
for large companies, the second part of their article reaches the
conclusion that banking capital does indeed exercise this control
through industrial capital's need for external finance. Fitch and
Oppenheimer do however point out that the relationship is one of
conflict. (Notice that finance capital and banks are seen as
equivalents for each other in this quotation.) "Conflict is built
into the very nature of the relationship between finance capital and
entrepreneurial or managerial capitalists. Bankers are like
Christ's lilies of the field: they flourish, though they neither
spin nor toil. Steel companies produce ingots; chemical companies
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produce plastic; auto companies make chassis; banks produce
profits. What is their source? Financial profits are simply a
subtraction from industrial profits ll.(16) Nevertheless, the
conclusion is that it is bankers who are in charge. f~hen we
consider these links between creditors, stockholders, directors, and
policies we can see clearly how the relationship between a corpo-
ration and its banker is unique The bankers not only hold
decisive positions on the board, but also have working control of the
corporations through stockholdings. And the b~~s ••• are major
creditors of the corporation. Add together directorships, stock-
holdings, and creditor relations and they have an unassaiable
positionll • Thus although there may be a conflict of interest, it
is one that is settled decisively in favour of banking capital for
Fitch and Oppenheimer.
At the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that it is
industrial capital which has the controlling influence thanks to its
ability to finance itself through retained profits or internal
fundings. This view tends to be put forward by orthodox economists,
and is opposed by the majority of marxists. Baran and Sweezy·
however emphasise the importance of internal funding as a source of
financial independence for the large corporations. Obviously
empirical evidence as well as a theoretical framework is needed to
determine the answers here. _~ongst others, Fitch and Oppenheimer
have examined the U.S. situation whilst Thompson has looked at the
Eritish one. Eesides the institutional variations between one
country and another leading to differences in the level of internal
funding, there are also variations within the business cycle. Fitch
and Oppenheimer point out that when corporate profits are high,
firms are more likely to be able to generate funds for expansion
internally, and they suggest that Bazan and Sweezy's case for
internal funding was based on evidence from a period of upswing.
Looking at the U.S. situation, Fitch and Oppenheimer felt that very
few corporations , particularly amongst the large ones, did not have
any external debt. Eut what of the Eritish situation, where the
proportion of internal funding is notoriously high (around 753~).
Thompson provides a detailed argument to show that neither the level
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nor the use of internal funds is independent of external constraints.
He points out that Britain has an overactive secondary market in the
sales of existing securities, rather than new issues. In Britain,
it is the valuation of a company on the stock exchange that
determines its financial viability. Although raising additional
capital is not important, trade in existing securities by banks and
other financial institutions ensures external monitoring.
A more helpful approach than polarising the argument about the
inter-relationships within finance capital between banking or
industrial control is to see finance capital as an 'articulated
combination' of the three forms of capital, banking, industrial and
commercial, as Thompson for instance does. This articulated
combination provides for the division of surplus value between the
three fractions of capital. Within this combination it is
industrial capital that determines whether accumulation will take
place, but the relationship between banking, industrial and co~mercial
capital will determine how the surplus is ::plit between them. Overbeek
suggests that the relations between industr~al and banking capital can
take four forms.(17) The financial relation has already been
mentioned and involves ownership of shares, long term credits or bonds
and short term credits. The other three relations are through
services (such as advising on mergers and take-overs or managing
investment portfolios for other firms), institutional relations
(through inter-locking directorates) and informal relations (for
example family ties). To determine the specific nature of these
relations within any particular economic formation requires empirical
study.
It is perhaps surp~~s~ng that there has been so little empirical
investigation of finance capital. Chevalier does however provide
one such study of the United States. In mentioning some of the
conclusions he reached about corporate organisation in the last
section, I have already drawn attention to the difficulties Chevalier
had in obtaining information about share ownership. The problems
of finding out about the relations between banking and industrial
capital may be one reason why only a limited amount of research has
been done. A-~other may be the breadth and extent of the task,
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which inevitably involves economy-wide investigations. Chevalier's
study provides a specific illustration of how the movement from
personal to impersonal possession has been paralleled by an increa-
sing interdependence between b~~ing and industrial capital. He
examines four possible types of group which might control the 200
largest forms which he studied: families, pension funds, commercial
banks and other financial institutions. He makes use of and
assesses the significance of the four types of relation mentioned by
Overbeek: financial, services, institutional and informal relations.
With regard to families, Chevalier concludes that their
importance is still considerable. "La puissance financiere de
quelques grandes familIes est encore considerable et n'est pas
appele'e a. disparaftre rapidementrt.(1S) Looking next at pension
fund companies, they have many personal liaisons with one another,
and with the 200 largest industrials in addition to share ownership.
rtAinsi, les fonds de pension sont progressivement ameries a. jouer un
r~e fort important dans les mechanismes du contre51e".(19) Never-
theless, pension fund companies tend to exert a secondary influence,
rather than a primary control. In terms of power the concentration
of pension funds could have very different effects according to
whether it takes place to the benefit of banks, boards of directors
or workers. Chevalier concludes that the former two seem to be
benefiting~. Chevalier's assessment of the other financial
institutions besides the commercial banks is that they intervene
rather little in the control mechanisms of industrial companies.
The evidence Chevalier uses for commercial banks covers inter-
locking directorates, firm indebtness, whether the bank holds a
proportion of the capital and whether it is a. trustee of the pension
fund. He concludes that there is considerable financial concen-
tration of indust~J, but that this takes the form of banks operating
as "poles of attraction" for a number .of firms. !tCes chiffres font
apparattre une certaine concentration financiere de l'industrie
americaine. Mais cette concentration a un charactere
dynamique: quelques banques tendent a. devenir des poles d'attraction
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autour desquels vont se regrouper un certain nombre de societ~s".(20)
Chevalier feels that the links between banks are such that one can
see the boards of directors of the big banks as a powerful oligarchy.
He identifies six banking groups operating as poles of attraction:
Rockefeller, Morgan, Nellon, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Chemical
Bank and Cleveland. Chevalier shows the links between these
banking groups and industrial firms and concludes that the banks
are recovering the influence that they had over industrial corpo-
rations in the 1920's. Control over the big American: firms is a
power struggle between the industrial and the financial oligarchy.
ItLe probleme du contrOJ.e des grandes societe's americaines semble des
lors se characteriser par un double phenom~ne: d'un part une
oligarchie industrielle se maintient difficilement au pouvoir en
evitant la dispersion de ses actions, d'autre part une oligarchie
financiere augmente peu a peu son pouvoir de controle sur l'ensemble
de I' industrie americaine lt • (21 ) Chevalier' s study of the U.S.
economy shows the articulation of industrial and banking capital
expressed through banks acting as poles of attraction, resulting in
the formation of interest groups. He demonstrates an extremely dense
network of personal liaisons between firms, centred primarily on the
interest group, and argues that any firm not attached to a group is
very vulnerable to takeover. Most mergers involve an extension of
the most important groups.
It would seem then that the concrete form taken by finance
capital at least in the American economy is that of the interest
group, or as Aglietta calls them, Itfinancial groups". In Britain,
however, financial groups have not been apparent until relatively
recently, the relations between financial and industrial capital
having been fairly amorphous. Overbeek claims to have found two
large financial groups in the making in Bri tain, one based around the
Midland Bank, the other centred on Lloyds and S.G. Warburg.
Is it now possible to provide a clearer characterisation of what
finance capital as an articulated combination of the three fractions
of capital is? What kinds of generalisation are possible in the
face of the (fairly limited) empirical evidence for different social
242
formations? Thompson has it that finance capital must involve the
dominance of banking capital within the combination, although it is
not determinant, since it is industrial capital which creates
surplus value. Banking capital is dominant in that it can
determine where accumulation takes place. Scott is more cautious
in his conclusions and sees the inter-relations between banking and
industrial capital producing a 'system of communication'.
"Relations of effective possession and strategic control involving
constellations of financial interests generate a structure of
interlocks, the main significance of which is the communication of
business information".(22) He rejects the idea of finance capital
as 'bank control', which indeed seems fair enough on the basis of
the evidence. Nevertheless, to see finance capital as a 'fusion'
of banking and Lnduatrry "expressed in the system of effective
possession, the mode of investment funding, and the integration of
large corporations into an extensive network of communication" seems
unnecessarily cautious.(23)
As both Scott and Thompson suggest, the development of the
credit system has surely a crucial role to play in understanding the
nature of the relationship between industrial and banking capital
within finance capital. Marx outlined the possibility that banking
capital could be seen as 'capital in general' having a real existence,
in its role of transferring capital from one sector of the economy
to another. "The dominance of banking capital is a dominance of the
lending/borrowing relationship as such and the creation of credit so
involved in that function".(24) As Thompson points out, the
rationale of banking capital is to constantly move credit provision
and assure the average rate of profit. The 'network of communi-
cations' established through finance capital changes the nature of
the credit system. Banks no longer come in from outside to provide
finance to industry (or commerce for that matter). Finance capital
can be seen as unifying the process of production and the process of
circulation. As we saw in the last section, large industrial
corporations have become essentially financial institutions, where
corporate identity relates to the pool of finance, extracted as
profits from the operating divisions, but handled by the general
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office. Given the inter-relations established between industry and
banks by finance capital, even internal funding undergoes some form
of external scrutiny. As Scott pus it "Under a system of entre-
preneurial capital i.e. competitive capital] internal funding is
a deduction from the personal income of the entrepreneur. Under a
system of finance capital, internal funding is a deduction from the
income of shareholders, banks and others who advance capital to the
concern". (25) There is here a cumulative and inter-dependent
extension of circulatory and industrial capitals, which has already
been expressed in the diagrammatic representation of the circulation
of finance capital given earlier. It arises out of the extension of
the process of centralisation of capital into combinations both of
industrial and banking capital and the two together. Aglietta
provides a terse definition: "The name finance capital is properly
given to the mediation by which coalitions of capitalists exercise
proprietary control over the structural forms necessary for the
continuing cycles of valorisation of their productive capital,
thanks to the centralised money capital at their d'lsp.esa.L"; (26)
As we have already seen, the cohesion of finance capital finds
concrete expression in financial groups. It is also useful to see
finance capital as 'capital in general' taking a concrete form.
Eoth Chevalier and Scott view finance capital as providing the
propertied class with an interest in the business system as a whole.
"En effet, les 'corporate rich' ne sont guere en conflit les uns avec
les autres, puisqu'ils cherchent avant t~ut ~ preserver leur position
et a maximiser leurs profits".(27) One here sees finance capital
as the concrete expression of the unity of the capitalist class.
We have seen in earlier chapters that this unity is also expressed
in the search to establish an average rate of profit. "Within the
capitalist modes of production any money capital that is thrown on
the market demands a share in the average rate of profit and it is
precisely the function of banking capital to establish this
average rate" says Thompson. What differences do the institutional
changes in corporate organisation and in banking capital through
finance capital considered in these last two sections make to the
formation of the average profit rate? This is the concern of the
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next section.
c. Profits, Not Prices
"For value theory" argues Fine ttmonopoly poses only distribu-
tional problems".(28) At the centre of much of the discussion over
the continuing applicability of the law of value is the issue of the
way in which surplus value is distributed. Accepting that capital
must 'valorise' itself (i.e. earn a profit), the question of the
regulation of that process then comes to the fore. True, the
valorisation process also relates to accumulation and the growth of
capital, but for many the distribution of surplus value is considered
as the primary concern. The discussion over distribution takes
three main approaches. Firstly, there are those who argue for the
tendency of the system to form a general profit rate, whilst a
second group see a hierarchy of profit rates instead. Finally
discussion centres around the distribution of surplus between
different fractions of capital (industrial, banking and commercial)
under the aegis of finance capital, or between monopoly and non-
monopoly capital and hence the barriers between capitals. Distri-
bution of profits is of course closely related to mobility of capital
within and between sectors.
One obvious advantage of approaching the issue of regulation
through profits rather than prices is that profits will include the
effects of non-price as well as of price competition. In addition,
monopoly prices may in part be used in maintaining a monopoly
position; this will be automatically apparent when using the profit
approach. It is also interesting to note that none of the writers
considered in the earlier section on prices specifically linked their
analysis to the exclusions from the formation of the average profit
rate which Marx identified in Das Kapital. The failure to make the
link can however be justified since Marx was talking exclusively in
terms of the monopoly barriers of land ownership. Is any connection
made by those who approach the issue via profits?
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This is indeed the case for Margaret Wirth whom I showed earlier
as emphasising the continuity between competition and monopoly, with
monopoly as a mode of appearance of competition. For Wirth the
operation of the average profit rate as a tendency derives from the
nature of capital as self-expanding value and from competition (which
I have argued is also inherent in the nature of capital). Capitals
seek either to achieve the average profit rate or to prevent a
reduction to this average. In other words, as we saw from Marx,
there is both a movement towards and a movement away from the average,
together constituting the tendency. Wirth sees the forms in which
capital attempts to do this changing. Under the monopoly phase a
crucial concept is "that of monopoly, conceived as a specific form
of comuetition in which the individual capital seeks to isolate
itself from the general process of the equalisation of profit".(29)
Note however that were there not a tendency to the equalisation of
profits, there would be no need for capital to attempt to free itself
from the t endency; What are the means available to the individual
capital to exert such opposition?
Here Mandel provides a useful framework. Chapter 3 in "Late
Capitalism" entitled 'The Three Main Sources of Surplus Profit in the
Development of Modern Capitalism' examines the question of distri-
bution of surplus value. Mandel attempts to demonstrate "that the
actual growth process of the capitalist mode of production is not
accompanied by any effective equalisation of the rates of profit".(30)
A quest for "surplus-profits" provides the basic motivating force for
the system, and Mandel starts by providing six factors which can lead
to "surplus-profits" in a "normal" capitalist economy. Ey the term
"normal" Mandel presumably means the competitive phase of capitalism,
for he then gives a list including some of Marx's exclusions from the
<,
formation of the average profit rate (e.g. absolute ground rent).
It seems very useful that Nande"l should start from Marx's own
framework here, although I feel that in seeing the quest for surplus-
profits as the motivating force for capital, he fails to emphasise
the two-sided nature of compKtition for Marx. Mandel sees the
tendency to gain more than the average rate of profit, whilst Marx
also talks about moving towards that average.
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What of the situation when capitalism is no longer in its
competitive phase? Much of Mandel's argument is here posed in
international terms, which as I have already explained, is being
excluded from this thesis. He is very concerned to emphasise the
lack of homogeneity (on a country basis, a regional basis and an
industry basis) in the capitalist world economy: the growth of the
capitalist mode of production by its nature leads to disequilibrium.
I have already argued for the undesirability of an implicit con-
demnation of the monopoly stage on the basis of its tendency towards
disequilibrium. Looking at the situation within a single country,
Mandel argues for the formation of two average profit rates, one in
the monopolised and the other in the non-monopolised sector which of
course is an idea that we found in Hilferding. This happens in
the context of technical innovations introduced in the absence of
perfect mobility of capitals, due either to restrictive agreements
between capitalists or barriers to entry due to economies of scale.
This means that temoorary surplus profits can become lasting surplus
profit, a characteristic feature of the monopoly stage of capitalism.
Yet Mandel immediately admits that "there are, of course, no absolute
monopolies in the long run, and the growth of the surplus profits of
monopolistic or oligopolistic concerns is not without its limits".(31)
Amongst other things, excessive surplus-profits will attract
competitors. (This is of course the argument that the degree of
monopoly is conditional upon potential entry; see Keith Cowling's
"Radical Economics".).
The idea of 'lasting surplus profits' associated with the
existence of monopoly and barriers to competition does indeed seem a
useful contrast to make with 'temporary surplus profits' associated
with competition within and between sectors. I am not clear there-
fore why Mandel should then insist on two average rates of profit
which very much imply permanency in the divisions between monopoly
and non-monopoly profits. In part his insistence may arise from the
fact that he has already emphasised only one side of the coin (the
earning of surplus profits) in the formation of the average profit
rate even under the competitive stage of capitalism. Mandel also
ignores Hilferding's qualification of the idea of a monopolised and
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a competitive average rate of profit through the action of finance
capital in combining spheres of capital and thus tending to re-
establish a unified general rate of profit.
The theme of 'lasting surplus profits' is one which crops up
again and again in the literature. Its origins can perhaps be
traced to Lenin's 'super profits', although these were specifically
linked to the export of capital to gain extra surplus value. Scott
certainly uses Lenin's term when, in describing marxist theories of
the monopoly stage, he says "Under 'monopoly' conditions, companies
earn 'super-profit' on top of average profit, and so the economy as
a whole shows no equalisation of actual profit rates, since the
market entry barriers inhibit the free movement of capital".(32)
Steindl in his "Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism"
published as early as 1952 attempts an empirical study of profit
margins in the oligopolistic and the competitive sector. Aglietta
too contrasts 'transitory surplus profit' under what he calls full
competi tion and the far larger surplus profit available to large
firms using 'monopolistic regulation' where the tendencies of
effective demand can be planned.
Is there then any empirical proof for this view either that
profit rates are higher and/or that they last longer in the mono-
polised sector of the economy? Unfortunately, as Semmler points out
in a recent paper, the large number of econometric studies of the
effect of monopolisation on the rate of profit have almost all been
conducted within the neo-classical paradigm.(33) The degree of
monopoly in these studies is seen as being determined by either the
degree of concentration in the seller market, the height of barriers
to entry or the degree of collusion. There are of course problems
in both defining and measuring all the concepts concerned whether
they be profits, concentration ratios, entry barriers or some proxy
for collusion. Semmler concludes his survey by saying that these
studies do not provide clear cut evidence for the view that
oligopolised industries or large scale firms show profit rates
persistently above average profit rates.
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It is however also possible to argue that this type of
empirical proof c~~not in any case be obtained. At a relatively
basic level, at least some of the implicit profits of a monopoly will
be used up in maintaining that monopoly position (e.g. by holding
excess capacity). More importantly, a tendency to equalisation of
profit rates is a process that is never concluded. As Borrelly puts
it "Dans notre conception de l'egalisation, Ie taux de profit moyen
ou normal n'est pas une donnee, il se revele au cours d'une
procedure sociale sans jamais devenir la realite".(34) There are
in any case all sorts of problems in devising a valid calculation of
profit levels. The most basic difficulty is that of measuring
capital, but other problems spring to mind: w~ choose an annual
period for measuring profit levels; what about the difficulties of
obtaining data from enterprises? To the extent that one can over-
come such difficulties it would still be true to say that the only
conclusion that one could draw from the divergence of profit from
the average over a period is that the average rate of profit is not
realised, but one cannot therefore conclude that there is no tendency.
It is thus impossible to get an econometric appreciation of a
tendency. "L'analyse de la dispersion des taux de profit des
industries comme celIe de leur stabilit~ ne peuvent en effet
permettre d'appr~ender Ie phenomene de l'egalisation que lorsque
celui-ci est con~u comme Ie mouvement simultane des taux de profit
d'industrie vers Ie taux de profit moyen, comme l'etablissement dans
Ie long terme d'un taux de profit normal dans toutes les industries"
(35). (That econometric verification or disproof of the tendency
to form an average profit rate is strictly speaking impossible does
of course raise important issues about the nature of a marxist social
science.)
It would appear then, that both theoretically and in practice,
we are unlikely to get econometric support either one way or the
other. If we accept that it is unhelpful to postulate two rates of
profit, or indeed a hierarchy of profit rates between monopoly
sectors and non-monopoly sectors, on the ground that it implies the
supersession of competition, what should be said about the formation
of the average profit rate under the monopoly phase of capitalism?
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Of course the existence of oligopolies and large scale enterprises
affects the establishment of the average rate of profit. Whilst
horizontal competition between firms and vertical competition between
industries under the competitive phase of capitalism are consonant
with temporary or evanescent surplus profits, under the monopoly
phase either of these types of surplus profit may become longer
lasting due either to barriers to capital mobility as such or to
collusion between capitalists. As I argued earlier, however,
such barriers also call forth the means to break them down sooner or
later. There is in addition the effect of combined competition
between giant enterprises and the financial groups, which provides
an alternative avenue for capital mobility, and the establishment
of the tendency.
There is however no doubt that the discipline of the average
profit rate is not as tight under monopoly as it is under competitive
capitalism. As Evanitsky puts it" Under competition the average
rate of profit thus established operated as an external, coercive law
to which the individual had to conform. The rate of profit he
could enjoy... was socially determined, whereas its mass was
proportionate to the amount of capital invested".(36) In contrast,
under monopoly, the rate of profit is more akin to a pre-determined
target for which the capitalist aims than to an independent variable
to which he must submit. Evanitsky therefore concludes that the
laws of capitalism put forward by Marx remain unaffected by the
growth of monopoly in a general abstract sense, meaning that the
capital-wage relation remains the fundamental social relation,
socially necessary labour time is still the substance of value and
surplus value continues to be the basis for profit. However, the
actual expression of these laws is distorted by monopoly, principally
because the quantitative equivalence between price and value has
become 'indeterminate'. "We see then that the laws of capitalism as
discovered by Marx have not been invalidated but that they are no
longer as directly controlling as they were in the past. They
appear now distorted or modified, sometimes held in abeyance for a
shorter or longer period; frequently they manifest themselves as no
more than a tendency, often operating through a relationship mediated
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by so many causal links that the causal sequence appears disrupted.
A law which operates remotely is none the less a law".(37)
Whilst I would agree with Evanitsky's general thrust that the
monopoly stage of capitalism has led to changes in the mode cf
expression of the law of value, I feel that he places too great an
emphasis on 'distortion' and 'disruption'. This happens for two
reasons. Firstly, Evanitsky places a considerable emphasis on
monopoly prices, and it is obvious that for him a major function of
the labour theory of value is to provide a quantitative basis for
prices. I have argued that the labour theory is more appropriately
concerned with social relations, but that in any case it is
perfectly admissable for marxists to acknowledge that monopoly (or
oligopoly) prices are not determinate, except within the limits of
a 'monopoly transformation procedure' which transfers surplus value
within the capitalist class. This lack of objective prices simply
underlines the problem of effective and efficient allocation by the
market mechanism under capitalism. The second drawback in
Evanitsky's stance is that his article fails to examine the changes
in the nature of competition in any detail~ I have suggested that
it is useful to see competition as operating at three different
levels, between firms, between industries and between the combined
units of finance capital. Competition is a question of the mobility
of capital, and to classify the changes in the nature of competition
it also is necessary to examine the distribution of surplus value
between both monopoly and non-monopoly capital, first at the level
of the industry, then at the inter-industry level. Finally how
does finance capital affect this distribution both between the
fractions of capital and between financial groups?
To clarify this, it is helpful first of all to consider the
circuit of industrial capital (see Diagram 6.1). X1 and X2 are
two firms within the same industry (or sector), whilst Y is another
sector. This uses Marx's diagram for the circuit of industrial
capital. Each capital valorises itself during the circuit of
capital, making a profit (M') at the end of each circuit. If it
is to continue performing the role of capital, the money realised
DIAGRAM 6.1 THE CIRCUIT OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL WITH BARRIERS WITHIN AND BETWEEN SECTORS
Barriers/agreements
~
o
'n
oj-)
'n
oj-)
Ql
~~
o oj-)
o 0
• Ql
r-l co
CII
oj-) CII
~
O.t:l
N oj-)
'n 'n~ ~
o
::=
Barriers/agreements
My Cy
LP/ .
~MP
Py C'Y
1
1
___-M'
Y
P C' M'
Xl····· Xl Xl
~
0
'n
oj-) co
'n I:l
oj-) 0
Ql 'n
p,oj-)
a 0
0 Ql
0 co
r-l ~
CII Ql
0 Ql
'n ~
oj-) oj-)
~ Ql
Ql
..0
:>
I\)
\.J1
~
252
at the end of each circuit can either be reinvested in that firm
(X2), or another firm within the same industry (X1) or a different
industry (Y). Competition involves the mobility of capital from
less profitable to more profitable firms and sectors. However,
there may be barriers to such mobility (such as economies of scale
and agreements between firms, of which more in a moment). I have
represented the forces for mobility of capital by arrows between
the money capital of firms (MX2 and MX1) and of industries
(MX1 and My). The barriers are represented by horizontal lines,
preventing such mobility. Under the competitive phase of
capitalism, banking capital facilitated competition between firms
and industries by assisting mobility of capital. There was however
(as we saw in Chapter 3) also competition between the fractions of
capital (industrial, banking and commercial) for the division of
profit between profit of enterprise and interest.
Under what circumstances will the barriers between firms and
industries be overcome? This can be further clarified by
distinguishing monopoly and non-monopoly capital as in Diagram 6.2,
which incidentally considers only industrial capital. The two
industries X and Y have each been represented as containing both
monopoly and non-monopoly capital. The former is characterised by
five main features: it is large scale; it may be formed through a
variety of collusive agreements between firms; there are barriers
to entry, whether they be product differentiation through advertising,
economies of scale or absolute cost advantages; and finally it is
frequently diversified into a variety of products and even
industries. Non-monopoly capital is on the contrary small scale,
often with a large number of firms in the same line of business,
and having barriers to exit in the sense that capital is not very
mobile out of the industry.
This means that three kinds of competition can be identified
within the industry. Firstly, there is what I think is best called
'free competition' between non-monopoly capitals. This is competi-
tion between units of capital which don't have barriers between them.
Marx saw this type of competition operating through temporary
HORIZONTAL COMPETITION WITHIN AN INDUSTRY
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surplus profits due to the fact that innovation could allow market
value to fall below market price, with a movement back towards the
average profit rate as all firms introduced the innovation.
Secondly there is competition between monopoly and non-monopoly
capital. This is a process in which monopoly capital dominates
non-monopoly capital due to the relative disadvantages of the latter.
This inequality is represented by the non-reversibility of the
competitive process: whilst monopoly capital can take over non-
monopoly capital, or drive it to insolvency, non-monopoly capital must
grow or accumulate to become monopoly capital. In most industries
however it is convenient for monopoly capital that there should be a
competitive fringe. Finally, there may be competition between
different monopoly capitals within an industry or sector, provided
it is sufficiently large. This last type of competition is similar
to the competition between monopolies in different sectors or
industries.
I have called this type of competition 'monopoly as a form of
competition'. It is different from competition between monopoly
and non-monopoly capital in that it is reversible, in the sense the
same type of competitive processes operate in each direction. Thus
competition between monopolies incorporates the characteristics that
monopolies anyway possess. Agreements between firms in the same
industry can be replaced or supplemented by agreements between firms
in different industries. It is particularly significant that
monopoly capital X can diversify and so compete with monopoly capital
Y and vice versa. In other words the barriers between monopoly
capitals in different industries or sectors are porous, moveable and
variable, as represented by the overlapping dotted lines in the
diagram. 'Monopoly as a form of competition' is very different from
the competition between industries that Marx envisaged. Thus
competition between non-monopoly capitals in different sectors
remains in existence under the monopoly phase, albeit considerably
overshadowed by the competition between monopolies. Banking capital
today still ensures some capital mobility between non-monopoly
capitals in different sectors, but its contribution is relatively
limited.
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Linking this analysis of competition more closely to the
tendency to form an average profit rate, it is possible to classify
competition into levels on the one hand and types on the other.
It is the structural changes brought about by the accumulation
process (due to centralisation and to some extent concentration of
capitals) that leads to the establishment of new types and levels
of competition with the historical development of capitalism. Each
type of competition involves a range of competitive strategies which
have already been mentioned in a number of contexts. Diagram 6.3
sets out such a typology of competition. Horizontal competition
within an industry can take three forms, the first of which is free
competition between non-monopoly capitals. In this case the
tendency to form an average profit rate involves the dual process of
establishing normal surplus profits (value being pushed below market
price by e.g. introduction of new techniques of production) and
then overcoming them, as all firms adopt the new techniques.
Surplus profits are here very transient. However, as Marx pointed
out, in the accumulation process, there is a tendency for
concentration and centralisation of capital to take place. This
gives rise to the growth of monopolies, so that one finds two
further types of horizontal competition.
The competition between monopoly and non-monopoly capital is one
in which monopoly capital dominates, and it involves the possibility
of extra surplus profits being made by monopoly capital thanks to
barriers to entry. Such barriers will, however, encourage either
non-monopoly capital to overcome them through growth and accumulation,
or it will encourage the third type of competition: that between
monopoly capitals. Monopoly as a form of competition means that the
tendency to form an average profit rate takes the form of establishing
and overcoming barriers which in particular may involve vertical
integration within the industry. It may be that a ~monopoly trans-
formation' ensures the transfer of extra surplus profits for a period
of time from within or between sectors of the economy, but this will
tend to be overcome by vertical competition between monopoly capitals.
Let us now look at the second level of competition, vertical
DIAGRAM 6.3
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LEVELS AND TYPES OF COMPETITION AND THE ROLE OF ACCUMULATION
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competition between industries. This can be of two types. There
is free competition between non-monopoly capitals where, as Marx
pointed out, banking capital ensures capital mobility. There is
some possibility for surplus profits here, when capital is less
than perfectly mobile, as has already been pointed out. The other
type is competition between monopoly capitals. The process of
accumulation and centralisation of capital has in this case led to
combinations of the units of capital across sectors or industries.
Again the tendency to form an average rate of profit is achieved by
establishing and overcoming barriers. In the case of vertical
competition between monopoly capitals this typically takes the form
of combinations between sectors by means of diversification.
Centralisation involving diversification then creates the third
level of competition, that of combined competition between financial
groups. The formation of finance capital can be seen as the
process of diversification writ large. Finance capital is the
ultimate result of a continuing process of centralisation from which
an articulated combination between banking and industrial capital
grows up. Combined competition across sectors of the economy
becomes the rule with finance capital. We have seen that under the
competitive phase of capitalism, banking capital performs an
important role in the tendency to form an average profit rate by
facilitating capital mobility between firms and industries. The
interrelations between industrial and banking capital are
institutionalised under the monopoly phase through finance capital.
Financial groups are able to move in and out of sectors of the
economy, so that competition becomes an economy wide phenomenon:
combined competition between cohesive sums of self-expanding capital.
What is interesting about combined competition between financial
groups is that competition has at this level decisively linked the
spheres of exchange and of production. The competitive process
becomes one for securing the most favourable conditions of growth,
and not simply of exchange. The implications of this change will
be discussed in the concluding section.
What this classification of levels and types of competition
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has endeavoured to show, is that the competition process is, if
anything, far more vigorous under the monopoly phase of capitalism.
Competition not merely takes place at three different levels, but
also involves a range of types in the interactions between and
within monopoly and non-monopoly capital. The forms of competition
in other words have changed. Whilst there will undoubtedly be
temporary movements away from the average profit rate (whether above
or below it), there will always be a tendency towards its re-
establishment. The tendency to form an average profit rate is the
very root of competition. As Aglietta puts it "The constraint of
competition requires a social law proceeding from the nature of
capital as a social relation, which operates as the law of the
formation of a general rate of profit by which the valorisation of
individual capitals is forcibly governed".(38) The tendency to
form an average profit rate is a process of conflict and under the
monopoly phase of capitalism, there is a very wide range of
competitive strategies.
But how far is such an analysis modified by the role of the
state?
D. The Role of the State in Competition
If marxist theorists of imperialism writing at the beginning of
the century felt it important to include the state in their analyses
of competition, how much more important it is to provide an indi-
cation of the state's role in competition in the latter half of the
century. There is concurrently a wide-ranging debate within
marxism on the capitalist state. It is a huge area of considerable
controversy where it is probably possible to identify as many as
five or six different major approaches to the theory of the state.(39)
Whilst it is inappropriate in a thesis concerned with competition to
enter into the theoretical controversy over the nature of the state,
it is essential to consider how the state intervenes in the
competitive struggle. It has already been pointed out that the
orthodox tradition in economics pays scant attention to the role of
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the state, but the same is sometimes true of those examining
competition and monopoly from a marxist perspective.(40)
At what level is it appropriate to consider the state for such
task? Fine and Harris suggest that work on the state car:, be divided
into several types depending on the level of abstraction.(41)
Firstly, one can consider the 'general nature of the capitalist
state' at the level of the mode of production and abstracting from
the existence of national states. Secondly, still at the level of
the mode of production, the national state can be introduced, so
including relations with other states. Next, the role of the state
in a world where several modes of production exist can be considered,
whilst finally there is the national state in its concrete form, as,
for example, the national state of the USA. I indicated in the
introduction that I proposed to simplify and restrict my analysis
of competition and monopoly by following Marx in abstracting from
the national state, so ignoring the effects of internationalisation.
This means that I shall be considering the state only at the first
level proposed by Fine and Harris, what they elsewhere distinguish
as 'the state in general', a concept associated with the state
guaranteeing the reproduction of social relations, and pertaining
to the existence of 'capital in general' .(42) The 'national state',
in contrast, presumes the division of capital into competing blocs
of 'many capitals'. In effect, then, I shall be considering 'the
state in general' at the level of the mode of production, but in
relation to 'many capitals' as well as to 'capital in general' though
without the dimension of 'national capitals' and 'national states'.
I want therefore to attempt a classification of state interventions
and then establish their relationship with competition between many
capitals. For such a purpose it is not appropriate to examine the
general nature of the state, but it is perhaps useful as a starting
point to see the state, as Jessop suggests, as an institutional
ensemble of forms of representation" internal organisation and
intervention. (43)
Diagram 6.4, which was also used in the introduction, shows how
state policies and state intervention fit into the context of
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capitalist competition. State policies influence the competition
among capitalists, the forms that accumulation take, as well as the
forms taken by crises. The influence is of course not just one
way - competition among capitalists also influences state policy.
State policies in addition affect the class struggle which in turn
has an effect on both competition and crises. The credit system
and inflation are both mechanisms in the competition amongst
capitalists which are influenced by state policies amongst other
things. The diagram makes broad distinctions between state
str~cture, social reproduction and state intervention on the one
hand and economic structure, economic reproduction and the market
mechanism on the other. It is obvious from the complex inter-
relations between state policies and competition among capitalists
that these broad distinctions involve considerable inter-twining.
But let me now turn to the attempts that have been made to
classify state interventions. Such classifications have usually
been linked to the division of capitalism into stages. Thus
Poulantzas distinguishes the state as ensuring the reproduction of the
general conditions of the production of surplus value and the state
as involved in the actual process of the extended reproduction of
capital as a social relation. The former is characteristic of
competitive capitalism, whilst the latter develops with the monopoly
stage. (44) This distinction between the 'facilitative' functions of
the state such as the provision of law and order and a currency and
the 'supportive' f~~ctions of, for example the welfare state, is a
common one, where the 'facilitative' state provides a rationalisation
for the ideology of laissez-faire. Mandel gives a more detailed
classification distinguishing between three main functions: the
provision of the general conditions of production, the repressive
function and the legitimation function.(45) The last of these
ensures the maintenance of the ideology of the ruling class through
education, culture and the means of communication, whilst the
repressive function operates through the coercion of the army,
police, law and penal system. It is the first category that relates
most immediately to the sphere of production and Mandel further
subdivides the provision of the general conditions of production
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into what he calls the general-technical preconditions (such as
means of transport, the postal service), general-social preconditions
(for example a national market, law and order, a currency system)
and the reproduction of the forms of intellectual labour required
for production (an adequate educational system). During the period
of 'imperialism' Mandel sees the provision of the general
conditions of production being extended through social legislation,
which on the one hand is a concession to the working class, whilst
on the other answering to the general interests of the capitalist
class for a healthy, educated workforce. Mandel sees a still
greater extension of this function under late capitalism. "There is
thus an inherent trend under late capitalism for the state to
incorporate an ever greater number of productive and reproductive
sectors into the 'general conditions of production' which it
finances". (46)
Although the classifications of state interventions which I have
considered so far do link intervention to specific stages of capita-
lism, they do not clearly relate to state intervention in the process
of capitalist competition. James O'Connor provides a much admired
classification of state expenditure in "The Fiscal Crisis of the State ll
(47). He argues that the capitalist state has to fulfil two basic
and often contradictory functions: accumulation and legitimisation.
State expenditures can correspondingly be divided into social capital
expenditures required for profitable private accumulation, and social
expenses which are needed to maintain social harmony. It is
important to realise that any specific state expenditure will usually
fulfil both functions in some respect or another. Social capital
can in turn be subdivided into social investment, which increases the
productivity of labour power, and social consumption, which lowers
the reproduction costs of labour. Both social investment and social
consumption will tend to increase profit rates for private capital.
Social consumption may either affect the goods and services collecti-
vely consumed by the working class or it may provide social
insurance against economic instability. "In general" argues O'Connor
"the greater the socialisation of the costs of variable capital, the
lower will be the level of money wages".(4S) O'Connor in fact sees
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this as benefiting the monopoly as opposed to the competitive
sector of the economy, but I want to deal with the effects of state
intervention later on, and continue to examine classifications for
the moment. Social consumption expenditure may affect the compe-
tition between capitalists, but only indirectly, through its effect
on class struggle (see Diagram 6.4).
Social investment, on the other hand, may directly affect
capitalist competition. O'Connor here distinguishes human capital
(the education system, scientific and R&D services) and physical
capital, where the physical economic infrastructure is socialised
partly because all private capitals need it, partly because it is
thought of as financially risky. Physical capital may take the form
of complementary investments without which private capital projects
would be unprofitable, and discretionary ones designed to improve
incentives for new private accumulation (e.g. regional policies).
O'Connor sees the social expenses of production in terms of the
warfare-welfare state. In looking at both the welfare and the
warfare state the two-fold nature of state intervention can be seen.
Thus the welfare system provides political control over the surplus
population so fulfilling a legitimation role, but also expands the
domestic market, and provides for accumulation. The warfare system
similarly fulfils two functions by on the one hand keeping rivals at
bay and containing revolution and on the other, staving off domestic
economic stagnation. Returning again to Diagram 6.4 it can be seen
that the accumulation aspects of the warfare-welfare state act in-
directly on the process of competition amongst capitalists through
their effect on crisis.
So far the classifications of state intervention have related
to the functions that they fulfil. An alternative approach would
be to look directly at the current range of state policies. One
could then distinguish four types of state intervention: inter-
vention relating to the competitive struggle between capitals,
intervention relating to the class struggle, intervention in the
infrastructure and intervention in the interests of legitimation.
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Examples of state intervention in the competitive struggle are anti-
monopoly policies, rationalisation policies, nationalisation,
assistance to depressed areas and structural policy. The state here
may intervene in favour of monopoly or non-monopoly capital, in
favour of capitals in different regions of the economy or in favour
of expanding or contracting sectors of the economy. The major
example of state intervention in the class struggle is through the
welfare state, while state infrastructure policy can be seen as state
involvement in the socialisation of production through growth policy,
cyclical policy and planning for example. Legitimation has already
been covered in some detail. Such a classification does not mean
that only the first type of intervention has an effect on the competi-
tive struggle, for the last three types of intervention may all
affect the competitive struggle indirectly.
Fine and Harris provide a classification of state intervention
under the 'state monopoly stage' based on the relationship with the
economic structure of capitalism.(49) Here the state's predominance
is seen as the distinguishing feature of this stage, representing a
higher level of the socialisation of the relations of production.
State intervention now predominates over the forces of the market and
the credit system. State predominance expresses itself in four ways.
Firstly, the state replaces the private credit system as the dominant
agency for regulating capitalist accumulation. This is achieved for
example through state control of credit via monetary policy or
distributing state credit to particular sectors. Secondly the state
affects the distribution of surplus value through its tax and subsidy
system while thirdly the state may intervene in the business cycle.
Finally the state can monopolise control of individual capitals
through nationalisation. Fine and Harris conclude that "The result
is that the competitive struggle between fractions of capital over
the appropriation of surplus value as interest or profit of enterprise,
becomes increasingly socialised through the state".(SO) Eut I am
moving ahead of myself since I will be dealing with the analysis of
state intervention in competition in a moment. Fine and Harris's
classification is certainly useful in that it ties in with the
mechanisms through which competition becomes effective.
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Eut Eob Jessop probably provides the most extensive classifi-
cation of the different types of intervention when he distinguishes
five forms in "The Capitalist State" which again relate to specific
stages within capitalism.(51) With 'formal facilitation' the state
is maintaining the general external conditions of capitalist
production. I have already given examples of this form of inter-
vention: Provision of a monetary system, a legal system and adminis-
tration. As Jessop points out, formal facilitation implies that
capitalist production itself operates in a self-expanding manner
consonant with laissez-faire and free competition. The second form
is 'substantive facilitation' where the state reproduces certain
general conditions of production whose provision is essential for
the majority of individual capitals to continue production. A
major example is labour power, but others are infrastructure, basic
research and development or economic statistics. Eoth types of
'facilitation' thus relate to 'capital in general', so that it is
only incidentally that particular capitals in competition could be
advantaged or disadvantaged.
'Formal' and 'substantive support' on the other hand relate to
particular capitals and are thereby inevitably bound up in the
competitive struggle between 'many capitals'. In the case of
'formal support' the state alters the general external conditions of
production favourable to particular capitals. This is an indirect
state intervention through law, money and administrative measures,
so that it is the forces of the market which determine whether
'formal support' is actually exploited by economic agents or not.
Obvious examples here are competition policy and investment allowances.
'Substantive support' in contrast, is the direct allocation of
particular conditions of production to particular economic agents.
(For example, state credit, licences etc.) In the final form of
'direction' state intervention overrides even the formal freedom of
economic agents and directs them. 'TIirection' "may promote the
substantive rationality of capitalism through recognition of the
substantive interdependence of economic agents and promotion of their
collective interest at the cost of their particular interest".(52)
Although Jessop does not provide any examples here, presumably demand
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management would provide a good one. Whilst 'support' would seem
to be directly associated with competition between capitals,
'direction' is not, and seems rather to relate to the socialisation
of production which Fine and Harris see as a prominent characteristic
of state monopoly capitalism.
I have already provided a few pointers as to how various
classifications of state intervention relate to the formal analysis
that marxists make of competition. Let me now look at this
relation in rather more detail. How can state intervention be linked
to the division between the monopoly and the non-monopoly sector, to
the credit mechanism, to the departments of production, to the
circuit of capital and to the relations between the fractions of
capital? As a starting point, the distinction between 'capital in
general' and 'many capitals' in competition has been a crucial one
for many marxists examining competition. I have just shown that
Jessop's distinction between 'facilitative' and 'supportive' inter-
vention relates to state support for capital in general in the
former case and for particular capitals in the latter. State
intervention on behalf of the general interests of capital is most
characteristic of laissez-faire capitalism whilst intervention on
behalf of the specific interests of certain capitals is more
characteristic of the monopoly stage. Many marxists see the state
arising from the conflicts involved in the class struggle on the one
hand and from those involved in the competitive struggle between
capitals on the other. State intervention on behalf of capital in
general can then be seen as emanating from the class struggle,
whilst intervention on behalf of specific capitals arises from the
competitive struggle. As Mandel points out, the representation of
the general interests of capital is unevitably very difficult due to
competition. "Capitalist competition thus inevitably determines
a tendency towards an autonomisation of the state apparatus so that
it can function as an 'ideal total capitalist'''.(53) Unfortunately,
even state expenditure on the unavoidable (or 'facilitative')
functions of law, currency, the market, the army and the customs
system are seen as a waste of surplus value by capitalists. (The
concept of unproductive expenditure by the state is briefly examined
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below.) Mandel argues that therefore all groups of capitalists
are obliged to become politically active in order to articulate both
their collective and their particular interests. The state is thus
unlikely to remain purely 'facilitative'.
Given that the state at the monopoly stage of capitalism
intervenes on behalf of particular capitals, can any generalisations
be made about the state's relationship with either monopoly or non-
monopoly capital? It is generally agreed that the crude Stamocap
theories of various communist parties, which see the state under
monopoly capitalism as simply acting in the interests of monopoly
capital, are oversimplified and lack subtlety. There is not here
the space to argue the case in detail, but O'Connor expresses the
difficulty of such a view quite well when he says "Monopoly class
interests ••• are no.t the aggregate of the particular interests of
this class but rather emerge within the state administration
'unintentionally'ft.(54) Poulantzas of course directs many of his
arguments against 'Stamocap' theory.
Earlier in this chapter the distinction between the monopoly
and the non-monopoly sector of the economy was drawn out. O'Connor
amongst others has suggested that a state sector can also be dis-
tinguished involving the production of goods and services by the
state itself and the production by industries under contract to the
state. Productivity in the state sector (as in the non-monopoly
sector) is low. However, labour demand is stable, subject only to
political pressures rather than market forces. It is the private
sector, and in particular the monopoly sector which provides the
motive force for economic expansion since it is organised on the
basis of the profit motive. The private sector is however
dependent on the state to provide social capital and social
expenses.
To propose the concept of a 'state sector' as well as a
private sector is undoubtedly a useful addition to marxist theory,
but it is one which has not as yet been extensively developed.
Gough suggests that the legitimation expenses of the state
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(O'Connor's social expenses) should be considered to belong to
Department III, Marx's residual department to which he allocated the
production of luxuries, having placed production of the means of
production in Department I and wage goods in Department 11.(55)
It would perhaps be useful to identify a separate department of
production for all state production. It is nevertheless important
to keep in mind that the state's economic activities are predicated
on the fiscal d~pendence of the state on profitable private business,
of which I shall have more to say in the conclusion to this section.
We have already seen that Fine and Harris suggest that state
mediation is added to mediation of the competitive struggle through
the market and credit mechanisms. But state mediation is inevitably
political mediation and as Mandel points out, in such a situation the
private lobbies of the capitalist class take on considerable impor-
tance. Jessop is clear that in providing both formal and sub-
stantive support, the state has to work through the institutions
of the private economic sector, and that even direction by the state
may have its problems. "In short, although the circuit of state
monopoly capital requires specific forms of political intervention,
the insti~~tional separation of the state casts doubt on its
functionality". (56) The implications of the existence of a state
sector adding a new mode of mediation for the competition between
monopoly and non-monopoly sectors are thus far from cut and dried.
As Altvater sees it, the state does not replace competition, but
rather runs alongside it.(57)
Looking in more detail now at the relation between many
capitals, how can the state be formally included in the circuit of
capital? The state is involved in the circuit of capital in two
different ways. Most simply, through nationalised industries it is
involved in the circuit of productive capital, producing surplus
value. This can be represented as:
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and there will be competition within a sector between private and
state industrial capital as well as between sectors whether private
or state.
The 'second way in which the state is involved in the circuit of
capital is through its intervention in the credit system. The
circuit of state capital here becomes a moment in the total circuit
of finance capital, where the state taxes the surplus value created
in the circuit of industrial (or indeed, commercial) capital and
injects this in to the circuit of banking capital through its control
over the credit system. Diagram 6.5 shows the circuit of state
money capital indicating that the state now influences the distri-
bution of surplus value between profit of enterprise (for industrial
capital) and interest (for banking capital). This diagram also
shows the relationship between state capital and the other fractions
of capital, banking, industrial and commercial capital.
Briefly summarising on the implications of state intervention
for the formal analysis of competition, state intervention is based
on the contradictory nature of the valorisation, the accumulation
and the reproduction processes of capitalism.
What now of the effects of this intervention on the competitive
process? Fine and Harris, as we have already seen, argue that the
state today appropriates surplus value through taxation and although
the economy is still controlled according to the needs of capital,
the agency of control is the state. If one accepts that the state
does indeed appropriate surplus value, how is this then used?
Much of the early debate on the state focussed on the argument that
state expenditure is unproductive, in other words that it does not
contribute to the process of accumulation but is rather a deduction
from accumulation. Such a view is based firstly on the argument
that state revenues come out of the existing pool of surplus value,
so that there is less for accumulation and secondly that state
spending itself is also unproductive. But as Wright points out, on
the one hand, taxation is at least partly the result of class
struggle, while on the other, many state expenditures facilitate the
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production of surplus value as has already been argued.(58)
The argument that state expenditure is at least in part the
outcome of class struggle is an important one. The capitalist class
of course wants a state budget which generates an increase in
surplus value and profits, whilst the working class do not.
Capital, in other words as Fine and Harris argue, wants state employ-
ment to be operated productively for the production of surplus value
in accordance with the law of value, while the working class wants
state employment to act unproductively for capital, but for the
planned production of use values and the maintenance of employment.
This distribution of surplus value thus seems to become a function
of the political constraints of class struggle and competition
between capitals. As Mandel suggests, the result is actually a
horizontal redistribution of surplus value amongst the capitalist
class on the one hand and of wages amongst the working class on the
other, "whose effect is to ensure that certain expenditures,
important for the preservation of bourgeois society, but which the
private outlays of the two main income groups do not cover, are in
fact realised".(59)
The line that I have been taking so far over the politicisation
of state intervention would seem to support the 'decommodification'
view of the state, which emphasises the freedom of the state from
economic restraints and the law of value. Thus Bazan and Sweezy
writing in the 60s saw the limitations of government civilian
spending almost entirely in political terms. "Given the power
structure of US monopoly capitalism, the increase of civilian
spending had about reached its outer limits by 1939"(60) or again,
"In the case of almost every major item in the civilian budget,
powerful vested interests are soon aroused in opposition as expansion
proceeds beyond the necessary minimum".(61) :But since the beginning
of the 1970's and the appearance of the so-called 'fiscal crisis of
the state', opinions have changed, and there is now considerably more
emphasis on the economic limits to state spending. As Mandel so
nicely expresses it: "Permanent 'crisis-management' by the State
therewith turns into a permanent crisis of the State".(62) So
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whilst the institutional changes deriving from increased state
participation in economic processes do indeed provide a measure of
the growing socialisation of monopoly capitalism, the state does
remain dependent upon a profitable private sector, and it must
continue to work to achieve its aims sub8tantially through the
private sector.
State intervention then in the competitive process is as contra-
dictory as its private counterpart. Whilst the state may provide
support for sectors of the economy with a below average level of
profit which the private sector is unprepared to run, such as steel
or railways, the state is also the main customer for the relatively
prosperous armaments sector. The state may support the competitive
sector through provision of cheap credit or anti-monopoly policies,
whilst it may promote the growth of monopoly capital through
nationalisation programmes. Similarly, any specific piece of state
intervention can be used to support either the capitalist or the
working class in the class struggle. For example, the distinction
between socialist and capitalist nationalisations is a common one.
As Fine and Harris point out, the working class require state owner-
ship in general as a step towards the abolition of capital, but in
the meanwhile there is a struggle for the unproductive expenditure of
surplus value on nationalised industries in ways that restrict
capitalist control. The capitalist class, however, wants ownership
by the capitalist class, with limited, partial and particular
nationalisations.
To conclude then, on the role of the state in the competition
between capitals, it seems that there are two broad views. The
first view emphasises the 'de-commodification' of the economy,
arguing that political constraints have replaced the law of surplus
value. The second view sees an alternation between the loosening
of market-based constraints and their preservation; in other words
that although there may be periods in which it operates at several
removes as it were, sooner or later the law of surplus value will
reassert itself. It is the second view that I would support, what
might be called a 'state transformation' in the law of surplus value.
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In the post-war boom years of the 1950's and the first half of the
1960's there was little concern with the economic limitations of
state intervention. With the end of the long boom, far more
attention has been paid by both marxists and the 'new right' to these
limitations. The 'alternating' view of state intervention fits in
with recent and wide-supported ideas about the fiscal crisis of the
state. Such a view sees very definite limits to the possibilities
for state intervention due on the one hand to the fiscal dependence
of the state on profitable private enterprise and on the other to
the state's need to work through private sector economic institutions.
As de Erunhoff puts it:. "Economic policy proceeds by an alternation
between a loosening of market-based constraints ••• and a preser-
vation of these constraints in a form mediated by state intervention".
(63) Examples of the former are 'pseudo-validations' of state
currencies in irredeemable currency systems or of 'de-monetised'
labour power, while examples of the latter would be financial or
cash-limits needing authorisation to be exceeded.
State institutions are integrated in many ways into the circuit
of capital, so that state power is constrained by the law of surplus
value. The state and the law of value cannot be mechanically
opposed, since the contradictions of the capital relation (both in
terms of class struggle and competition between capitals) are
reproduced within the state itself. The state does not replace
competition, but rather functions in addition to it, with the state
partially concealing the capital relation insofar as competition
becomes politicised. Eut whilst it is true that the political
dimension introduced by state involvement in the competitive process
modifies it and introduces a relative contingency into the regulative
process, nevertheless the limitations on state involvement mean that
economic regulation ultimately asserts itself. (It is for this
reason that I prefer to use the term 'modified monopoly capitalism'
for contemporary capitalism rather than 'state monopoly capitalism';
the latter term seems to place too much emphasis on the novelty of
state intervention.) I would therefore feel that Hirsch puts it a
bit strongly when he says "The law of value as a mechanism for
regulating the distribution of social labour and imposing the
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proportionality of the various spheres of production operates •••
in a very much more frictional and contradictory manner than under
the conditions of competitive capitalism".(64) State intervention
does however undoubtedly become a moment in the operation of the
law of value.
E. Conclusions
I would like to frame the conclusions to this and the previous
chapter in terms of what the marxist paradigm has to offer to a
study of competition and monopoly. It was shown in Chapter 1 that
the law of surplus value can be seen as the adjustment mechanism
for capitalism, the means by which capitalism is regulated.
Throughout this thesis I have been examining the forms which the law
of surplus value takes as capitalism develops. Marxist theory has,
it seems to me, an important contribution to make in its ability to
link the changing nature of the adjustment mechanism with the
dynamic aspects of capitalism. The changing forms taken by the law
of surplus value in other words link in with what Marx called the
"laws of motion" of capitalism, the way in which accumulation has
influenced the development of capitalism. Diagram 6.6 provides a
summary of the way in which changing structural conditions are
paralleled by changing competitive strategies. Changes in the
nature of competition indicate the changing forms taken by the law
of surplus value, which in turn is expressed through the distribution
of surplus value within the capitalist class.
During the establishment of capitalism, merchant capital is the
predominant type of capital. At this stage it appears that profits
are made simply in the sphere of exchange, with merchant capital
able to buy cheap and sell deaf, (M - C - M" what Marx called
'profit upon alienation'). Competition is thus restricted to the
sphere of exchange, since the production process is outside the
control of merchant capital. Capital is however freely mobile
between the units of merchant capital since capital is not immobilised
in the production process. This free capital mobility eventually
DIAGRAM 6.6
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destroys the possibility of earning any 'profit upon alienation',
and this is one of the factors which forces money capital into
productive activity where surplus value can be obtained.
In the ensuing competitive phase of capitalism, the circuit of
capital expands to include the productive process
(M - ~~ .•• p ••• Cl - M') and profit is derived from surplus
value as shown in Chapter 2. Competition, however, primarily takes
the form of price competition in the sphere of circulation via the
realisation of surplus value. It can, as we have seen, take place
at two levels, horizontal and vertical competition, but involves
mainly market behaviour. Non-monopoly (or competitive) capital is
here the typical form taken by 'many capitals' with banking capital
ensuring a (somewhat limited) mobility of capital within and between
sectors. The tendency to form an average profit rate derives from
both levels of competition. At both levels there is what I have
called a process of 'free competition', in other words a competition
external to the enterprise, given that typically there are not
institutional connections between capitals. There are also no
institutional connections between banking and industrial capital,
and this means that the division of surplus value between the
fractions of capital is again determined through a process of free
competition.
It has been continually emphasised that competition creates its
opposite, monopoly. In the process of capitalist development, the
typical form taken by 'many capitals' becomes monopoly capital.
Non-monopoly capital continues to exist, albeit in a formation
dominated by monopoly capital. Section C spelled out the complexity
of competitive relationships which thus arise. Crucial new
phenomena are that competition actually takes the form of monopoly
and that a new level of competition, combined competition between
the units of finance capital comes into existence. The tendency to
form an average profit rate now takes place at three levels. What
is more, the institutional links formed by finance capital allow of
free capital mobility across the whole economy. Capital in general
has a real existence in financial groups. Competition now takes
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place across the economy as a whole, including not only the
realisation of surplus value, but also its production. This is
achieved through pursuing a far wider range of competitive strate-
gies which include product competition, sales promotion, diversifi-
cation and consumer manipulation. Competition unier finance
capital involves the systematic organisation of production across
spheres and industries so that competition is no way limited to the
exchange process. Combined competition is competition between
cohesive sums of self expanding capital with diversification (or
combination) as a crucial structural condition. Not only does this
involve the investment strategy of the financial group, it also
involves creating a market context where consumer habits are
continually broken down and re-created through product innovation.
This amounts to the units of finance capital seeking the most
favourable terms of growth for themselves.
The concept of finance capital is thus an important contribution
by marxists to the theory of competition which arises from the
emphasis placed within the paradigm on historical change as a
developmental process. Financial groups express a growing cohesion
within the capitalist system, and the unity of the capitalist class
is forcibly expressed in that the theoretical category of 'capital
in general' used by Marx now takes on a real existence. The
institutional phenomenon of finance capital however does require
considerably more empirical research than has been expended on it to
date by marxists. As I have already emphasised, the form taken by
finance capital and its articulated combination of the fractions of
capital will differ from one social formation to another. For
instance, to what extent is banking capital dominant within the
combination, and how is su-~lus value divided between the fractions?
Yet despite the growing cohesion created by finance capital,
capital as a social relation also creates competition. Differenti-
ation between capitals continues to exist under the monopoly phase
of capitalism, but competition takes different forms. As Panzieri
expresses it ttAccording to Marx, historically speaking, there is a
growing cohesion in the system, passing through various stages, from
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the predominance of the individual capitalist to that of the
capitalist as a simple shareholder of capital, passing through
production prices up until the appearance of social capital in the
financial form and division of profit into interest and entre-
preneurial gain. Clearly, in each of these various stages of
development, the specific forms assumed by surplus-value (i.e. the
laws of movement of capital as a whole) are distinct".(65) This
chapter and the last one have been concerned to spell out these
specific forms.
These changing forms are also visible during the 'modified
monopoly stage', when the state intervenes in the process of
competition, in addition to and alongside existing competition
between 'many capitals'. I have argued that state mediation of
competition is limited on the one hand by the profitability of the
private sector, on the other by the fact that it must work to
achieve its aims with the co-operation of private institutions.
Capital now takes on the additional form of 'state capital' which
operates in three possible ways: as state credit, as state
productive capital or as state capital as a moment in the total
circuit of finance capital. The state therefore participates in
the distribution of surplus value through the possibility that the
state may intervene at any of the three levels of competition,
whether horizontal, vertical or combined. 'Politicised competition'
therefore leads to a 'state transformation' of surplus value, with
the state becoming a moment in the operation of the law of value.
'Politidised competition' is nevertheless limited, and just as
monopoly and competition create each other in the process of
competition, so too does state intervention create its opposite,
market regulation. This is what I have called 'alternating' state
intervention in the distribution of surplus value.
Perhaps it is as well to point out once again that I have been
concerned to examine the effects of the monopoly phase on relations
within the capitalist class, and the effects on class struggle have
not been looked at. Class theory is obviously a major contri-
bution of the marAist paradigm, and it underlies much of the
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exposition of the labour theory of value in the second chapter.
For this thesis class struggle has nevertheless to a considerable
extent been taken as read. It has seemed a sufficiently large
task to examine the effects of the monopoly phase on the
capitalist class alone!
Finally, let me underline again what the marxist paradigm is
not good at. It does not have a great deal to contribute to the
study of price-formation under the monopoly phase. Nevertheless
it is able to take on board the fact that prices are indeterminate
under monopoly. For the marxist it is not surprising that the
market mechanism should prove inadequate to the task of allocating
resource,s rationally under the monopoly phase of capitalism. Yet
the marxist paradigm is well equipped to analyse the institutional
framework that has tended to replace price competition and the
market.
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CONCLUSIONS
It has been a problem for marxists that capitalism has survived
as long as it has, for much in what both Marx and Lenin wrote
implied the immanent demise of the capitalist mode of production.
Capitalism has altered its nature substantially in the century since
Marx died, and a major change that commentators have identified has
been in the nature of competition. It has then been asserted that
under the monopoly stage of capitalism the labour theory of value,
which is a cornerstone of Marx's political economy, may no longer be
applicable. My task in this thesis has been to spell out in
detail the implications of the changing nature of competition for
Marx's law of surplus value.
I have done this making use of the method of the history of
economic thought. This has enabled me to examine how far marxists
from Lenin onwards have been able to make use of and develop Marx's
concepts as a basis for analysing competition in twentieth century
capitalism. Such a method of course links in with Marx's own
methodology. Throughout, I have been concerned to identify
continuity and disjuncture in the 'filiation of ideas' (to use
Schumpeter's term) within the marxist tradition. The aim has been
to achieve a meaningful synthesis of what the paradigm has to say
about competition and monopoly. The conclusions that I have drawn
at the end of each chapter have supported the idea that the law of
surplus value remains of relevance despite the changing nature of
competition. Since detailed conclusions have been made at the end
of each chapter, what I have to say here will be relatively brief.
My conclusion that the labour theory of value retains its
usefulness relies initially on the methodological points made in the
first chapter. For Marx it is important to go behind appearances
to discover the essence of phenomena. For example the appearance
given by competition is that it contradicts the labour theorJ of
value even under competitive capitalism. This is because of what
Marx calls the 'upsidedown' nature of competition. When uncovered,
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this ambivalent nature of competition provides an example of the
dialectic at work. Yet Marx himself does not clearly develop the
twofold process by which the tendency to form an average profit rate
through competition comes about: as a movement both towards and
away from that average. With the development of capitalism the
ambivalent nature of competition is further expressed in competition
giving rise to monopoly and vice versa, with barriers between
capitals being on the one hand erected in the process of competition
and on the other hand broken down.
However, essence itself is historically transitory for Marx and
this links with an 'elasticity' and 'alter..ability' of concepts.
Essence is not fixed, but self-developing. Rather than putting
forward a theory of value, I have therefore argued that Marx is
investigating the concrete social forms of value. Correspondingly,
my emphasis has not been on a theory of competition as such, but on
the forms that competition takes. The law of surplus value does not
provide a rigidly deterministic mode of regulation for the relations
between many capitals, but retains a flexibility. This flexibility
is based on the fact that on the one hand labour lacks the substance
of value as the embodiment of labour-time since it is the subject of
production, not its object, although on the other hand labour is
regulated by the substance of value as the labour-time embodied in
the necessary means of subsistence. At its simplest the fluidity
of labour arises from work being human self-activity.
The law of surplus value derives its status as a 'general law',
and a general law cannot, by its nature, provide tight and particula-
rised statements as for example the laws of supply and demand can.
As capitalism develops the 'flexibility' of the law of surplus value
expresses itself in different ways: through a 'monopoly transfer'
of surplus value with the growth of large scale ent~rprise and
through a 'state transfer' as the state becomes involved in the
competition between many capitals. Yet the dialectical nature of
competition ensures that this flexibility has limits, since monopoly
creates competition, and state intervention creates market constraints.
Again the dialectical character of marxist methodology is clearly
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visible.
A further aspect of methodology is the historical nature of
Marx's analysis. Inherent in this method is a presumption about
historical change. This finds expression on the one hand in the
periodisation of history into modes of production and stages within
those modes. Thus, whilst Marx himself did not propose a monopoly
stage for capitalism, he provided the basic tools for its analysis.
On the other hand Marx puts forward what he calls 'laws of motion'
for capitalism; what might be better expressed as 'laws of
development' of capitalism. Importantly for this thesis, amongst
these is the law of accumulation of capital. With the development
of capitalism and the corresponding changes in the nature of
competition, accumulation takes different structural forms. 'Many
capitals' develop to become in t~~ 'monopoly capital', 'finance
capital' and 'state capital'.
Finally Marx's methodology illuminates the importance of the
level of analysis at which this study has been undertaken. For
throughout this thesis I have been attempting to show the links
between the pure theory of capitalism which Marx put forward and
which includes the labour theory of value, with the application of
those abstract concepts in concrete, stage characteristic forms.
The labour theory of value relates to 'capital in general' at an
abstract level whilst the law of surplus value provides the
regulatory procedure between 'many capitals' at a level nearer to
reality through the operation of competition. Competition is
however inherent in the nature of 'capital in general' in capital's
need for self-expansion, so that a presupposition can be made that
changes in the nature of competition will be unlikely to invalidate
the value theory of labour.
From Marx's methodology I therefore obtain a series of threads
which link many of my lines of argument. Let me now draw together
and summarise the conclusions I have reached on the changing nature
of competition and the law of surplus value. In competition the
inner tendency of capital to self-expansion appears as a compulsion
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exercised by other capitals. Competition is the process of inter-
action within the capitalist class, and it is the tendency to form
an average profit rate which provides the adjustment mechanism for
the distribution of surplus value between 'many capitals' • How
do these abstract principles appear in stage-characteristic forms?
To answer this question means analysing the changing forms of
competition and of the law of surplus value, changes which run
parallel to each other. During the accumulation process, the
institutional form taken by 'many capitals' in competition changes.
But both accumulation and competition are expressions of the inner
nature of 'capital in general', different sides of the same coin if
you like. The changing forms of competition therefore affect the
institutional forms of accumulation and vice versa.
At the time that Marx was writing, 'many capitals' took the
'non-monopoly' (or competitive) form with free competition between
them. Marx therefore saw competition to establish the average rate
of profit taking place at two levels: between firms within a sector
(horizontal competition) and between sectors or industries (vertical
competition). Surplus profits in any firm would be temporary,
and banking capital through the credit system ensured capital
mobility between sectors, albeit a far from perfect mobility. It
is therefore important to acknowledge that the formation of the
average profit rate was a tendency. (I have already pointed to
the dialectical character of this tendency as both a movement towards
and a movement away from the average profit rate.) However, as the
conclusions to Chapter 3 point out in some detail, Marx also identi-
fied certain features of competition which might be called
'transitional' in the sense that they foreshadow a potential analysis
of the monopoly stage of capitalism. In his concep~of centrali-
sation and concentration, Marx shows that in the process of accumu-
lation, competition creates its opposite, monopoly. He also
classifies 'many capitals' into fractions and indicates that there
is a further division of surplus value between banking and industrial
capital which is separate from the formation of the average profit
rate. Marx also suggests the possibility that barriers between
sectors may restrict the tendency to form an average profit rate.
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Since the turn of the century there have been sufficient changes
in the form of social relations, and in particular for my purposes,
in the forms taken by the relations within the capitalist class, to
justify the assumption of a new, monopoly stage of capitalism. In
the competitive process monopolies are established and monopoly
itself becomes a form of competition. Accumulation now takes the
form of monopoly capital. Hilferding showed in some detail how the
growth of monopolies related to the formation of the average profit
rate. On the one hand sectors characterised by monopoly can escape
submitting to the average profit rate, benefiting from a 'monopoly
transfer' of surplus value. However, monopoly barriers to competition
will also tend to create the competition (from non-monopoly capital)
that will overcome them. On the other hand the process of accumu-
lation also leads to combinations between sectors and monopoly as a
form of competition therefore calls forth competition on a new level:
combined competition between such combinations.
Thus under the monopoly stage of capitalism monopoly capital
becomes the dominant form of 'many capitals', although non-monopoly
capital subsists as both a potential aide and a potential challenge
to it. However the dominance of monopoly capital by no means
signifies that non-monopoly capital is the only source of competition,
for competition now takes place on a third level: that of combined
competition.
What is more, the tendency to form an average profit rate is
reinforced from a further direction through the competitive effect
of finance capital. Under the competitive stage of capitalism 'many
capitals' were institutionally separated from each other, and the
system relied on banking capital to achieve the requisite mobility
of capital. But under the monopoly stage of capitalism fin~~ce
capital leads to an institutional unity amongst 'many capitals'.
The fusion or merging of industrial and banking capital to form
finance capital is but an extension of the centralisation process
which initiated combinations between sectors. As I argued in more
detail in Chapter 6, competition between the units of finance capital
takes place across the economy as a whole, extending competition
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from the sphere of exchange to include the sphere of production too,
as each unit of finance capital seeks the most favourable terms of
growth for itself. The institutional links formed by finance
capital allow free capital mobility across the whole economy,
reinforcing the tendency to form an average profit rate. Financial
groups express a growing cohesion within the capitalist system, and
the unity of the capitalist class is forcibly expressed in that the
theoretical category of 'capital in general' used by Marx takes on
a real existence. State intervention itself is subject to market
constraints (see Chapter 6 section D), so that even under 'modified
monopoly capitalism' the competitive process altogether is considera-
bly more vigorous than it was under competitive capitalism. Armed
with an awareness of the forms that competition takes under the
monopoly stage, there is little doubt then, that in the twentieth
century competition has actually been reinforced. The regulatory
process therefore continues to act through the law of surplus value.
I started this thesis by asking how far a 'scientific revolution'
(in the technical sense of the term) is. needed within marxist
political economy in view of the changing problem situation as
monopoly capitalism has replaced the competitive stage analysed by
Marx. In examining what the marxist tradition has had to say about
competition and monopoly, I feel that I have been able to identify
a coherent marxist theory of competition by drawing on a series of
concepts from marxist writers that are relevant to the present
problem situation. In providing a history of marxist ideas on
competition aad monopoly, I have also been able to fashion a con-
sistent synthesis by using marxist concepts in a way which has not
been done before. I have thus brought together Marx's comments on
competition, as well as identifying the transitional elements in his
thought which might be useful for analysing later stages of
capitalism. I have drawn attention to the extensive descriptive
literature at the turn of the century concerned with the growth of
large scale enterprise and which influenced marxists. Nor am I
aware of other commentators making use of either Bukharin's analysis
of the levels of competition or of Hilferding's integration of the
formation of the average profit rate with the formation and
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supersession of barriers to competition. By using marxist metho-
dology I have been able to emphasise the 'elasticity' or flexibility
of the law of value and to draw attention to the importance of
examining the forms taken by competition. I have also been at pains
to demonstrate the dialectical nature of competition, in a way that
Marx himself did not. Other authors have relied on asserting that
the labour theory of value may not be relevant for the monopoly stage
of capitalism; throughout, my concern has been to spell out the way
in which the law of surplus value operates with the development of
the monopoly stage.
I hope that I have demonstrated that certainly in terms of
marxist methodology itself, value theory remains relevant and
applicable. However, I do not wish to argue that the marxist
approach to competition is true, rather that it is useful. Since
they are in any case abstractions, it is by their fruitfulness and
not their truth that paradigms should be judged. I argued in the
conclusion to Chapter 6 that the strength of the marxist paradigm in
a study of competition and monopoly lies in the institutional and
developmental elements that it can contribute to the tendency to form
an average profit rate. Although it is weak in the direction of
prices, the paradigm is able to take on board the fact that prices
are indeterminate under oligopoly. For the marxist it is not
surprising that the market mechanism should prove inadequate to the
task of allocating resources rationally under the monopoly stage of
capitalism. Nevertheless the marxist paradigm is well equipped to
analyse the institutional framework that has tended to replace price
competition and the market. Marxist theory has, then, an important
contribution to make in its ability to link the changing nature of
the adjustment mechanism with the dynamic aspects of capitalism.
The changing forms taken by the law of surplus value in other words
link in with what Marx called the 'laws of motion' of capitalism, the
way in which accumulation has influenced the development of capita-
lism. 'Nhat is still required is a link between this level of analy-
sis (the application of the general laws in their stage-characteris-
tic form) and the level of analysing the actual state of capitalism
using empirical material. Whilst in a history of thought approach
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I have restricted myself to the analysis of the form in which laws
apply, Appendix B points briefly to some empirical possibilities,
which would provide links with real world phenomena.
Some might argue that a concern with a marxist theory of
competition can be dismissed as a purely intellectual exercise. I
would hope not. An understanding of how competition operates under
the monopoly stage of capitalism is inevitably needed before any
changes can be suggested. An encouraging feature of the theory of
competition spelled out here is the flexibility of the law of
surplus value and the theoretical space it allows for human self
development. Our work is indeed the subject of production, and it
is creative, despite the fact that we are all limited by the power
of competition. But once we know those limits, there is no limit
to our creativity.
Appendix A: Orthodox Theories of Competition and Monopoly
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The main purpose of this thesis has been to examine the
elements of a theory of competition and monopoly contained within a
specifically marxist paradigm. It nevertheless seems important to
provide an opportunity for some comparison to be made with orthodox
theories of competition and monopoly. This appendix thus aims to
provide a general overview of the essential strands within the
orthodox paradigm. It also expands upon and provides some back-
ground to various points of comparison between the two paradigms
which are made in the main body of the thesis.
I have represented orthodox theorising on competition and
monopoly as punctuated by periodic theoretical crises occurring
approximately in the 1920's, the 1940's and again today, and
interspersed by periods of reformulation. Eroadly I have classi-
fied these re-formulations into those within the market paradigm
(i.e. what is usually termed the theory of the firm) and those
outside it. These latter subdivide into managerialist approaches
concerned with the internal organisation of the firm, growth theories
concerned with business concentration and institutional theories and
those concerned with non-price competition. Diagram A.1 provides
a summary from the classics to the 1940's, while Diagrams A2 and A3
deal with post-war developments. I have also indicated some points
of contact between orthodox and marxist theories in Diagrams A1
and A3. It is interesting to notice that the current crisis in
orthodox theories seems to point in the direction of a possible
marxist contribution and to show possibilities for fruitful cross-
fertilisation between the paradigms. Partly because of lack of
space, but also because I am primarily examining theory, this
appendix on the whole ignores empirical studies.
1. Competition and monopoly to the 1920's
a. Classics
The classical economists were particularly concerned with
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competition as a policy objective, seeking to eliminate the institu-
tional restraints on competition. For them, capitalism was a
highly imperfect new order, and they sought to break down the social
and political barriers to free competition. Monopoly was therefore
condemned as an obstruction to the workings of the invisible hand
and the free market. In theoretical terms however, the institu-
tional framework was ignored by the classics who saw the unit of the
private-property economy as the firm of medium size. J.S. Mill
provided a lone exception who did consider large scale production and
joint stock companies. Schumpeter argues that the classical
economists took free competition so much for granted that they did
not analyse it further. "So firmly were they convinced that the
competitive case was the obvious thing, familiar to all, that they
did not bother to analyse its logical content. In fact the concept
was usually not even defined".(1)
b. Neo-classics
No more than the classics did the neo-classics have a theory
of the firm. They ignored the development of the economic structure
to concentrate on the behaviour of a system with given structures.
Neo-classical economics has a very limited conception of the firm,
considering it as a single and homogeneous agent, possessing full
information. It is further assumed that each unit has the goal of
maximising profits. Neo-classical economics involved the dominance
of the market paradigm in which the theory of market price became
elevated in status with stress placed on the market allocation of
scarce resources. This involved the further assumption that
competition is an atomistic price competition. Schumpeter sees the
competitive hypothesis as containing two features: 'excluded price
strategy' and the 'law of indifference'. The former means "the
quantity produced by anyone producer is too small to affect price
perceptibly, or to admit of price strategy" while the latter means
"there cannot exist, at any moment, more than one price for each
homogeneous commodity".(2) Allocative efficiency could then be
determined using Pareto optimality criteria.
The neo-classical system (Which incidentally, Shackle called
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the Great Theory of Economics) was one finally which saw the birth
of static equilibrium theory, a theory which excluded strategy and
in which no causal process was specified. Competition was thus
very much an axiom rather than a process. Within the neo-classical
framework, equilibrium theory was approached from two directions.
General equilibrium theory derived from Walras examined the equi-
librium of the system as a whole, and, given initial quantities
of productive resources, technology and individual preferences, asked
what determines the quantities of goods produced and exchanged as
well as their prices. General equilibrium theory retained perfect
competition as an axiom, and a critique of this approach is contained
in Chapter 1, section E and section 5 below. The second approach
was that of partial equilibrium, involving the equilibrium of single
economic units, whether firms or consumers. Marshall is its most
prominent exponent, and is considered separately in section 1c.
Neo-classical economics did however also consider the case of
pure monopoly, which along with perfect competition had the advantage
of lending itself "to treatment by means of relatively simple and
(in general) uniquely determined rational schemata".(3) Edgeworth
in particular developed Cournott's work of 1838.
Schumpeter argues that the theorists of monopolistic or im-
perfect competition (see 2b below) see "pure monopoly and pure
competition as the two genuine or fundamental patterns" and so
"proceed by investigating how their hybrids work out", whereas
Marshall looked on "the hybrids as fundamental and on pure monopoly
and pure competition as limiting cases in which the content of actual
business behaviour has been refined away".(4) Let us look at
Marshall first, noting at the same time that at the turn of the
century, the descriptive writers discussed at the beginning of
Chapter 5 were describing the growth of oligopolies, trusts and
cartels in the industrial nations.
c. Marshall
Marshall prOVides a notable exception to the rest of the
neo-classical schools thanks to his concern for the institutional
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framework, and it has indeed been proposed that the theory of the
firm derives from Marshall. Loasby argues that the Marshallian
paradigm seeks a 'mechanism of evolution' and sees the Mecca of the
economist in economic biology rather than in economic dynamics.(S)
Marshall provides a richer and less mechanical view of the structure
and behaviour of the competitive firm.
For instance he introduced the idea of the life cycle of a firm,
a dynamic concept of the small firm growing to take advantage of
large scale production and then waning as entrepreneurial motivation
fades. Such a view is of course not very relevant to the modern
large corporation, whose presence in the economy was being chronicled
at just the period when Marshall was working. Firms for Marshall
were trees in the forest of industry. He also devised the concept
of the "representative firm" which was a conflation of the normal
life cycle of individual firms. The representative firms links
the historical analysis of the firm with Marshall's static, abstract
analysis of the industry.
Marshall also introduced an element of time into the analysis
of price determination by using three periods of time: the market
period was too short for an adjustment in production, the short run
allowed changes in the intensity of utilisation whilst the long run
allowed for changes in capacity. Marshall did not really deal with
long run economic change; essentially he transposed a static' system
into one of comparative statics.
Although Marshall's verbal discussion was subtle, he used the
method of static equilibrium analysis in his formal presentation.
His two phases in the study of competitive equilibrium are still
standard fare for first year undergraduate students. The first
phase deals with the equilibrium of the individual firm whilst the
second deals with industry equilibrium. For 11arshall perfect
competition thus requires the additional characteristic of freedom
of entry to the industry. It is probably because all economists
get first year lectures in micro-theory whilst few get lectures in
the history of thought that Marshall is better known for his formal
297
analysis of equilibrium under perfect competition tha~ for his
institutional contribution. "Just as Walras, more than any other
of the leaders, was bent on scraping off everything he did not
consider essential to his theoretical schema, so Marshall... was
bent on salvaging every bit of real life he could possibly leave
in".(6)
2.a. The 1930's theoretical crisis
Shackle has argued that theoretical advance can only spring
from theoretical crisis, seeing crisis as either internal or ex-
ternal. An internal crisis he sees as one where the internal
consistency of a theory is open to challenges, whilst in an external
crisis, theory does not seem able to explain reality.(7) Both
elements are present in the theoretical crisis of the 1930's over
theories of competition and monopoly. On the one hand the internal
coherence of the perfectly competitive model was challenged by
Sraffa, who argued that the assumption of perfect competition
conflicted with the notion of economies of large scale. On the
other hand, the assumptions of perfect competition and of profit
maximisation were seen to be remote from the real work of large scale
enterprises which had been observed by people like Veblen, Hobson and
Macrosty for nearly thirty years (see Chapter 5, section A).
Considerable emphasis has been placed in the history of thought on
the lack of realism arising from the perfectly competitive axiom,
what is sometimes called the "price revolutionll of Robinson and
Chamberlin. Less emphasis is given to the "managerial revolutionll
initiated by Berle and Means, which challenged the relevance of the
profit maximising assumption in large scale enterprise. The latter
did in fact challenge the market paradigm of neo-classical economics,
whilst the "price revolution" as its name implies preserved price
theory and static equilibrium analysis.
2.b. Sraffa, Robinson and Chamberlin
~Iuch has been written on the establishment of the theory of the
firm in the decade between 1925 and 1935, although Shackle is the most
admired source.(8) Sraffa's major role was in clearing the ground
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for Robinson (and Chamberlin) by proposing monopoly as a replacement
for perfect competition, rather than abandoning partial equilibrium
theory. For Sraffa in the first part of his 1926 article shows a
logical inconsistency between the assumption of perfect competition
and Ma.:=shall' s supply curve based on the law of variable propor-
tions.(9) For Marshall, supply and demand had to be independent of
each other and of the supply and demand for all other commodities.
Only the case of constant returns is consistent with the assumption
of perfect competition.
Sraffa directed his critique against Marshall, although Marshall
was actually aware of the dilemma too. The critique however did
much to undermine general equilibrium theory, since abandoning the
axiom of perfect competition makes development of the theory
impossible. Hicks actually retained the assumption of perfect
competition in order to keep general equilibrium analysis. Sraffa
himself eventually reconstructed value theory in the Production of
Commodities by Commodities.(10) Robinson and Chamberlin however
abandoned value theory for a plausible theor"J of the firm. But, as
Napoleoni puts it "even for Marshallian partial equilibrium theory,
the abandoning of perfect competition or of monopoly means the risk
of reducing economic discussion to the listing of an inexhaustible
series of particular cases".(11) This problem will be further
discussed when dealing with the next theoretical crisis, that of
the 1940's.
It is generally accepted that whilst Robinson and Chamberlin
worked separately at Cambridge (England) and Cambridge (USA) respecti-
vely and approached the theory of the firm from two different
directions, that of imperfect competition and monopolistic competition,
the outcome of their work was surprisingly similar. They both
attempted to bring partial equilibrium theory more into line with the
reality of the economic world. As Chamberlin saw it in his preface,
there had been a tendency to refine a separate body of theory for
competition and monopoly, but actual competition contained elements
of monopoly, so that the theory did not fit the facts, and in the
process theory became obscured as well. "A comparison of the
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conclusions of this book with those of pure competition
indicates that economic theory is often remote and unreal, not
because the method is wrong, but because the underlying assumptions
are not as closely in accord with the facts as they might be".(12)
Robinson sees her analysis in a perspective in which monopoly
analysis engulfs competitive analysis and she suggests starting
from the fact that every individual produced has a monopoly of his
own output, so that if a large number are selling we have a perfect
market.(13) It is widely acknowledged that the achievement of
Chamberlin's and Robinson's contributions was that they introduced
an empirically relevant set of assumptions for the firm. Both
retained the concept of an 'atomistic' industry, although Chamberlin
used the term 'group'. Despite their different approaches, both
used models in which the goods of firms are not considered identical
by various purchasers. After the 'price revolution', the theory of
the firm came to be identified with price theory, providing the
basis for the classification of markets or industries in terms of
market structures (see 4.a below).
2.c. EerIe and Means
Since I have dealt with the ideas of the 'managerial revolu-
tion' elsewhere it is only necessary here to restate that EerIe and
Means in their study of the separation of ownership and control in
large American corporations raised the question of whether the profit
motive remained operative with the new institutional framework.
Such a line of argument was backed up by some rather different research
into the way businessmen actually set prices, published in 1939.
Hall and Hitch also challenged the marginalististic behavioural rules
of the theory of the firm.(14) The 'managerial revolution' can be
seen as the precursor of the various managerial decision~making
theories of the post-war period. It thus seems curious that EerIe
and Means are not usually accorded a position in the orthodox history
of ideas on competition and monopoly.
3. 1940's theoretical crisis
I have just indicated that EerIe and Means and Hall and Hitch
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issued a double challenge to the neo-classical tradition in
questioning both the validity of the profit motive and of the
marginal method. These questions remained an issue in the ensuing
decade, providing the basis for an attack on the lack of 'realism
in process' in traditional theory as Devine et ale put i.t.(15)
But the theoretical crisis went far wider than this, although
essentially focussing on the fact that the 'price revolution' seemed
to have raised as many questions as it had solved. Firstly,
Chamberlin's introduction of product differentiation had brought up
the importance of non-price competition in addition to price
competition, but little more was done to define the concept.
A major theme in the critique of Chamberlin and Robinson's
contribution was its fragmenting effect on theory. As Shackle puts
it: 'fWhen economic theory elects to bring in imperfect competition
and to recognise uncertainty, there is an end of the meaning of
general equilibrium. Economics thereafter is the description, piece
by piece, of a collection of fragments. These fragments may fit
together into a brilliant, arrestingly suggestive mosaic, but they
do not compose a pattern of unique, inevitable order".(16) The
'price revolution' ironically sacrificed a coherent general theory
of prices.
Criticisms were not limited to the theoretical, however.
Traditional theory was still unable to deal with the real world of
interdependent oligopolies. There remained a formal requirement
that the environment to which the firm adapted was exogenously given.
But in fact "oligopoly consists in the interdependence existing
between the behaviour of the relevant set of firms. The action of
each firm changes the environment confronting every other firm lf.(17)
Triffin took this criticism to its ultimate conclusion, and
argued for a return from partial equilibrium to general equilibrium,
since monopolistic competition renders the concept of the industry
empty. "The grouping of firms into industries, and the discussion
of value theorJ within the walls of one isolated industry are
perfectly valid and adequate procedures under purely competitive
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assumptions. They are, however, antiquated and entirely out of
place in so far as monopolistic competition is concerned. Product
differentiation robs the concept of the industry of both its
definiteness and its serviceability".(18)
If we are to return to general equilibrium theory as Triffin
would wish, a further series of questions about the axioms of perfect
competition and perfect knowledge are raised by, for example, Andrews
and Loasby. These will be dealt with in section 5 below. A further
criticism of the reformulation of the theo~J of competition that did
not surface until later was that it remained strictly within a static
equilibrium framework, and no account was taken of how the concen-
tration of economic power came about, nor of its possible effects on
the economy as a whole. As Edith Penrose was to remark in 1959:
"We shall be dealing with the firm as a growing organisation, not as
a 'price- and output-decision maker' for given products; for this
purpose the 'firm' must be endowed with many more attributes than are
possessed by the 'firm' in the theory of the firm, and the signifi-
cance of these attributes is not conveniently represented by cost and
revenue curves".(19) Indeed, the focus of theory, even today,
remains directed towards the price mechanism.
In their "Introduction to Industrial Economics" Devine et ale
provide a useful outline of the criticisms that can be made of what
they call the 'traditional theory I , arguing for a reformulation after
the second world war.(20) To this reformulation I now turn.
4. Post-war reformulation
Diagram A2 summarises the elements present in the post-war
reformulation as a response to the theoretical crisis of the 1940's.
Probably the major concern has been the later views of market
structure which have centred on the problem of oligopoly (see 4.a).
I have called this the theory of the firm, part II, and it retains
the static equilibrium framework of neo-classical economics, as well
as the concern with the market paradigm and market price. The
second major area of concern is often put under the heading of
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industrial organisation and concerns theories of managerial decision
making (see a.s), This approach challenges the market paradigm and
in particular its profit maximising axiom, though it also challenges
the assumption of perfect knowledge.
Theories of growth of business enterprise challenge the static
equilibrium framework of neo-classical economics and the concept of
optimum firm size (see 4.c). This is a relatively minor strand in
post-war theorising, although work on diversification, mergers and
innovation can all be seen as highly relevant to a theory of how
and why firms grow.
The remaining strand is something. of a catch-all where I have
included a variety of challenges to the market paradigm. Important
here is the concern with non-price competition, which has gone
furthest in the concern with advertising. I have also included a
variety of institutionalist approaches to competition and monopoly,
including business historians such as Chandler and what Scott calls
the theory of industrial society (see 4.d).
Diagram A3 attempts to capture some of the interconnections
between the four broad elements I have just outlined, as well as
indicating some links with the marxist paradigm. In what follows,
there is no intention to provide an exhaustive catalogue of post-
war developments; merely to provide a classificatory outline of the
most important developments.
4.a. Later views of market structure
It has already been mentioned that the 1930's 'price revolu-
tion' did not deal with the issue of collusive oligopolies. Fellner
initiated work in this area, distinguishing two types of collusion
between oligopolies: price leadership and cartels. The latter
could either be joint profit maximising or market sharing.(21)
For the sake of completeness I have also included Sweezy's
'kinked demand curve' model of non-collusive oligopoly developed in
1939. Another approach to oligopoly was initiated by Rain who
argued that the threat of potential entry provided an explanation
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for oligopoly pricing practices.(22) Entry preventing policies
based on product differentiation, absolute cost advantage, high
initial capital requirements and economies of scale secured maximum
long-run profits for oligopolists. Bain's work has been further
developed by Sylos-Labini, Modigliani, Bhagwati and Pashigian.(23)
A third approach to oligopoly pricing is provided by Kalecki's
cost~plus analysis which challenges marginal pricing principles.
"In fixing the price the firm takes into consideration its average
prime costs and the prices of other firms producing similar
products". (24) But as Koutsoyiannis argues lithe interdependence
of firms in oligopolistic markets and the inherent uncertainty about
competitors' reactions to any course of action adopted by a firm
cannot be analysed effectively by the traditional tools of economic
theory".(25) The theory of games (used initially by Neumann and
Morgenstern in 1944) was a new line of attack on the problem, later
followed by linear programming as a further technique of analysis.
The latter has helped to bridge the gap between abstract economic
theory and practical managerial decision making. However it seems
to be generally accepted that the outcome of these new techniques
has not been as radical as had been hoped~ "Prom the economic
point of view, this theory does not seem to have much relevance
because the behaviour of the oligopolists appears to be generally
very different from that of players of parlour games, and the
similarity decreases even more when the behaviour of the 'players'
is defined in very rational terms ll.(26)
4.b. Managerial decision making theories
Two main theories of managerial decision making have been
developed since the war, managerial theories and behavioural ones.
The former accept as an axiom that managers have discretion in
determining the goals of the firm; they deviate from profit
maximisation and pursue policies maximising their own utility.
Baumol and Williamson's models have managers who are interested only
in their own utility, but Marris's model of managerial enterprise
sees managers seeking the maximisation of their own and the share-
holders' utility at the same time. Marris's model is also a theory
of growth of the firm (see 4.c below) since he argues that the
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interests of the managers and owners coincide through a goal for
maximisation of the balanced rate of growth of the firm. Managerial
models do much to shift the emphasis from how price is determined in
the market to output, and the ability of firms to use advertising to
create new needs in consumers.
The behavioural theories of Cyert and March and of Simon see
firms, not as maximisers, but as satisficers. Such theories see
firms as a coalition of groups (managers, workers, shareholders,
customers etc.) with conflicting interests. The demands of each
group take the form of aspiration levels depending largely on past
achievements. The firm then seeks to 'satisfice' i.e. to attain
'satisfactory' overall performance, as defined by the set of aspira-
tion goals. It is argued that satisficing behaviour is rational,
given the internal limitations already mentioned, and the external
limitations of information. As Devine et ale put it: "if it is
intended to aid in understanding the actual behaviour of actual firms,
it is probably desirable to incorporate realism in process; the
behavioural theory appears to be called for".(27)
4.c. Corporate growth
Two approaches to the growth of business enterprises have been
identified: stochastic and empiricist theories. The former, based
on Gibrat's 1931 work, see 'spontaneous drift' as a cause of concen-
tration. "It will be seen that under certain simple but realistic
assumptions, we must expect concentration to rise ••• simply as a
result of there being some variability in the growth rates of indivi-
dual firms" as Prais puts it.(28) Empiricist theories challenge
traditional emphasis on the concept of an optimum size for the firm,
arguing for constraints on the rate of growth of firms, and often
drawing on historical evidence.(29) Downie, Penrose and Marris are
the three major names associated with this approach. In contrast
with previous theory, the multiproduct firm is here seen as the rule
and, as Devine et ale express it, Itthe essence of this concept of
the firm is that the firm is no longer confined to a single market".
(30) Downie concentrates on the financial and demand restraints on
the growth of the firm. He sees a two way relationship between
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growth and profitability and insists on rooting the analysis of the
growth of the firm in the wider context of the competitive process.
Edith Penrose spelled out the internal managerial restraints on the
growth of the firm, whilst Marris elaborated on the financial
rest.raints.
"The essentual structure of the theorylt of growth of the firm
argue Devine et ale ltis to be found in the relationship between
growth, profitability and stock market valuation".(31) This lead
to the possibility of formal 'steady state' models, an early example
of which was Radice's. Unfortunately, as Devine et ale point out,
steady state growth models are flawed by internal contradictions.
"Steady-state growth by all firms is logically incompatible with the
assumptions required to enable steady-state growth by anyone
firm" • ( 32)
What is lacking in the modern theory of corporate growth is any
development of Downie's theory of the competitive process as a whole.
Elements of such a theory are contained in work on diversification,
mergers and innovation, all of which have close links with the growth
process. Chapter 5 in Devine et ale covers the work done in these
areas fairly comprehensively.
4.d. Non-price comnetition and institutional apnroaches
Many economists accept that with the growth of oligopoly, non-
price competition has probably become more important than price compe-
tition. Pricing practice becomes simply part of a more general
marketing strategy which also includes the design and quality of the
product, product advertising, sales and distribution activities and
the quality of service. Almost all types of non-price competition
are attempts to differentiate products, argue Marris and Mueller,
who quote research indicating that "resources devoted to gathering,
processing and disseminating information" exceed 25 per cent of GNP.
"To the extent it leads to pure redistributions of wealth, this
information has no (or at least an ambiguous) net social value".(33)
And yet, apart from advertising, non-price competition has not been
very fully investigated by economists.
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Institutional approaches to competition and monopoly are
similarly at odds with the invisible hand tradition of the neo-
classics. Such approaches are certainly not part of mainstream
orthodoxy, although Scott also distinguishes what he calls the 'theory
of industrial society' with Galbraith as a prominent advocate, from
marxist 'theories of capitalist society'.(34) The institutionalists
in many respects continue the tradition of what I called the turn of
the century 'descriptive writers' dealing with competition and
monopoly. Unlike the neo-classical mainstream, these writers pay
considerable attention to the institutional framework and to the
historical dimension. They additionally draw on the Schumpeterian
tradition as well as including business historians such as Chandler.(35)
5. Current theoretical questioning
It is obvious that an enormous amount of theoretical (and indeed
empirical) work has been done since the price and managerial revo-
lutions of the 1930's, and that great strides have been made within
the orthodox paradigm in developing theories of competition and
monopoly. Nevertheless, questions remain, and to an extent which
can, I feel, be said to amount to a theoretical crisis.
Perhaps an initial pointer is to be found in the fact that old
ideas seem to be so dominant ~~d to die so h~rd in textbooks of
economics. Thus Koutsoyiannis in the preface to her intermediate
level micro-economics text sees a gap in the established textbooks in
the field: "Mixed and capitalist economies continue to be character-
ised by increasing concentration of the industrial sector; still most
micro-texts continue to do this fact scant justice, by devoting only a
few pages to the analysis of oligopolistic behaviour. The impressive
new developments in the oligopoly front over the last two decades are
either being ignored or treated superficially in established text-
books".(36)
The essential approach of orthodox economics exemplified in the
neo-classical school, though modified, remains basically the same.
As was argued in Chapter 1, section B, where the place of the marxist
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paradigm in a study of competition and monopoly was spelled out,
the orthodox approach shows a number of contrasts with it. Thus,
firstly, modern orthodox theories of competition are still very much
dominated by micro-static equilibrium analysis. Theories of
corporate growth are both incomplete and very much in the minority.
Again, the emphasis remains non-dynamic and a-historical. The
contribution of the institutionalists is certainly not in the main-
stream of analysis. There is in addition considerable lack of
institutional framework. As I shall argue in a moment, perfect
competition remains the benchmark for orthodox theories of compe-
tition and monopoly, which also tend to see these two concepts as
opposites. Finally, despite the lack of determinate equilibrium
outcomes with collusive oligopoly, orthodoxy continues to make its
heaviest theoretical input on price theory and the theory of demand.
Whilst Marris and Mueller argue that "a large literature has now
evolved within the formal bounds of the discipline that is much at
odds with the implications of the invisible hand theorem",(37) primary
emphasis is still placed on the market paradigm.
Insofar as its essential approach remains unchanged," there is
still a theoretical crisis within orthodox economics. I have already
argued that despite the hopes offered by games theo~J and linear
programming, pricing under oligopoly remains indeterminate. This
helps to support my argument in Chapter 5 that the problems which the
marxist paradigm has with determinate pricing rules is actually a
function of the capitalist system rather than a function of an
inadequate theory.
In addition the growth of businesenterprises remains very in-
adequately dealt with. I have argued that Downie and Penrose brought
up the need for a theory of the competitive process as a whole, but
that this challenge was not taken up by later writers. Devine et ale
see a need "for a theoretical framework within which the active
attempts of oligopolistic competitors to control their environment
and dominate their rivals can be analysed".(38) In its absence
diversification, merger and innovation are not integrated within any
theoretical framework. In addition, it must of course be remembered,
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that the majority of theory is actually conducted within a static
equilibrium framework, where it is far more difficult to analyse
growth. P.W.S. Andrews was a relatively early critic who was
emphatic that writing time into a static analysis did not produce
a dynamic theory. '~e should not be su.~rised that static micro-
equilibrium analysis should turn out to be invalid, for the
individual firm is so very much in a changing world and its
behaviour is an adaptation to that fact".(39)
More recently, substantial criticisms have been levelled at two
aspects of general equilibrium theory: the axioms of perfect compe-
tition and of perfect knowledge. The latter is also relevant to the
case of partial equilibrium analysis. It is further important to
realise that it is not possible to retreat from the difficulties of
partial analysis into a haven of general analysis, as argued in the
1930's by Hicks or in the 1940's by Triffin. Thus Loasby points out
that it is logically impossible even to derive sufficient conditions
for the existence of firms from general equilibrium theory. "In
conditions -of perfect knowledge, the theory of the firm is ve~J
simple: there are no firms. The firm exists because of the costs of
handling ignorance".(40) Perfect information can only exist in
equilibrium, but equilibrium theory provides us with no answers as to
how equilibrium actually comes about.
"Competitionlf , for Loasby, "is a proper response to ignorance".
(41) Competition is then a process and not a state, meaning that
perfect competition exists only as the description of a state for,
Ifcompetitive equilibrium requires pre-reconciled choice; and there
is no reason to expect any mechanism capable of this pre-reconcilia-
tion. Thus competition implies ignorance, as non-economists have
always believed: competition is not a state of equilibrium, but a
process of searchlf.(42) Loasby ends his critique with a proposal
for abandoning the interconnected notions of optimality, equilibrium
and determinacy, and embarking on investigating an on-going process
instead.
Finally, in addition to the theoretical difficulties already
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outlined, orthodox economics also faces the question of what is
relevant policy towards competition and monopoly. Here, as Marris
and Mueller point out, perfect competition tends to be retained as the
benchmark despite three quarters of a century of oligopolistic power.
"Under the invisible hand theorem, Pareto optimality emerges as a
beneficial side-effect of the pursuit of profit through a process of
costless price competition".(43) What also becomes very noticeable
in any consideration of policy is that orthodox theory has very little
to say about the role of the state in the competitive process. It
is perhaps because it makes policy prescriptions so much easier that
there has been such a desire for determinacy amongst orthodox theore-
ticians. Eut as Devine et ale point out, an analysis of modern
capitalism as an integrated system might in fact allow of an expla-
nation of actual policies pursued. "The study of the interaction
between monopolistic firms' strategies and structural change in the
economy can also contribute to understanding the new orientation of
economic policy which is induced by the development of the system.
In fact we shall get beyond neo-voluntarism in the approach to the
problems of economic policy".(44)
In conclusion, I think it can be argued that the continuing
theoretical crisis within the orthodox paradigm points towards a
valuable role for the marxist approach to competition and monopoly as
spelled out in this thesis. There have indeed been a number of
individuals who have contributed to both paradigms already: Diagram
A3 shows some of them, including Steindl, Kalecki and Sweezy. There
is no doubt, of course, that the orthodox tradition has contributed
a great deal to theories of competition and monopoly. It is however
the gaps and weak spots of the orthodox tradition that marxists are
particularly well equipped to help fill: institutional and historical
dimensions, and the analysis of the competitive process as a whole,
including the role of the state and international considerations.
Is the marxist tradition sufficiently alive and well to make such a
contribution? The potential is there, although the orthodox
paradigm has also done something to respond to its critics. Alfred
Eicher's work is probably the major example here.(4S)
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Appendix B: The Empirical Possibilities
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In the course of developing the theoretical aspects of the
relation between the changing nature of competition and the law of
surplus value, a variety of conclusions have emerged which indicate
the possibility either of empirical proof or of empirical backup.
The most fundamental requirement is for an empirical programme which
will demonstrate the form which the law of surplus value takes with
the development of the monopoly stage of capitalism, so as to
clarify the changing relation between individual capitals and
'capital in general'.
As I see it, such an empirical task could be approached from
three different directions. The first would be to attempt a
demonstration of the tendency to form an average profit rate between
individual sectors of the economy. Since the formation of an
average profit rate is but a tendency, such a demonstration would
need to extend over a substantial period of time (probably a century
or so). The empirical testing of the continued applicability of the
law of surplus value to the monopoly stage of capitalism would
require studies of the relationship between prices and value in
individual sectors of the economy. There has to date been no
empirical attempt (so far as I am aware) to measure the organic
composition of capital, the rate of surplus value and the rate of
profit of individual sectors of the economy. To show that the
individual industry conformed to the law of surplus value it would
be necessary to compare the organic composition of capital of that
industry with the organic composition of capital for the economy as
a whole, since only in the case of an industry with an average
social composition of capital will the mass of surplus value equal
the mass of profits. It would then be known whether the surplus
value created in the industry is transferred via the average rate of
profit to other industries, and if the whole process is considered
over time, the tendency to form an average profit rate overall.
A second approach would assume that total s~~lus value is equal
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to total products within the system, and would then proceed to
examine or measure what I have called the 'monopoly transfer'.
Surplus profits may mean that there is a divergence between the
profits of monopoly capital and non-monopoly capital, albeit, as I
have suggested, not a permanent surplus profit. A 'monopoly
transfer' can take place at two levels: within sectors and between
sectors. In the theoretical exegesis this has been associated with
different forms of competition - horizontal, vertical and combined
competition. The latter of course occurs only with the monopoly
stage of capitalis~.
The empirical efforts of non-marxist economists which were
examined in Appendix A simply deal with the 'monopoly transfer'
within sectors. Bain's limit pricing model, in which a distinction
is made between the limit price and the competitive price, deals with
the conditions for the creation of barriers to entry within an
industry. This is useful as far as it goes, though the marxist
paradigm is more interested in profit levels than in monopoly versus
competitive pricing. But what of vertical and compounded competi-
tion? Bain simply deals with the state of potential competition
within a sphere, i.e. at the level of horizontal competition. Thus
he deals with the entry of new firms, but excludes the case of
already established firms entering new lines of production. Market
classifications, pertaining as they do to the sectoral level alone,
do not relate to the special features of the monopoly stage of
capitalism.
How then is one to identify areas between sectors in which
lasting surplus profits are being made? One needs to examine the
conditions for the creation, maintenance, modification or collapse of
barriers across sectors as well as within them. This in turn
requires identification of those areas of the economy where monopoly
capital is operating and those where non-monopoly capital is the rule.
This leads to a further empirical need; that of an extension of the
descriptive work of the monopoly stage of capitalism and the changing
nature of competition. However, were these areas to be readily
identified, empirical work on the 'monopoly transfer' and the
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earning of temporary surplus profits across sectors could then be
embarked upon.
What the two broad alternatives to an empirical approach have
so far failed to do is to emphasise competition and monopoly as two
concurrent features of the monopoly stage of capitalism. There is
not merely a tendency towards equalisation of profit rates, there is
a tendency towards differentiation at the same time. Both monopoly
and competitive prices are the result of a process of approximation
operating within the mechanism of the average profit rate. A third
possible empirical approach might resolve this problem by illus-
trating the theoretical themes through consideration of the
functioning of two related industries over a fairly substantial
period of time (say one century), aiming at a sectoral marxist
analysis of the law of surplus value, thus taking into account that
it is scarcely manageable to consider the operation of the law of
value for a whole economy.
How might such an illustration proceed? Essentially what I
envisage would be a sectoral analysis of the law of value, the aim of
which would be to clarify the relation between individual capitals
and 'capital in general'. As has been shown earlier in the thesis,
Marx himself is emphatic that the important thing about the law of
value is to show how it works; so that theoretical understanding
needs to be complemented by demonstrating the application of the law
of surplus value via the competitive process. There has not, as far
as I am aware, been a sectoral marxist analysis of the law of value,
and such a piece of work would help to develop a framework for
further analysis.
Any wish to illustrate the operation of the law of value under
the monopoly stage of capitalism would come face to face with a
problem of manageability. Consideration of its operation for a
whole economy is not feasible, and would never get beyond generali-
sations. Yet, there is a need to pick a sufficiently comprehensive
section, and it is apparent that even under competitive capitalism,
as Marx considered it in ":Das Kapital fl , a sphere of the economy
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would be more significant than a single industry. Under the
monopoly stage it becomes still more important to consider a sphere
rather than a single industry. Palloix provides justification for
this approach when he contrasts marxist usage of the sector and the
department with orthodox concepts of the firm and the branch.
Orthodox analysis breaks economic reality down by the use of the
concept of the firm (with multinationals as gigantic examples of this
undifferentiated genus), but through an empirical consideration of
the product, the concept of branch or sector is superimposed. In
contrast asserts Palloix, the branch has a theoretical content for
marxists, expressing the exigencies of valorisation on the one hand
and of production and exchange (through the tendency towards
equalisation and differentiation of profit rates) on the other.(1)
What sector should be chosen for such an illustration? For
a number of reasons the energy sector seems best. A.~ obvious
starting point is the importance of energy in a modern economy, where
energy usage gives a significant measure of the development of an
economy. The coal and oil industries are part of Marx's Department I
in which production of the means of production takes place and where
energy is an important component of the circulating part of capital,
whilst at the same time it is an essential consumer good in
Department II. In the second place information on this sector is
relatively easily available. Thirdly, coal and oil provide
contrasts in terms of being old and new industries respectively, the
former being competitive in its origins, the latter monopolised from
the start, whilst post-war there have been combinations between the
two. Unevenness of development between the two industries is an
obvious feature, and the involvement of the state has taken
contrasting forms.
Such an illustration would have two main aims; the first of
which would be to illustrate the changing nature of competition 1L~der
the monopoly stage as already theoretically outlined, the second
being to illustrate the changing mode of operation of the law of
surplus value. To demonstrate the changing nature of competition
it will be necessary to provide a clear descriptive interpretation
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of the key elements indicated by the theoretical considerations.
Much of the choice of material could draw on the framework of Varga
and Mendelsohn's "New Data for Lenin's Imperialism" (2) and it
would basically be concerned to update the material which they
provide for the coal and oil industries to the present day,
expanding it in certain respects.
This descriptive study could be complemented by a quantitative
consideration. It is probably reasonable to assume that the coal
industry was initially competitive, whilst the oil industry started
as monopolised. The 'monopoly transfer' could then be studied within
the coal industry on the one hand, and between the coal and oil
industries on the other. In the first place, however, a comparison
with the economy as a whole would be needed. It is only in the
case of an industry with the average social composition of capital
that the mass of surplus value will equal the mass of profits, i.e.
that there will be no transfer of surplus value to or from the
industry. A comparison of the organic composition of capital for
the economy as a whole would therefore be needed to know whether the
surplus value created in the industry is transferred via the average
rate of profit to other industries (or vice versa). It would also
be useful to compare the rate of profit and the rate of surplus value
for the energy sector and the economy as a whole. Based on such
an overall comparison of the situation in the energy industry with
the economy as a whole, it should then be possible to determine how
far there is a 'monopoly transfer' to or from the energy sector
relative to the economy as a whole, and how far this situation has
changed over time. If the period 1850-1975 were taken, would there
be any times at which the organic composition of capital of the
energy industry was equal to the average social composition of
capital?
Having determined the overall relative position of the energy
industry, attention could then be concentrated on the 'monopoly
transfer' between the coal and the oil industry and within each
industry. This would involve calculating the three marxist ratios,
the organic composition of capital, the rate of surplus value and the
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rate of profit in each industry and for firms within each. Results
would then show any transfer of surplus value within and between
the industries. Would a tendency to form an average rate of
profit over time be shown, or would temporary surplus profits
prove to be long lasting? It is to be hoped that the descriptive
material on centralisation and concentration etc. collected for
the illustrative section would assist in providing an explanation
for the results obtained. Inevitably, however, as the first
such attempt at a sectoral marxist analysis, the results and in
particular the explanations put forward for them would have a
certain tentative quality.
Footnotes to Aupendix 3
1. See Palloix (1975) p. 109.
2. See Varga and Mendelsohn (n.d.).
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